Showdown: ILP vs. ILO Finale

Out of curiosity, Pav, how much merit do you think ILO’s definition of universal morality actually has? On the one hand, I find it ridiculous, because morality is generally taken as a motivator, and that definition cannot motivate. On the other hand, I don’t think people push morality for any reason other than to get what they want. It seems like the conventional understanding of morality presents an impossible standard, and that ILO just tried to transcend and defy the conventional understanding, since a discussion within that understanding would have been hopeless.

I think that is an oversimplified understanding of want, but I guess I’m supposed to redefine “want” along with ILO and use it as a catch all for every human motivator. I would have to be convinced to do so, rather than just forced to by some underdeveloped sentence that compelled it on all of us unconsciously. But, It lacks explanatory power because it lacks complexity, I would be unable to even explain the inner motivations of myself let alone try to universalize them out to the entire species. A binary account of want doesn’t accurately describe the human condition.

The problem ofcourse is that It doesn’t make sense for the reason I pointed out in my previous post. Different motivators come into conflict all the time, and the human is not a binary creature that has just one sort of motivation in only one sort of intensity. The two motivators I used were values and attitudes, and I gave a very plausible account of how my attitude is felt more intensely than this sort of “in the back of my mind” values, but I am ultimately moved by my values to action. I don’t think any of us can deny that the desire to stay in bed when we’ve stayed up too late is NOT more intense than the nagging feeling we have that we ought to go to class even though we don’t have to. Yet, occasions occur when we are moved by that nagging feeling. The answer is that we have either previously decided to be motivated by our values over our more intense baser wants and desires, we are moved to action out of habit, or we find motivation from values qualitatively superior to motivation by quantitatively superior attitudes. Your platitude is incompatible with all three of these answers, it cannot account for human behavior.

I should have anticipated your response, but the surprise gave me a good laugh, so thank you for that. Your response was in keeping with the ILO position, but it didn’t address the difficulties I laid out. Instead it was a descriptive statement that is folk psychological. Focusing on the problem of satisfying multiple “wants” is a problem dear to folk psychology, and saying the most intense wins out is an answer dear to folk psychology, so as per usual your answer is immediately understood and seen as the right answer. But it addressed neither the point that was made, nor made sense beyond a immediate guttural agreement.

That’s exactly what we did, attempted to transcend the conventional standard. That’s what we had to do. Let’s assume for a second that ILO (As a team) could come up with one thing so vile and wrong that no human being would be capable of doing it, even if we were to do that it wouldn’t be a Universal Morality, per se, but simply a Universal Moral, and one Moral does not a Morality make.

Just for the sake of argument, even if Team ILP were to accept a single Moral as an entire Morality, the fact that no human could do the thing described still would not prove anything. The very fact that someone could think of an example of something that no person could ever do indicates that someone could actually conceivably do it, because for a thing to be inconceivable one must not even be able to think about it.

So, the next strategy is to take it the other way because morality usually entails not doing something that could be construed or generally regarded as bad, but then what if we could come up with something Universally regarded as good that virtually everyone does as a matter of course? It still wouldn’t matter because there are certain groups of people (i.e. mentally handicapped) that it could still probably not be applied to.

So, we pretty much had to change the terms of the entire Debate which required an overhaul on what is construed as Morality. With the path we chose, it actually 180’ed the argument and made it near-impossible for ILP to argue against us because the nature of our argument was self-contained, how can anyone possibly help but do whatever it is they are going to do when they must always be doing something?

So, that makes the very doing of anything moral, or even the doing of nothing because inaction is still a form of action.

Anyway, we basically had to go with that, and the fact that immorality (under our definition) doesn’t actually exist (or cannot exist) isn’t really important because it has nothing to do with there being a morality. That would be like saying that God cannot be Universal without there simultaneously being no God, that makes no sense.

Anyway, some Debates without clearly defined bounds work much like a legal trial works. It is largely about controlling definitions and terms of the argument. Even though laws are written to avoid ambiguity many of them are ambiguous, especially when it comes to proper sentencing, so there is a lot of argument that has to go on there. In this case, though, the bounds were pretty clearly defined, so it was the bounds themselves that had to be changed, a paradigm that needed to be shifted.

So, to answer the question do I really believed what ILO described to be the Universal Morality. Probably not, but it is just as good as there not being a Universal Morality, either way, the end result is the same people do whatever they think is best for them to do at the time.

