Heidegger

As I said, “except the one between quotation marks”. It is not between quotation marks for nothing.

Yeah, I know, Sau. But that this is intelligible doesn’t make Heidegger so, which I took to be your point. Sorry if i misunderstood.

Well, I think he is, up to this point at least. With some effort, I am able to understand him.

I think we might rephrase the sentence in question as follows:

“The Being of that which is, itself something that is, “is” not.”

Which we might, after my example, compare to:

“The running of that which runs, itself something that runs, “is” not.”

Or, according to you:

“The running of that which runs, itself something that runs, “runs” not.”

But “itself something that runs” means: “which [running] is itself something that runs”. So you cannot evade the “is”.

In any case, the “is” between quotation marks is a different use of the verb “to be” than the forms of that verb outside of the quotation marks - as you yourself have taught me. In the former case, it means something in the line of “is equal or identical to”; in the latter case, it means “to have reality or actuality”. Merriam-Webster distinguishes between these two meanings by giving the former the number “1”, the latter the number “2”:

http://m-w.com/dictionary/be

“Being” in the first sense is not comparable to the transitive verb “to run”. We might make it completely unambiguous if we replace “running” by “aspiring”:

“The aspiring of him who aspires is not itself something that aspires.”

This makes sense. The following does not:

“The aspiring of him who aspires does not itself aspire something that aspires.”

This is nonsense because “to aspire” is not a transitive verb.

Now, as for my rephrasing at the beginning of this post:

“The Being of that which is, [which is] itself something that is, “is” not.”

In this way, the “is” between quotation marks means the same thing as the other forms of the verb “to be” (except for the “is” between brackets).

“The existence of that which exists, [which is] itself something existent, does not exist.”

I.e.: that which exists, exists, but its existence does not.

Okay, but if we accept that reading, Being becomes a nothing that still manages to have characteristics. Properties, if I may say so. He seems to replace metaphysics with nothing. This is just odd on its face. It is in this way that I find Heidegger nonsensical.

This nothing is, in fact, treated as a something, despite, or even because of H’s protestations to the contrary. If it is merely an abstraction, an unreal characteristic of any thing, and of everything, why do we need to know about it in such detail? I have never been able to figure out what we are to do with this being that is not, or what it does, if it is not.

He still treats possibilty, for instance, as if it has no object, but is a thing, or a no-thing in itself. In other words, he takes the fundamental metaphysical mistake of language, or the fundamental linguistic mistake of metaphysics, and turns it on its head. But what does this produce? I wonder if anyone can tell me.

B and S.
You must be to do.
It’s not rocket science.

B and S?

Boats and Ships?

Backs and Sides?

Bread and Sircuses?

Baloney and Salami?

You obviously haven’t read his definitive “Being and Rocket Science”.

Look it up.

What characteristics, or properties, does it have, then?

I do not know whether I am jumping ahead if I, like you, identify Heidegger’s “Being” with his “Nothing”, but I know he has said that the Nothing itself nothings… So that which exists, exists, but its existence does not exist, but nothings. It nothings all day long.

Well, I have not read anything by him about possibility, so I certainly cannot.

This is where I feel the urge to slap you upside the head, Saully.

Language is used to represent a place value, right? Value of our thoughts, right?

So is the number 0 but don’t go saying it’s not a number because it represents nothing because it is a number just as nothing is the value of something.

I’ll flesh out a couple of points. I don’t usually quote, but it might be useful here.

“An understanding of Being is always already contained in everything we apprehend in beings”.

I respond to statements like this with “Okay. 'Nuff said, then.”

Now, he soon says “If one says accordingly that “Being” is the most universal concept, that cannot mean that it is the clearest and that it needs no further discussion”.

Wrong.

“The concept of “Being” is undefinable”.

Correct.

So we can’t sensibly talk about it.

“The undefinability of being does not dispense with the question of its meaning but compels that question”.

He is, of course, anticipating objections by the time he writes Being and Time.

“Being is the self-evident concept.”

Correct.

Of course, B & T is all about refuting these ideas. He also produces some tellingly thorough apologetics for the fact that he spends virtually his entire career on the question of Being.

I would simply like for someone to tell me the answer he has found. I believe that he does wind up with a method, but it is a method for a method. We must interpret the world by interpreting it. And this interpretaion, or interpreting, has as its object not the transcendence of one sphere to another, but of transcendence itself.

What the fuck does that mean?

Universalism is always nonsensical as a philosphical basis. He doesn’t escape Aristotle or Hegel, even as he flees.

I’m still open to anyone who wishes to answer, or otherwise dispense with my questions.

So your cogito ergo sum is “I do, therefore I am”, right? But what do you mean by “do”?

I’ll put it this way since it seems as though I’ve stumbled upon an equal place value, 0.

When we use the word “nothing” we are using the number 0. Nothing has a place and 0 has a place. 0 is used to form mathematical equations and nothing is used to form sentences. To form a sentence with the word “nothing” you must be giving nothing a place value or else it cannot be in a sentence. To use the number 0 you must be giving it a place value or else it cannot be in a mathematical equation. This value is its being. Its place. If it does not have a place it just can’t be. See?

Nothing can be a confusing word to represent the absence of something as a value but it is a value, it is a place, and it is a being.

SS - that is, in part, Heidegger’s thesis, all right. But “nothing” can also be used as “nullset” or “empty set” in regular language. This is one way of stating Heidegger. An empty set is not strictly “nothing” The set itself exists. This is not a problem in mathematics, but Heidegger confuses the set (which exists) with its contents (which do not). Even where he doesn’t, any formulation that concludes a null set is always trivial.

I cannot escape that we have the choice between calling his thesis either nonsensical or trivial.

Well, here’s what he’s doing. He’s saying that there can be a mathematical equation using 0…without 0. That there can be a sentence using the word nothing…without the word nothing.

Bogus. There can’t. 0 and nothing hold it together. They are the beings that make it.

It’s trivial 'cause it ain’t true. It’s logically inept.

Yeah SS. It’s one or the other. I am trying to give a charitable reading its due. But basically I agree. Even the most charitable reading I can find doesn’t seem to help his case.

And stop being so bright, dudette. It’s annoying.

Well, not really.

If I say “That glass is not empty”, then what I’m really saying is: “That glass, empty, is not” - “That empty glass is not.”

A, to B, pointing at a full glass: “That empty glass does not exist.”
B, confused: “What empty glass!”
A, smugly: “See?”

Yes, it’s being used with a place value, therefore, it exists. Be it 0 or nothing, it exists for crying out loud.

It doesn’t lose its symbolic place for being metaphorical. You made a “non-existent” glass with your mind, the non-existent glass is the object you made, so it can’t be non-existent even if only existing under ideal terms because “non-existence” also has place value.

Sauwelios - There is a difference between particulars and universals.

A separate point - “That empty glass does not exist” is nonsense. Because of the word “that”.

To avoid full notation, “That glass is not empty” = ~(empty glass). The glass exists, here.

“That empty glass does not exist” is not a statement at all; it’s giggerish.

It is not “~(empty) glass”, nor is it “~(empty glass)” nor is it “~glass” (in any state).

An empty set can be that empty set. But its contents can’t be that nothing. It’s that nothing that is in question in Heidegger. But that is gibberish, also.

I am not sure what point you are making.

So the empty glass and the full glass are equally real, eh?

They share an equal value. :wink:

Why are you telling me this? What are you referring to?

What does “~” mean?

It seems that you are approaching the problem from a mathematical, I from a linguistic perspective.

I think there is a difference between absolute nothing and relative nothing. Relative nothing does have a place value. Absolute nothing does not. It is the absence of everything (including all places).