The Philosophers

This is the place to shave off that long white beard and stop being philosophical; a forum for members to just talk like normal human beings.

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Re: The Philosophers

Postby Jakob » Thu Feb 08, 2018 7:24 pm

iambiguous wrote:
Jakob wrote:Balancing on the egde of where language can go. VO is a means to transcend the idiocies that modern grammar implies. The idiocies of subject, object and action as segregate entities, which by some mysterious God-force are united. VO replaces the god force and shows these three agents of modern thought to be faces of the same usurper.


Is this true?

In other words, is it true as an "intellectual construct" or can Jacob actually note instances from his own interactions with others in which he came to embody the conclusions proposed?

Or does "serious philosophy" [on this thread] revolve more around making that crucial distinction between words and worlds?

Jakob believes that you are wasting your time.
The whole point here is that philosophy is a reward for the excellent, not an instruction manual for those prone to failing at life to fall back on. Thats what slave-religions are for.
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby iambiguous » Thu Feb 08, 2018 7:39 pm

Jakob wrote: Iamb, the part I asked Sauwelios to translate (Part VI) contains a reference to Dasein as that before which the suicidal one fails.
In a phrase: The fruit of Dasein is the higher goal.


Let's just say that when Dasein reconfigures into dasein, there are other ways in which to construe/embody it out in the world. For example, historically, culturally and experientially.

Jakob wrote: Like in mathematics you can integrate Nietzsches logics with each other.
A second statement he makes is: Power sets goals.


Power embedded in political economy? In the narratives of folks like Freud? And in what particular context construed from what particular point of view? Or, philosophically, are we able to derive the optimal or the only rational consideration of it?

Jakob wrote: Dasein is that which births the power to set higher goals.
Athens and Rome, but also the USA is a great Dasein.


Are we to actually take this seriously? As though we can follow, say, the arguments of the Trump administrations and Nancy Pelosi regarding DACA and intertwine your argument here into it.

Jakob wrote: Nietzsche is an anti-individualist. He does not believe that meaning can exist without a structure of power that comprises many humans and employs each of them to serve and enjoy their greater whole.


Let's just say that, among the intellectuals, the jury is still out: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosoph ... ividualism

While he had a dislike of the state in general, which he called a "cold monster" in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche also spoke negatively of anarchism, communism, socialism and liberalism, and made it clear that only certain individuals could attempt to break away from the herd mentality.

Nietzsche never spoke much of the ubermasses.

Jakob wrote: The flip side is that such forged wholes of power-relations are the only wholes he believes in. There is no "the" world. Only this world. And thus, no one is equal, equality ant be fought for, one can only fight for rank.


So, does this revolve more around "I" or "we"? And the closest most objectivists come to "we" is when they distinguish between "one of us" and "one of them". But, invariably [as with Satyr at KT], there is almost always one or another "alpha male" to lead the pack.
He was like a man who wanted to change all; and could not; so burned with his impotence; and had only me, an infinitely small microcosm to convert or detest. John Fowles

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Re: The Philosophers

Postby iambiguous » Thu Feb 08, 2018 7:50 pm

Jakob wrote:
iambiguous wrote:
Jakob wrote:Balancing on the egde of where language can go. VO is a means to transcend the idiocies that modern grammar implies. The idiocies of subject, object and action as segregate entities, which by some mysterious God-force are united. VO replaces the god force and shows these three agents of modern thought to be faces of the same usurper.


Is this true?

In other words, is it true as an "intellectual construct" or can Jacob actually note instances from his own interactions with others in which he came to embody the conclusions proposed?

Or does "serious philosophy" [on this thread] revolve more around making that crucial distinction between words and worlds?

Jakob believes that you are wasting your time.
The whole point here is that philosophy is a reward for the excellent, not an instruction manual for those prone to failing at life to fall back on. Thats what slave-religions are for.


Well, it's my time to waste. And, besides, in the act of waiting for godot, what does that even mean?

And my whole point is merely to suggest that your whole point is but one more rendition of this:

In the end it is dishonesty that breeds the sterile intellectualism of contemporary speculation. A man who is not certain of his mental integrity shuns the vital problems of human existence; at any moment the great laboratory of life may explode his little lie and leave him naked and shivering in the face of truth. So he builds himself an ivory tower of esoteric tomes and professionally philosophical periodicals; he is comfortable only in their company...he wanders farther and farther away from his time and place, and from the problems that absorb his people and his century. The vast concerns that properly belong to philosophy do not concern him...He retreats into a little corner, and insulates himself from the world under layer and layer of technical terminology. He ceases to be a philosopher, and becomes an epistemologist. Will Durant.