Does 2 + 2 = 4 lack explanatory power because it lacks complexity?

Values and attitudes, but then everything is also situational. Let’s posit the values for a second, because I think that is what you were intending to do in the first place. The question then becomes, why is the person with these values motivated to skip class?

Is it because the person was up all night studying for an exam in that very class? It could be, but then skipping class defeats completely the very reason that they put themselves into a position to want to skip class in the first place. As a result, the person is almost definitely going to go to class because the person does not want to waste all that effort studying and then fail a test by not showing up.

On the other hand, maybe the person is very studious, but decided to have a wild night for a change of pace and is seriously hungover with a bad headache. This person is motivated not to go to class because he will not only worsen his headache, but even though he attends the first class he may not get that much out of it. However, if there is a later class for him to attend, he might be able to get himself into good physical condition for that one by fully sleeping off his drunk.

Anyway, none of your answers work because they are all one or the other, or constitute pre-planning.

1.) “previously decided to be motivated by our values over our more intense baser wants and desires.”

That’s a good rule of thumb and I am sure it applies to many people, but the way you define it prevents it from being situational. It’s something that we can do as a rule, but occasionally we will still act in opposition to our values.

2.) “we are moved to action out of habit”

Nope, doesn’t account for one-time decisions for which no habit has been formed.

3.) “find motivation from values qualitatively superior to motivation by quantitatively superior attitudes.”

What?

Duck test, observation, personal experience?

The fact is (whether the fact constitutes a Universal Morality notwithstanding) that everything that we do (or don’t) by our own volition we do because we wanted to do it. We’re confronted with choices every day. I generally like Life more that I like Kix, I think Life is the superior breakfast cereal, but maybe I wake up one day and I want Kix. Maybe I want eggs.

I don’t know. It seems to me that people do what they most want to do at any given time when what they most want to do is feasible, it strikes me as obvious. There are reasons and there are reasons for those reasons and it’s all pretty much cause and effect.

Some things will make a person shelf their values for a time, some things won’t.

I’m not sure what to do with your post. You seem to think that I’m offering some behavioral theory of everything, but all I am doing is pointing out examples that show why “do what you want most” doesn’t properly describe all human behavior. What this means is that I don’t have to account for all human behavior, nor do I in anyway intend to, claim to, or want to, all I have to do is show examples where “do what you want most” doesn’t apply.

I’ve taken it a little further in order to debunk the less strict original formulation of “do what you want” by claiming that it is too simple to describe human behavior because it is using “want” as a catch all, but humans have multiple distinct motivators.

That is not to say that cases don’t exist where “do what you want” applies, as in when the only motivators at work are immediate desires. There are plenty of cases, like when I know I want to drink soda but have the choice of mountain dew or coke. The only thing that weighs on this decision is my immediate want. In such a case we can describe my behavior with “do what you want”, but only because the relevant motivators have the same origin.

Anyway, you’ve contradicted yourself and admitted that “do what you most want” doesn’t work as a universal because examples exist in which it doesn’t describe our behavior.

I would argue further that you’ve also conceded that “do what you want” doesn’t make sense when “want” is a catch all for all human motivators because you employed distinctions among motivators in your last post, but that might still be up in the air.

I think the example you chose at the end of your post to describe “want” pretty much sums up the story of your post. It is a folk psychological example that is overly simplistic and misses the complexities of human motivators in more complex cases. Yet, for some reason, it is seen as the archetypal case that can be universalized out to all examples. It’s a very curious thing, to watch it in action.

Show me a situation where doing what someone most wants to do out of all available options does not come into play.

How does a motivator, as you put it, not result in a want? If it doesn’t result in a want, how is it a motivator?

A want is a type of motivator, it doesn’t make sense to say “result” in reference to the relation

And if you decide to say that there is only one type of motivator and it is called “want”, despite the reasons I gave for not doing so, then the ILO position becomes “we are motivated to action by what motivates us”. Such a statement says nothing.

Ok, so a want is a type of motivator, I’ll work with that. Other types of motivators could be needs or values and of course there are others. So, we understand that any of these motivators, whether collaboratively or individually result in us taking a certain action. However, we want to take this action in order to satisfy these motivators.

So it is not saying, “We are motivated to action by what motivates us,” or, “We are motivated to want by our wants,” and you are correct that such statements say nothing. Basically, what it is saying is that we want to take a certain action as a result of these motivators, whatever they may be, and that is a seperate thing. Essentially then, we are wanting two things, the first of which is the initial want or the desire to satisfy the initial value, the second thing is that we want to determine and implement an action that will satisfy the initial want or value.

