Calvinist believe (more or less) that 144,000 people will go to heaven. There are more Calvinist today than seats, and including those from the past, statistically odds are slim any given person will get that ticket.
So given predestination, hypothetically (don’t anybody go do thus) if one was to go about shooting them… statistically everyone’s odds to going to heaven would increase, because these Calvinists would have less chance to breed and compete.
For a Calvinist to get into heaven, on a statistical level, he has a better chance if most every living Calvinist is massacred, right? By default, the percentage of tickets to heaven hypothetically increases for all Calvinists up to that point, right?
But if it’s predestinedmatter prior to birth, statistics don’t matter, right?
So what does this mean in regards to statistics? Proportionality of chance is meaningless if predestination is affirmed in advance, yet proportionality still builds it’s presumptions. How does this effect our economic thinking? Do we see this effect in other areas of human life, where people think statistically against certainties? I know the left dorsal lateral does a lot of economic thought.