Unless of course we're both wrong. And it sure won't be the first time. At least not for me.
He was like a man who wanted to change all; and could not; so burned with his impotence; and had only me, an infinitely small microcosm to convert or detest. John Fowles

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Re: The Philosophers

Postby Jakob » Thu Feb 08, 2018 11:06 pm

Meaning you wish to value VO in terms of your own powers, your own familiar universe, in which your ego feels comfortable.
A major feature that VO adds to working WtP grammar is its explicative power in the reflexive side of things.

I.e. it allows concepts (including that of the "I") to compute with themselves.
Now if that's not practical, I don't know what is.

And Annie, this aint no bus stop.
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby Mitra-Sauwelios » Fri Feb 09, 2018 12:50 am

Zoot Allures wrote:"there is always the possiblity that one of them may in fact come up with an argument that does in fact manage to yank me up out of this hole."- iambiguous

to get out of that hole you have to dismiss any motivist or deontological theory of ethics and just become a consequentialist. now all these have their own problems, but the latter is completely free of any objectivism so long as you don't try to evaluate a specific consequence according to whether or not it's good or bad... rather useful or not useful, convenient or not convenient, advantageous or not advantageous.

don't ask yourself 'would it be wrong to rob this bank', since that's a nonsensical question. instead ask yourself 'what kind of risk is this and what are the possible consequences.'

so you don't want to go to jail, but not because going to jail is right or wrong. going to jail is a big pain in the ass, that's why you don't want to go. you need not wonder whether or not you are right in not wanting to go; you don't want to go because the food sucks, the mats are flat and worn out, and you have to ask a deputy like seven times to bring you a request form.

just listen to your ego and it will tell you what you want and don't want. and the beauty of it is, you don't have to explain anything to yourself or others. you don't need to provide any more justification for what you do other than that you do it because you like to do it.

who the fuck knows why we like to do what we do? that discussion would go on forever. consider only the immediacy of your desires and the possible consequences of your actions.

an objectivist is what stirner might call an involuntary egoist; they are motivated by their own selfish desires just like a voluntary egoist, but they aren't aware of it.

show me any altruistic act and i'll show you how that act either benefits the person directly or indirectly (e.g., in the case of kin altruism).

"Sacred things exist only for the egoist who does not acknowledge himself, the involuntary egoist ... in short, for the egoist who would like not to be an egoist, and abases himself (combats his egoism), but at the same time abases himself only for the sake of "being exalted", and therefore of gratifying his egoism. Because he would like to cease to be an egoist, he looks about in heaven and earth for higher beings to serve and sacrifice himself to; but, however much he shakes and disciplines himself, in the end he does all for his own sake... [on] this account I call him the involuntary egoist."- mad-max stirner

an objectivist theory of ethics is an example of this 'sacred thing'; the objectivist wants to do what he thinks is 'right', so he can be exalted for disregarding what he REALLY wants to do (which wouldn't be right). but, the desire to be exalted is again just another form of egoism. he simply exchanges one advantage (doing the wrong thing, which he would rather do) for another; the praise, respect and admiration he gets for doing what's right. he makes a compromise, but he does not act selflessly.
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby Mitra-Sauwelios » Fri Feb 09, 2018 2:06 am

Fixed Cross wrote:Capable - Sauwelios is, I believe, trying hard to serve the clan.
Or in the way he can, to restore his standing with it.


Thanks for the faith in me. For what it's worth, I think I've been doing pretty good work recently--though much of it is, as of yet, still behind the scenes, so to say.


Sauwelios, it is, I see, beyond your capabilities to offer Zoot some hard honesty about the endless banal and frankly very offensive stupidities he wrings from his brain. I guess your talks with him take enough out of you as they are. For example you have to endure being compared to CN.


My approach is very different from yours. And in actual, spoken conversation, Zoot and I have had some pretty intensive philosophical discussions. Yesterday, I among other things introduced the issues surrounding logic's self-identical "A". Zoot was then reminded of GS 111, and I was glad to be reminded of it by him. Anyway, so I explained to him that for all we know the axioms of logic are false, but we _have_ to treat them as true. Then I tried to explain that the doctrine of the will to power, no less than VO, does the same thing everyone does who treats reality as logical, except that it goes much further, is much more complete, in projecting subjects _everywhere_; and that VO beautifully starts right "before the logic", with the circularity of a valuing which is a valuing of that very valuing. Zoot does seem to understand this last bit (i.e., self-valuing) on a human and even animal level (for example, that encounter of mine with the three-legged cat), but not on a (pre-)logical level (yet).