These are two completely different things, even though they may seem like they are the same thing. What I mean by this is that it is theoretically possible to want something while not taking the necessary action to get it, in this event, the want by itself is not enough of a Motivator. Since it is not enough of a Motivator, we do not do what is necessary to satisfy the initial want, or in other words, we do not want (For whatever reason) to take action that will satisfy the initial want. What this means is that the taking of an action to satisfy a different want, or inaction, apparently satisfies a separate Motivator having more of an affect on us (Qualitatively or Quantitatively, or both) than the unsatisfied want mentioned above.

Or, in simpler terms, there is something that we want more.

In a case where we take the action, which means we wanted to take the action, to satisfy a want as a Motivator, it means the want was enough of a Motivator to take that action.

At the end of it all, it is simply a matter of Motivation to take a certain action, or to not take action. Therefore, the choice between two (or more) individual or collective sets of wants/needs/values/habits that we make and take action to satisfy results in a separate want altogether which is wanting to take action to satisfy the Motivator.

For an example of this, let’s look at something that I do not want to do vs. something that I would like to do. I would like to go play a round of golf, but at the same time, I would not like to do the gardening.

If I refrain from doing the gardening in favor of playing golf, I will get bitched at by my wife. Even though I don’t want to do the gardening, I want even less to get bitched at by my wife, so now it is time to decide which action to take.

For the purpose of simplicity in stating my point, I am going to assign values to these thing and present two different scenarios. In scenario A, not doing the gardening (which is a want, by the way, it is a want to not do something) I will assign a value of five, I will assign getting bitched at by my wife a twenty-five and a round of golf a ten.

So, I could go golfing (10), not do the gardening (5), but get bitched at by my wife (-25) which results in a total of negative ten. I could do the gardening (-5) and not get bitched at by my wife (25), but I sacrifice the golfing (negative ten) for a total of ten. Finally, I could not go golfing (negative ten) not do the gardening (five) and still get bitched at by my wife (negative -25) for a total of negative thirty.

With the scores assigned to each outcome, it is obvious that (in order) the best results for me are as follows:

1.) Gardening: Yes Golfing: No Bitched At: No
2.) Golfing: Yes Gardening: No Bitched At: Yes
3.) Gardening: No Golfing: No Bitched At: Yes

Now, if I change the value of golfing to a positive thirty, let’s see how the possibilities above score:

1.) Negative Ten
2.) Ten
3.) Negative Fifty

In the first case, my Motivators (Laziness, Wanting to Golf, Not Getting Bitched at) are most satisfied by doing the gardening, not going golfing and not getting bitched at. When the value of golfing changes, my Motivators are most satisfied by golfing, not doing the gardening and getting bitched at.

These are Value Equations that we do in our head everyday. Although it may be true that we do not assign a specific numerical value to all of these things, we do attempt to come up with probable results of our actions mentally before determining which action to take at any given time. As we are determining what action to take, all of these Motivators are swirling through our head and the goal is to take whatever action either Quantitatively satisfies the most Motivators (Assuming all present Motivators carry an equal value) or Qualitatively satisfies the most Motivators (Assumes a different value for at least two of the motivators, as in the example above.)

As a result, we will take whatever action is necessary to satisfy what Motivates us the most, that becomes the action that we want to take, and in some cases, the action that we need to take. To conclude, the Universal Morality is to take whatever action most satisfies our wants and/or needs and it is something that all people do which is what makes it a Universal to begin with.

Your turn.

I should also add that the specific value rankings of Motivators will differ on an individual, and even on a same-person basis, and that is the reason why some people deem the actions of others to be immoral. It is also the reason why that a certain action in a certain situation may be deemed immoral by a specific person at one point in time, but may be deemed completely moral by that same person at a different point in time.

However, these valuation differences do not result in actual immorality, but merely the perception of immorality. This perception comes about because we judge the actions of others against what we ourselves would do, however the Value of Motivators that we assign ourselves are only differing from the Value of Motivators that the other person is assigning himself/herself. Therefore, the perception of immorality (or even that of superior Morality) that one person places upon another has absolutely nothing to do with the actual Morality of the action taken by the other person.

