…which is still contradictory. {actually, it isn’t} But I suppose the more interesting question is, how do you know this to be the case? {knowledge is impossible}
That doesn’t answer my question. Where in the “Treatise” does he specifically say that analytic and synthetic judgements cannot lead to knowledge?
{from book I part III: Thus not only our reason fails us in the discovery of the ultimate
connexion of causes and effects, but even after experience has informed
us of their constant conjunction, it is impossible for us to satisfy
ourselves by our reason, why we should extend that experience beyond
those particular instances, which have fallen under our observation. We
suppose, but are never able to prove, that there must be a resemblance
betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and those which
lie beyond the reach of our discovery.
We have already taken notice of certain relations, which make us pass
from one object to another, even though there be no reason to determine us
to that transition; and this we may establish for a general rule, that
wherever the mind constantly and uniformly makes a transition without any
reason, it is influenced by these relations. Now this is exactly the
present case. Reason can never shew us the connexion of one object with
another, though aided by experience, and the observation of their constant
conjunction in all past instances. When the mind, therefore, passes from
the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another, it
is not determined by reason, but by certain principles, which associate
together the ideas of these objects, and unite them in the imagination.
Had ideas no more union in the fancy than objects seem to have to the
understanding, we coued never draw any inference from causes to effects,
nor repose belief in any matter of fact. The inference, therefore,
depends solely on the union of ideas…
and from part IX …Those philosophers, who have divided human reason into knowledge and
probability, and have defined the first to be that evidence, which arises
from the comparison of ideas, are obliged to comprehend all our arguments
from causes or effects under the general term of probability. But though
every one be free to use his terms in what sense he pleases; and
accordingly in the precedent part of this discourse, I have followed this
method of expression; it is however certain, that in common discourse we
readily affirm, that many arguments from causation exceed probability,
and may be received as a superior kind of evidence. One would appear
ridiculous, who would say, that it is only probable the sun will rise
to-morrow, or that all men must dye; though it is plain we have no further
assurance of these facts, than what experience affords us. For this
reason, it would perhaps be more convenient, in order at once to preserve
the common signification of words, and mark the several degrees of
evidence, to distinguish human reason into three kinds, viz. THAT FROM
KNOWLEDGE, FROM PROOFS, AND FROM PROBABILITIES. By knowledge, I mean the
assurance arising from the comparison of ideas. By proofs, those
arguments, which are derived from the relation of cause and effect, and
which are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty. By probability, that
evidence, which is still attended with uncertainty. It is this last
species of reasoning, I proceed to examine…
analytics (concerning themselves with language/mathematics only aren’t knowledge because they don’t tell us anything about the world…)
synthetics (cannot be knowledge because they are not entirely free of doubt or uncertainity… you really need to read the whole of part III}
This is far from obvious. Even accepting Plato’s definition of knowledge, what serious philosopher in the last hundred years has actually held this view of justification? {stroud, moore, strawson, unger, gettier, klein, harman, nozick, sellars, sosa, pollock, haack, bon jour, quine, putnam, lehrer, plantinga, bender, and kim to name a few of the leading modern epistemologists} At the very least you need to give a reason why justification must involve certainty.
No…you have assumptions plus experience plus a well-confirmed scientific theory. That’s knowledge…as the term is used in English.
{but it is not knowledge as the term is used in Philosophy}
Mmn? Do I really need to step you through it? Okay…
Socrates: I know nothing.
Logo: How do you know?
{Socrates: because knowledge can only be had when in direct contact with the forms and the forms can not be contacted in this world. period. read the books}
Socrates: Well, imagine a cave with a fire and shadows…etc, etc
Logo: Well how do you know all THAT? And why the hell am I wasting my time talking to you?
Socrates: Chill out man…I was using hyperbole.