Let me offer you some aid. Translate for him from Nachlass Summer 1875 [9[1] part VIII. Die Erkenntniss. Or if you wish, also from the preceding parts, such as part VI. Der Tod.


I don't think I've ever read that before. I will, in the very near future.
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby Pedro I Rengel » Fri Feb 09, 2018 3:08 am

"But, for all practical purposes, how relevant is this argument pertaining to our day to day interactions with others?

You tell me.

And the world starts for mere mortals not in "value" so much as in the need to subsist from day to day."

Well, you say subsist, in my experience there are a good number of other things that matter to the most subsistentist of mortals. And I'm near certain I've lived more precarious situations of subsistence with people that have been living that way for more generations than you.

You were in Nam? More people murder more people brutally in the streets of Caracas than ever did in Vietnam. Not to mention the simple to-dos of poverty sans killing.

I agree it's not "value." There must already be something there for it to be valued. It's not a genesis. Genesis is will to power. I wake up and make some coffee. Prepare to go to work. Wonder about that pretty girl and that guy who wants to kill me because he didn't feel I appropriately shared the loot from that mango tree he told me about. All of this is already instantly willing to power.

As is one of Sawelios's considerations on whether Heidegger was a philosopher or a thinker because Lampard noted this depended on whether he wondered about the emptyness aside from being in the genesis of something or other.

Or Nancy Pelosi confering with her strategic network on what to opine on this or that bill.

Will to power is itself the death of God. Because it explains everything from the grandest to the mundanest to the subtlest. It takes the weight of God, of an external measure, off. It shifts the responsibility from Him to us. And the freedom.

What can you figure matters? What can anyone?

Forget useful. What is rewarding? The specific thing you find to be rewarding doesn't matter. What matters is that you can always determine it. Because will to power doesn't will power. It wills will to power. The mango guy doesn't want coffee for taste and alertness, he wants the state of wanting coffee for taste and alertness.
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby Mitra-Sauwelios » Fri Feb 09, 2018 11:04 pm

Zoot Allures wrote:saully and i had a delightful conversation earlier. we were discussing some of the basis for VO and logic, and i felt compelled to reference these following quotes. the line of conversation went something like this: VO's self-valuing logic as an expression of WTP > WTP as an expression of the survival instinct (in humans)> survival instinct as a substantiation of logic > substantiation of logic through application of law of identity and excluded middle in human reasoning. it was here that i referenced nietzsche... because 'nobody does it better', as carly simon says...

"Origin of the logical.-- How did logic come into existence in man's head? Certainly out of illogic, whose realm originally must have been immense. Innumerable beings who made inferences in a way different from ours perished; for all that, their ways might have been truer. Those, for example, who did not know how to find often enough what is "equal" as regards both nourishment and hostile animals--those, in other words, who subsumed things too slowly and cautiously--were favored with a lesser probability of survival than those who guessed immediately upon encountering similar instances that they must be equal."- nietzsche

this is a brilliant insight. what he means is that those humans who generalized or stereotyped their experiences, were too cautious, responded too slowly, and were therefore put in greater danger than those for whom the principle of the law of identity was an unconscious instinct; while this tiger is different from the last tiger by whatever degree (so A does not equal A), a consideration of these differences would cost him precious time and put him in danger. his instinct of self-preservation forces him to posit an identical case immediately (A does equal A; particular tigers are instances of general tigers), and he reacts to the tiger as he reacts to any tiger. he gets the fuck outta there and pays no attention to the fact that this tiger might be a little different than the last one he encountered.

now the point here is not that the law of identity isn't true- A certainly IS A, whatever A is, because it can't both be A and not A (law of excluded middle)- but that the origins of logic began with identifying individual cases as general cases on a conscious level.

"The dominant tendency, however, to treat as equal what is merely similar--an illogical tendency, for nothing is really equal--is what first created any basis for logic."- nietzsche

what he means is that logic cannot exist without such error in reasoning existing FIRST... the assumption of identical cases. he is mistaken, here. now look:

"In order that the concept of substance could originate--which is indispensible for logic although in the strictest sense nothing real corresponds to it--it was likewise necessary that for a long time one did not see or perceive the changes in things."- nietzsche

replace 'substance' with 'property', but first consider hume's thoughts: we have no impression or idea of 'substance' (something that can be conceived apart from everything else, as spinoza put it):