It’s hard to tell, but you seem to be discussing second order volitions. There is no reason to think that everything we do is subject to second order volitions or that wants are the only motivators present during second order volitions. We are all wanton to a certain degree. And as it happens, the ideas I’m offering are most powerful as a response to the problem of second order volitions.

I want to smoke because I’m addicted to nicotine, but I am aware of the concequences it causes to my health so I don’t value this want. Now we could say I don’t want to want to smoke, but we wouldn’t really capture what is going on within me because, in this example, two different motivators are at play. An immediate want that unconsciously compels me to smoke, and then the relation between a higher cognitive processes and my values that makes me disvalue smoking. If we say I don’t want to want we are forced into equivocation or unnecessarily vague language. It is simply a very poor way to describe my behavior if I am ultimately motivated by my second order value to quit smoking.

Or consider an example where wants come into direct contradiction with each other. Let’s say I want to smoke because I’m addicted, but I don’t want to smoke because it makes my house smelly. Let’s further say that each of these wants is of identical intensity and I want to want to do both. It is plausible that I am so torn between my wants that it resonates infinitely to any order of desire we wish to investigate. I want to want to want to want…to do both. Your theory cannot account for how I decide which path to pursue, infact it further says that I will never be able to be moved to action at all. I am stuck at an impasse of wants for all eternity. Yet, when situations like this do arise, we clearly pick one path like it is the natural path and don’t really even realize what obvious peril we were in. On the other hand, what I have been putting forward has no problem at all in dealing with the situation. It answers with values, or attitudes, or explanatory coherence of past behavior ect.

First Paragraph:

I agree, but earlier I said that want is not the only Motivator. It is the Motivator of want, or any other Motivator, that makes a person take an action. In other words, we want to do everything that we do, we have to want to do it. It is the Motivators that make us want to take an action, so in that sense, everything is want.

Even simple things, if I take my arm and rest it on my desk (as opposed to the arm of my chair) when I read your post, it is because I wanted to do that.

Second Paragraph:

I would have to say that you don’t want to want to smoke. It makes sense. You must want to smoke, otherwise you would either not want to smoke, or you would be neutral to smoking. The only work-around to it is to say that you want nicotine, but not to smoke, but that must not be the case or you would use chewing tobacco or a nicotine patch. In the end, you can’t both want to smoke and not want to smoke, so you want to not want to smoke.

Third Paragraph:

It’s a very difficult example for me to answer, but it’s also a very unusual situation. The fact that we take (or don’t take) action theoretically indicates one need superceding another. Even if it did not, one action (or inaction) might be taken for the purpose of it being easier. For instance, in your second paragraph example, it might be easier for you to smoke than not. It’s still tough to imagine two wants having identical Motivators, especially when you consider the fact that an entire lifetime can go into making a person experience one want due to cause/effect.

Even if it worked, I don’t think this extra “want” step adds anything to understanding our behavior. In fact, I think it takes away from it. There is a serious sense in which we don’t want to do many actions that we perform, but we do them anyway in order to achieve things we want in the future or avoid other things we don’t want. And I certainly don’t experience this struggle as you have described it, and I don’t think you do either. There are multiple motivators at play, and the motivator that we have been calling “want” can be strongly opposed to an action but be overrided by a value. I find it extremely silly to say in such circumstances that we wanted to perform that action, when the motivational want was a “not want”. The description freely equivocated.

Further, you fail to give any serious causal or behavioral power to this second step “want” to begin with, so it cannot hope to help explain our behavior. It’s this irrelevant add on, an afterthought, or an “oh yeah”. It’s supposed to be like this psychological rationalization, yet it is oddly applied to cases even when we not only don’t recognize a want, but recognize a distinct and powerful “not want”. If you expect me to put a “want” on every action anyone performs ever, contrary to their first person experience of that action, you better make a powerful argument for it and it better add some sort of explanatory coherence to that persons behavior. The fact is that it does neither. Also, if you expect to make a morality out of it, it has to effect behavior in some way, and this second step “want” clearly does not.

Let me, for a moment, hold all of that in abeyance so I can ask if even if I assume it makes sense, does it work. There are two immediate reasons why it doesn’t, two cases that it cannot account for.

  1. Involuntary or unconscious action

  2. I am at home and I want to go out tonight, but I want to go out with a girl I met. She told me earlier in the day that she would call me. She is honest, so I am justified in believing I am going out with her tonight, I fully intend to go out with her tonight, and I want to go out with her tonight. I fall asleep waiting for her to call, she never calls, and I wake up the next morning having not gone out the night in question.

