Okay, but if we accept that reading, Being becomes a nothing that still manages to have characteristics. Properties, if I may say so. He seems to replace metaphysics with nothing. This is just odd on its face. It is in this way that I find Heidegger nonsensical.
This nothing is, in fact, treated as a something, despite, or even because of H’s protestations to the contrary. If it is merely an abstraction, an unreal characteristic of any thing, and of everything, why do we need to know about it in such detail? I have never been able to figure out what we are to do with this being that is not, or what it does, if it is not.
He still treats possibilty, for instance, as if it has no object, but is a thing, or a no-thing in itself. In other words, he takes the fundamental metaphysical mistake of language, or the fundamental linguistic mistake of metaphysics, and turns it on its head. But what does this produce? I wonder if anyone can tell me.