"what possibility then of answering the question, whether perceptions inhere in a material or immaterial substance, when we do not so much as understand the meaning of the question?"- hume

now then, the concept of the tiger is not a concept of a substance, so nietzsche is mistaken in asserting that the idea of the A, which would be the tiger, assumes a substance 'tiger' in order to then assume an identical case. the idea of substance is not at all required for logic. indeed, it's a nonsensical concept to begin with and does not detract from the law of identity as nietzsche believes it does, BECAUSE it's nonsensical. nietzsche's correct, but for the wrong reasons.

a tiger is a set of properties, and while individual tigers may possess different properties, the properties themselves cannot both be what they are and not be what they are (regardless of whether they're perceived or not). despite failing to conceive of a 'general' tiger-type, which is what nietzsche claims was the problem of those pre-logical reasoners, the law of identity still persists in, or for, rather, the properties of the individual tigers.

the fact that an infinite regress would be involved in the properties of the properties, etc., makes no difference.

so the law of identity and excluded middle certainly apply, and while it is a mistake to posit identical cases as experiences of an A-tiger, the properties of the unidentical tigers MUST BE what they are, and can't also be what they aren't at the same time.

nietzsche is right, but not because 'the concept of substance... which is indispensible for logic' is true. this assertion isn't true or false, but nonsensical.

"The beings that did not see so precisely had an advantage over those who saw everything "in flux." At bottom, every high degree of caution in making inferences and every skeptical tendency constitute a great danger for life. No living beings would have survived if the opposite tendency--to affirm rather than suspend judgement, to err and make up things rather than wait, to assent rather than negate, to pass judgement rather than be just-- had not been bred to the point where it became extraordinarily strong."- nietzsche

excellent point, again. however, NOT that logic did not exist until this tendency had been bred (a naturally selected behavior), but because logic hadn't yet come into the foreground of reasoning, had not yet been recognized AS logic, hadn't yet emerged out of unconscious instinct.

the fact that pre-logical man might have had a better fitness level is a remarkable irony. spontaneous man at one point was more successful than the calculating man. what has changed, then? the speed with which the mind now works; modern man's frontal cortex has evolved, enabling him to process information faster and with logical consistency- he now can make a logical snap-judgment and waste fractions of a second doing so.

the last time i encountered a tiger, i was able to instinctively assume an identical case, critique that assumption, recognize the law of identity and excluded middle still remained in spite of that, AND get away from him... all in the blink of an eye.

...

VO advocates such self-valuing logic in human behavior, and is correct in doing so. really, this idea is nothing revolutionary and goes without saying. what is problematic is the notion that all things express the same self-valuing logic, like urgod's rock, for example. i won't get into that again right now.

what i might suggest here is that the self-valuing of the human being is an emergent property that makes of the human a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts; the atomic, chemical and molecular parts of the human do not possess self-valuing, but when combined, self-valuing emerges from the system.

saully seems to go another way with this idea, as he explained yesterday. for him, self-valuing might be an emergent property of even these smaller parts... but this implies that idea of panpsychism or proto-consciousness. he does seem to admit that 'valuing' is not just action, but involves a complex of action AND reasoning- this consisting of phenomenological structures requiring the necessary attribute 'intentionality' (consciousness is consciousness OF something [brentano, husserl, sartre]). without being conscious, a being isn't able to differentiate between values and non-values. without being able to do this, any action is arbitrary and can't be described as either. saully would have to surmise that each of these parts possess such structural capacities in order to 'value' anything. i don't think they do, personally, for many reasons.
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby Mitra-Sauwelios » Sat Feb 10, 2018 12:04 am

We see here that Zoot's still a metaphysician. He sincerely be-lieves that logic, which evolved so contingently in man's head, necessarily applies to all reality; whereas there is no good reason to suppose so, except that we humans are _incapable_ of contradicting in the sense of the law of non-contradiction.

I don't think the line of our delightful conversation went like this, by the way: "VO's self-valuing logic as an expression of WTP > WTP as an expression of the survival instinct (in humans)> survival instinct as a substantiation of logic > substantiation of logic through application of law of identity and excluded middle in human reasoning." That is, we definitely went beyond the survival instinct, with Zoot spontaneously granting that Spinoza's conatus is not just concerned with survival but also with expansion, and me introducing the idea of altruism and the like as a fitness indicator. Zoot was then reminded of the concept of the "selfish gene", and I pointed out to him that the carrier of such a gene does not have to be selfish (all the time). Also, I pointed out that such genes are only selfish so-called, because conceiving them as "selfish" is an anthropomorphism, in analogy with a selfish _person_. This then allowed me to make the same suggestion for "self-valuing".