Now initially the point of attack seems to be the fact that I wanted to go out with her but never did. But the actual point to be made lays in analysis of why I stayed home. What is immediately appearant is that this is not a classic case of willed inaction, as when I stay home and do nothing because that’s what I intend and want to do. It cannot be said that I wanted to do nothing that night, because that clearly wasn’t what I wanted, and because I was at no point ever motivated to stay home all night to begin with. Yet, assuming your theory is true, I am forced to say either than I wanted to stay home or that I acted immorally. Niether of these answers is acceptable.

“In order to achieve things in the future or avoid other things we don’t want.” Like I said in my initial Debate post, not wanting to do something or wanting for something not to happen is still a want. That’s all a matter of whether you are wanting to express it in the positive or the negative, but any want can be expressed in the positive or negative.

With relation to achieving things in the future, that means that we want for certain things to be achieved in the future. Pointing this out only furthers the point that I was trying to make, the only way that it furthers your point is if you are somehow suggesting that a Motivator can only be satisfied by immediate action. That’s not true, though, for instance if someone wants to pay off their house and they owe $40,000 on the mortgage but do not have $40,000 at the time, but continue to make payments of $1,000/month they are still acting to satisfy the want of owning the house.

To clarify, the want itself is to commit a certain action, whereas a Motivator can be a value, want, need or anything else that you can think of. Just because a Value is a greater Motivator than a want does not mean that we do not want to take action to satisfy the value, otherwise we would not take it.

Simply stated, the person in this example WANTS to satisfy their values prior to their wants.

Are you trying to insinuate that satisfying our Motivators (or even having Motivators to begin with) does not affect our behaviour?

Once again, a not want is actually a want just expressed in the negative.

The first person experience of the action is that the person commits the action, unless there are no alternatives whatsoever but for the person to commit the action, then the person wanted to commit the action.

First off, define this or give examples. I’m not trying to be a smartass, but Judging from our conversation thus far I imagine that we define these two terms differently, and I want to argue from the perspective of your definition.

Because if we go with mine, I’m just going to say that nothing that we do is truly involuntary or unconscious, it is just that we are not consciously aware of the part of our brain that consciously performs the action. Do you think our hearts beat involuntarily or unconsciously? I don’t, it’s far too complicated of a process to take place unconsciously.

You wanted to go out with the girl, but in order for that to happen the girl had to call. She never called and you fell asleep waiting for her to call. Due to the fact that you wanted to receive her call and chose to wait for her call at home, you effectively wanted to stay at home.

In other words, because she never called you were never in a position to satisfy the Motivator of going out with her, it’s like flying of your own power, you may want to do it, but it is not an option. The Motivator you were satisfying is waiting for the call, which (within the confines of your example) you either chose to do at home or had to do at home.

Phaedrus,

8!!???

A F*^$#$^ing 8???

See if I ever choose you as a Judge again!!!

J/K

Actually, now that all of the Judging and everything is said and done, I will reveal the argument Team ILO was most afraid of that I was surprised to see not come out:

Severely mentally handicapped people.

Obviously, some people are mentally handicapped to the extreme that they may not, “Want,” anything in a certain sense of the word and are unable to recognize their needs, let alone fulfill them. The only argument that Team ILO could have countered with is that they do it to whatever extent that they can, but “Whatever extent that they can,” coming into play pretty much means it fails to qualify as a Universal.

Anyway, I’m kind of glad that didn’t come out, we pretty much knew before I had even posted that us having any chance in the Debate whatsoever depended on that not being brought up. However, with the terms of the Debate, that brought us from no chance to a slim chance, so at least it was an improvement!

I thought it was a very interesting debate. Personally I felt that ILP did more to prove their case and impose their definition upon the debate, but I did feel the unorthodox tactics of the ILO team got them a bit out of their comfort zone. Congrats to ILP on a hard fought round and congrats to ILO on the victory.

Yeah, ILO did astoundingly well given their task. I think everyone involved in the debate would reject a universal morality outside of the debate, so it is greatly to their credit that ILO mustered any case at all, let alone one so interesting and engaging, if ultimately unconvincing :wink:

Congrats to ILO, and thanks to everyone involved.

I meant that to be my closing argument because I feel we are going in circles and there isn’t much left to be said, but out of town and bored, so giddy-up.

