Perhaps you will see fit to post the following in the HM section.
Logo (Dec.14, 2004) writes as follows:
"Quine, for instance, thinks that Cartesian skepticism is pointless because it tries to impose deeper meanings on the terms it employs than the linguistic use of those terms would allow:
There is a certain verbal perversity in the idea that ordinary talk of familiar physical things is not in large part understood as it stands, or that the familiar physical things are not real, or that evidence for their reality needs to be uncovered. For surely the key words “understood”, “real”, and “evidence” here are too ill-defined to stand up under such punishment. We should only be depriving them of the very denotations to which they mainly owe such sense as they make to us. It was a lexicographer, Dr. Johnson, who demonstrated the reality of a stone by kicking it; and to begin with, we have little better to go on than Johnsonian usage.
-from Word and Object
For Quine, terms such as “real” and “true” do not pertain to certainties. He is a fallibilist through and through. However, these words, as they are used in English, are oblivious to Cartesian worries about what can be known or what has being. To skeptically overanalyze them is to use them illicitly. If I say, “it’s true that there is a monitor on the desk”, I don’t mean that I am absolutely certain of the monitor’s metaphysical being–or that I couldn’t be dreaming, or that I’m not living in the matrix. I only mean that I experience the monitor; that it is present to my consciousness. If you view truth in that sense, then I think you can get around skepticism of both inflated, capital-T Truth and of pure probability."
I have a certain sympathy with the spirit of all of this, but it still seems to me to be an inadequate response to skepticism. My reason is that the view of language embodied is inadequate.
Let me refer to J.L. Austin’s view as stated in his well-known, “A Plea for Excuses”. Austin is, of course, well-known as a staunch defender of ordinary language. Yet, even he said that although ordinary language is assuredly the “begin all” it is not the “end all”. Austin thinks we need to go further than to take only a Johnsonian attitude toward ordinary language for even ordinary language needs analysis, not to reject it, but to try to understand how it operates. A good example of this is Austin’s own analysis of the term “real” in his Sense and Sensibilia where he point out that “real” is a “trouser word” since it is the negative use that “wears the trousers”. So that when we use the adjective “real” as in a “real X” we are not asserting anything about X, but, rather, denying that it is a devient instance of X. Thus, a “real duck” is just a duck, and the qualification real simply denies it is, say, a toy duck, or a decoy duck. And to say that some object is real may be simply to deny that it is hallucinatory. Thus, Austin comes to the important conclusion that, “the attempt to find a characteristic common to all things that are, or could be, called ‘real’ is doomed to failure” The reason Austin gives is that the function of ‘real’ is not to contribute positively to the characterization of anything, but to exclude possible ways of being not real-and these ways are both numerous for particular kinds of things, and liable to be quite different for things of different kinds." (Sense and Sensibilia p.70.
So here Austin, although adhering to ordinary language, nevertheless analyses them. He doesn’t impose deeper meaning on them, if that implies alien meanings, but he does draw out what lies behind their ordinary meanings, and draws interesting philosophical conclusions for that.