Also, I think the self-valuing logic is rather at the bottom of WTP than the other way round; that the survival instinct in humans is an expression of WTP, not the other way round (if only in humans, and probably animals in general); and that logic is a substantiation or expression of survival instinct (possibly not (so much) of the gene-carrier, so this also means reproductive instinct).

Zoot wrote:now then, the concept of the tiger is not a concept of a substance, so nietzsche is mistaken in asserting that the idea of the A, which would be the tiger, assumes a substance 'tiger' in order to then assume an identical case. the idea of substance is not at all required for logic. indeed, it's a nonsensical concept to begin with and does not detract from the law of identity as nietzsche believes it does, BECAUSE it's nonsensical. nietzsche's correct, but for the wrong reasons.


I think Zoot's just missing a link in the chain of reasoning here. That missing link is the concept of the subject. Thus Nietzsche writes:

"The concept of substance is a consequence of the concept of the subject: not the reverse!" (WP 485, opening sentence.)

The substance "tiger" is the _subject_ "tiger"; and the subject is the original form of logic's self-identical "A": the latter is an abstraction from the former.


a tiger is a set of properties, and while individual tigers may possess different properties, the properties themselves cannot both be what they are and not be what they are (regardless of whether they're perceived or not). despite failing to conceive of a 'general' tiger-type, which is what nietzsche claims was the problem of those pre-logical reasoners, the law of identity still persists in, or for, rather, the properties of the individual tigers.


This is certainly much _more_ true or plausible than the notion that the law of identity applies to a "general" tiger-type. Now Nietzsche writes:

"The 'thing-in-itself' [is] nonsensical. If I remove all the relationships, all the 'properties', all the 'activities' of a thing, the thing does not remain over; because thingness has only been invented by us owing to the requirements of logic, thus with the aim of defining, communication (to bind together the multiplicity of relationships, properties, activities." (WP 558 whole. Cf. ff., in George Morgan's sense.)

No matter how plausible this may be, it's an abstraction (literally: it ab-tracts properties from things until nothing remains) from our common-sense understanding. Please bear with me while I quote Michael Zuckert at length:

"Although more than a few critics have challenged Strauss's notion of 'common sense' as hopelessly obscure, he quite precisely tells us that 'common‐sense understanding is understanding in terms of "things possessing qualities".' [...]
Empiricism is a theory based on recognition of the 'naiveté' or inadequacy of common sense or pre‐scientific awareness. Empiricism is the effort to look more carefully at what is actually given in experience than 'our primary awareness of things as things and people as people' does. 'What is perceived or "given" is only sense data [compare Hume's "impressions"!]; the "thing" emerges by virtue of unconscious or conscious construction. The "things" which to common sense present themselves as "givens" are in truth constructs'. 'Scientific understanding' comes into being when the naiveté of the prescientific is fully recognized, and understanding by means of 'unconscious construction' is replaced by 'understanding by means of conscious construction'.
This science, the new political science included, intends to reject the prescientific understanding, but Strauss, following Husserl, maintains that this effort necessarily fails. One cannot, Strauss insists, 'establish empiricism empirically: it is not known through sense data that the only possible objects of perception are sense data' rather than 'things' or 'patterns'. One can only establish or attempt to establish empiricism 'through the same kind of perception through which we perceive things as things rather than sense data or constructs'. Empiricism, then, must begin with the naive prescientific awareness, and by a process of abstraction from that 'sense data become known as sense data'. This act of abstraction both depends on and denies the legitimacy of such dependence on common sense. Strauss's very Husserlian conclusion is that 'there is no possible human thought which is not in the last analysis dependent on the legitimacy of that naiveté and the awareness or the knowledge going with it'." (Zuckert, "Why Leo Strauss is Not an Aristotelian", quoting from Strauss, Liberalism Ancient and Modern 212-13. Cf. the "Conversations with Zoot Allures thread", starting from this post: http://ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?p=2692334#p2692334)

You may want to reread my earlier post in this thread in this light: http://ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?p=2692205#p2692205--especially the two long quotes (Nietzsche and Picht). In the light of the Picht quote, I will now point out, following Picht, that a metaphysician is someone who sincerely believes in his unconscious pro-jection of himself into all being, whereas the Nietzschean is aware of his "automorphism", as I once called it; is aware that he's no mere theorist, but a poet; that his worldview is no immaculate perception of a world that's "out there", but a pro-creation.
"Your symbolical, lyrical and musical world can become an absolute standard. That is to say the highest on Earth." (Fixed Cross, "Re: A letter for the King" (return email to yours truly!), my translation.)
kali maa jaap mantra {om aim hreem kleem chamundaye vichaye}
"didja read that great wall of text he wrote? i'm tellin' you, ollie is the grand master of the esoteric and eclectic. if there IS something more to life, something extramundane or divine or whatever you wanna call it, ollie will figure it out" (Zoot Allures, to phoneutria, about yours truly.)
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby Pedro I Rengel » Sat Feb 10, 2018 2:13 am

"...that his worldview is no immaculate perception of a world that's "out there", but a pro-creation."