I agree, but that wasn’t really the point. The point is that I can recognize myself as very distinctly not wanting to B, but end up performing B anyway. I can identify with wanting “not B” before I perform B, as I perform B, and after I perform B. I can, in accordance with normal human behavior, ask myself why in the hell I’m doing it, given how miserable it makes me, and identify the motivator as habit, value, attitude, or consistency. Yet, according to you, all motivators have this sort of second step “want” that has no efficacy, and as best I can tell isn’t much more than a psychological rationalization. The problem, as I tried to point out in my last post, is two fold. First, if someone told me I actually wanted to perform B, I would look at them like they are crazy, and tell them I was motivated by other things. Second, and closely related, is the fact that there is an equivocation involved in which this second step “want” is something different than the motivator want. I can’t help but wonder what the point of this second step “want” is. It has no causal power because it is the result of motivators, I don’t identify with it, and it is sufficiently ambiguous that one could interpret it as almost anything. It leads to reduced explanatory coherence and adds nothing to understanding our behavior. Yet I continue to bother to argue against it.

The best I can tell is that “you do what you want” means something completely different from what you’re saying, and while I have no problem disabusing myself of the intricacies of your position, when I see that platitude I instantly identify with it because it’s a catch all that includes many ideas, one of which is, you are motivated to perform actions you are motivated to perform. Something that my theory holds as true, but explores in a way that is more restrictive than simply “you do what you want”.

This has become manifest in your explanation of the many examples that have come up in discussion. While they are plausible in a general way, they ultimately fail to explain the behavior involved in the narrative and miss critical nuances. For example, in response to the last scenario I gave, you wrote:

Now, it is immediatebly plausible because I did infact stay at home, which would suggest that I was motivated to do so and wanted to do so, but at no point in the scenario did I ever intend to stay at home But, without going into why this means I cannot possibly have been motivated to stay at home which entails, for you, that I couldn’t have wanted to stay at home, something fishy emerges. You are trying to have it both ways. In that same post you go on about how future plans mean you’re motivated by future wants and motivators don’t have to be satisfied by immediate action.)

This should lead you to analyze my example as me trying to satisfy the motivator of going out with the girl, as you did in the mortgage example. Infact, had I gone out with the girl, this would have been how you analyzed it. I could not immediately go out with her(pay 40,000 mortgage), so I waited by the phone in order to go out with her(pay monthly). Which means that you are obliged to say that my wants changed based on weather she called or not despite the fact that I am identical in both scenarios.

The proper way to analyze it is to say that when I fell asleep and stayed home i intended to go out and wanted to go out but failed to satisfy both, and when I go out the same is true only I satisfied them. What is clear is that at no point did I want to stay home all night. Yet, since you add on this second step want you cannot put caveats onto our behavior, and end up saying, quite ridiculously, that that I wanted to stay home when I did, and wanted to go out when I did, despite the fact that I was identical in both scenarios at the point in which I fell asleep or received the phone call. It is an over simplification that leads to absurdity and fails to account for intentional complexity.

The second step want is not always different than the Motivator want. If there is only one action necessary to satisfy the Motivator, then the second step want and the Motivator want are in fact the same thing. However, if multiple actions are necessary to satisfy the Motivator, then there are multiple second step wants involved. In other words, all the second step wants are parts of the whole, which is the Motivator.

In the course of satisfying the Motivator, you may have to undertake individual actions that when taken by themselves, you would otherwise not do or want to do. However, since these actions are necessary to satisfy the Motivator, you actually want to do what you don’t want to do because if you don’t, the Motivator will not be satisfied.

That’s pretty much where that is, you want the effect but do not want to have to undergo the cause to make the effect happen.

You didn’t want to stay at home, but you did to try to go out with the girl. I understand your point here that because you ended up staying at home, but did not actually want to at all, the Universal Morality is unsatisfied. The point here is, you did not act in opposition to what you wanted to do by staying home because you expected for the girl to call you. You stayed home waiting for the call from the girl which is acting in accordance with your want to go out with her, but you did not forsee staying at home.

That’s why the Universal Morality is that we will act in accordance with our wants (waiting for the call at home) and not that we will necessarily achieve all of our wants. (going out with the girl) This example only amounts to something that you wanted not to happening occuring due to factors out of your control. (The girl not calling)

You never wanted to stay home, you wanted to be at home to receive her phone call. She did not call you, but that is out of your control.