Hi Oliver. You sent me a PM over on btl, which I answered, but recieved no further reply. The subject you presented was good: is there a supreme will to power? If so, which one?

This was regarding a thread there in which I mentioned something key about will to power: the emptyness about it. By this, as I explained in my reply to your message, I meant precicely that there is no supreme anything. Will to power wills will to power, and this creates all hierarchies. I did admit that, of course, will to power implies verticality, hierarchy. But that #1 this isn't what matters about it and #2 that verticality is the wrong term, because it is two dimensional.

You suggested that there is something you consider to be the supreme will to power.


Regarding the quote:

What is it that creates? The poet? This is at the bottom of the subject at hand. Because will to power is constantly creation. As I wrote before, things don't exist until they matter.

For instance: is it the case only for the poet that he doesn't percieve an immaculate world that's out there but rather brings one into being?
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby Pedro I Rengel » Sat Feb 10, 2018 2:37 am

"the idea of substance is not at all required for logic."

What are the properties then? What goes for "tiger" goes for "whiskers," "violent" and "four legged." You can split properties appart all you want, but there will always be an assumed substance. If one could only split one's way to the atom, the irreducible substance.

You pointed out before that you can even split sub-atomic particles. That this is a big problem for the idea of a unit.

I don't think Nietzsche meant that logic logically needed this or that, I think he was explaining what it needed genealogically, what led to its existence.
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby UrGod » Sat Feb 10, 2018 4:21 am

Jakob wrote:It is in my best interest to keep the source clear. VO can't be seen as constraining the meaning of WtP to flow into a specific direction. Its just a gift for those that already know the world is will to power and nothing besides. A way of using that given to greater power.


Exactly.
Nietzschean anti-leftist.
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby UrGod » Sat Feb 10, 2018 4:27 am

In the will to power, one does not need to bear the burden of oneself, not really. One only bears partial burdens of oneself, here and there. And does a lot of outsourcing of this burden to other things. Indeed, WtP is in no small measure a means to the distribution of oneself across many disparate areas and experiences, for the purpose of lifting the burden of oneself 'here and there'. A redirection, as catharsis and new focus.

Whereas with VO one must bear the absolute entirety of oneself, if one is to even be capable of approaching VO at all. You might be able to will yourself in entirety to power, to some power or another, but to truly value yourself in entirety is very different than that. It is not "utilitarian" and therefore gains access to all potential utilities, precisely because it adopts them to itself rather than allows itself to be adapted to them.

VO is internal, WtP is external expression. But VO is also externality.

And besides, self-valuing is already a deeper (more fundamental) concept than is will to power. Where do you think power-willing begins, from where do you think the standards for what constitutes power come? The self sets these terms; the very thing which is said to act according to these terms of will to power, is itself that which sets and indeed must set the very terms, a priori, for that very same acting-willing. "You" are an abstraction or other distillation of this process, which we simply call valuation for lack of a better term.

Really it is just supreme standard-setting, which requires a goal, and intimate awareness of an encounter; necessity, the hardest kind in existence. Much harder than gravity, or nuclear force.
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby UrGod » Sat Feb 10, 2018 4:33 am

But this is also sublimating subjectivity to its highest level, and most people are not too comfortable with that. They think this means forgoing something about the earthiness in themselves, when in reality it is ouroboros-like, you come around full circle much further along from where you began. But only when you have learned to create the earth in your own soul. VO can teach you how to do that, WtP cannot. But WtP can offer great reverence for the earthiness that already exists, and can offer channels of potential power-expression and regulation-constrainment for the sublimating-subjectivity I mentioned above, which is basically what philosophy already is.

I see VO and WtP as working together, it is not one against the other. I am very much a WtP-ist, and this does not refute or refuse or cancel my also being a VO-ist, rather it enhances it a thousand-fold.
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby Mitra-Sauwelios » Sat Feb 10, 2018 4:55 am

Pedro I Rengel wrote:"...that his worldview is no immaculate perception of a world that's "out there", but a pro-creation."

Hi Oliver. You sent me a PM over on btl, which I answered, but recieved no further reply. The subject you presented was good: is there a supreme will to power? If so, which one?

This was regarding a thread there in which I mentioned something key about will to power: the emptyness about it. By this, as I explained in my reply to your message, I meant precicely that there is no supreme anything. Will to power wills will to power, and this creates all hierarchies. I did admit that, of course, will to power implies verticality, hierarchy. But that #1 this isn't what matters about it and #2 that verticality is the wrong term, because it is two dimensional.

You suggested that there is something you consider to be the supreme will to power.


Right, and thank you for your reply (belated, I know; at first I didn't know what to answer and then I just forgot).

I was alluding to the will to the eternal recurrence. Strauss writes:

"Nature, the eternity of nature, owes its being to a postulation, to an act of the will to power on the part of the highest nature." (Leo Strauss, "Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil".)

About this highest nature, he says:

"His supremacy is shown by the fact that he solves the highest, the most difficult problem." (ibid.)

That problem is the problem of the absence of nature, of there being only art (and law being art, not nature: not physis, but only nomos, "convention, custom, habit"). And about this solution, this act of the will to power, Strauss says:

"His [i.e., the philosopher-of-the-future's] action constitutes the highest form of the most spiritual will to power and therewith the highest form of the will to power." (ib. Cf. BGE 9 and WP 617.)

And:

"Philosophy, we have heard, is the most spiritual will to power (aph. 9): the philosophers of the future must possess that will to a degree which was not even dreamed of by the philosophy of the past; they must possess that will in its absolute form." (ib.)

In the lecture course on which this essay drew most, Strauss had said:

"We start again from the premise that reality is will to power, and there is no essential difference between men and brutes; there is no nature of man strictly speaking. Given this premise, the doctrine of eternal return, which means, subjectively, transformation of the will into acceptance, is the only way there can be knowledge, as acknowledging of what is, and it is the only way in which there can be nature; that is to say, that which is by itself and not by being willed or posited. But precisely because acceptance is transformed will, will survives in the acceptance, in the contemplation. Contemplation is creative." (Lecture transcript of May 18, 1959. Cf. my first post here: BTL, "The Hierarchies of Human Values", page 2.)

And:

"If the will of an individual human being, say of Nietzsche, is to be the origin of meaning and value, and that will manifestly has a cause, the only way out in order to save his position is to say that this will is the cause of itself: eternal return." (ibid.)


Regarding the quote:

What is it that creates? The poet? This is at the bottom of the subject at hand. Because will to power is constantly creation. As I wrote before, things don't exist until they matter.

For instance: is it the case only for the poet that he doesn't percieve an immaculate world that's out there but rather brings one into being?


That Picht passage is pertinent to this. The poet, the entity, is itself that in which he/it believes. What really creates is the abyss "beneath" all semblance of entities. And no, _all_ entities are poets; not just "the poet".

"[M]an must be a liar by nature, he must above all be an artist. And he is one: metaphysics, religion, morality, science--all of them only products of his will to art, to lie, to flight from 'truth', to negation of 'truth'. This ability itself, thanks to which he violates reality by means of lies, this artistic ability of man par excellence--he has it in common with everything that is. He himself is after all a piece of reality, truth, nature: how should he not also be a piece of genius in lying!" (WP 853, Kaufmann trans.)
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby Mitra-Sauwelios » Sat Feb 10, 2018 5:23 am

UrGod wrote:necessity


Is it, though... Isn't freedom the sole sufficient reason of "sufficient reason", as Heidegger has it? Here's the suppressed (originally) final paragraph of Strauss's "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero":

"The utmost I can hope to have shown in taking issue with Kojève's thesis regarding the relation of tyranny and wisdom is that Xenophon's thesis regarding that grave subject is not only compatible with the idea of philosophy but required by it. This is very little. For the question arises immediately whether the idea of philosophy is not itself in need of legitimation. Philosophy in the strict and classical sense is quest for the eternal order or for the eternal cause or causes of all things. It presupposes then that there is an eternal and unchangeable order within which History takes place and which is not in any way affected by History. It presupposes, in other words, that any 'realm of freedom' is not more than a dependent province within the 'realm of necessity.' It presupposes, in the words of Kojève, that 'Being is essentially immutable in itself and eternally identical with itself.' This presupposition is not self-evident. Kojève rejects it in favor of the view that 'Being creates itself in the course of History,' or that the highest being is Society and History, or that eternity is nothing but the totality of historical, i.e., finite time. On the basis of the classical presupposition, a radical distinction must be made between the conditions of understanding and the sources of understanding, between the conditions of the existence and perpetuation of philosophy (societies of a certain kind, and so on) and the sources of philosophic insight. On the basis of Kojève's presupposition, that distinction loses its crucial significance: social change or fate affects being, if it is not identical with Being, and hence affects truth. On the basis of Kojève's presuppositions, unqualified attachment to human concerns becomes the source of philosophic understanding: man must be absolutely at home on earth, he must be absolutely a citizen of the earth, if not a citizen of a part of the inhabitable earth. On the basis of the classical presupposition, philosophy requires a radical detachment from human concerns: man must not be absolutely at home on earth, he must be a citizen of the whole. In our discussion, the conflict between the two opposed basic presuppositions has barely been mentioned. But we have always been mindful of it. For we both apparently turned away from Being to Tyranny because we have seen that those who lacked the courage to face the issue of Tyranny, who therefore et humiliter serviebant et superbe dominabantur ["were themselves obsequiously subservient while arrogantly lording it over others", like the Nazi Heidegger] were forced to evade the issue of Being as well, precisely because they did nothing but talk of Being."
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby Fixed Cross » Sat Feb 10, 2018 5:36 pm

Mitra-Sauwelios wrote: and that VO beautifully starts right "before the logic", with the circularity of a valuing which is a valuing of that very valuing.

Fixed Cross sanctions these words.
Yes.
This Logos includes the possibility of the law of identity and its consequences, "the logic".
It gives this possibility.
But, here it gets infinitely deeper at once, as we cross the abyss: it is precisely by contradicting the harmonious consistency of a normal logical producedure that it allows for such procedures.

Logic stands in contradiction to what it speaks of.
But because it stands in such stark, hard contradiction, causing such sharp angles and limits, it is successful to an extent in identifying as much as that there exists something of which it speaks.
VO speaks the things from themselves -- in as far as there are "things" and "selves". But these things won't allow us to approach them except if we too speak from ourselves, or more simply: speak self-valuing.

This is how man attains thinghood, what we might interpret alongside the notions of metaphysical eternity.
And only then can he indulge in lineair, symmetrical logic and expect to arrive anywhere.

By being consistent first with its quality of being a self-valuing, quantum of will to power, and thereby ridding itself from all sanctimonious and delusional claims, the mind sheds its main weaknesses, becomes consistent with itself (hell has to be survived) and successfully projects itself across time and traces its path. All this needs to be done simply in order to do something that isn't completely botched with respect to the earth. So the mind, born orphan of atrophied instincts, finds a path which then becomes its ground, and this ground becomes its being, and the mind now is ready to identify itself. Its self, the experience of the "I" is the excess on top of this, the foam from which Aphrodite is born at every instance at your local coastline.
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby Fixed Cross » Sat Feb 10, 2018 9:16 pm

Pedro I Rengel wrote:Forget useful. What is rewarding?

Here is why I often think of you as Nietzsches literary heir.

One less elegant and more extensive way of phrasing this: If life was not rewarding, there would to be any use to it. And all utility is dependent on life being useful to an end. This end is always power which is its own reward. Self-valuing is the rewarding state of power from which everything flows forth; integrity - including integers and mathematical purity.
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby Pedro I Rengel » Sun Feb 11, 2018 12:08 am

"...a valuing of that very valuing."

This elegantly explains the operation of will to power willing not power but will to power.

The problem I have is this. The valuing operation is static. There is already a completeness here, the valuing exists and for its own sake. Also, what it values must already exist. Where is the genesis?

Oliver wrote earlier that the poet brings the world into being, but that the creation, the genesis, is responsability of an underlying abyss that already exists and contains, if I underdtand, the substance of being sans entity. You can imagine my question: is the operation of entity then really just a sort of giving shape? Is there already a clay for the poet to make pottery of? But then, what is the genesis of that abysmal substance? Maybe a dishonest question, as I already stated that substance is a superstition.

Will to power, contrary to self-valuing, has no preexisting anythings. It is just willing to power, and if there is power in value then value can exist. But then, of course, power isn't what will to power wills. Valuing would be one of an infinity of things that came to being through willing to power.


"Where do you think power-willing begins, from where do you think the standards for what constitutes power come?"

Tricky. And crucial. Power-willing isn't quite right. It puts power first. As if it is power that willing acts on. But, and here is the kit of the problem, will acts on will to power. Power is a side-product. This is why it is so variable and multifarious. The only reason the world is so uniform, so constant in the types of power one finds (though not as constant as many think), the answer to Baudrillard's reformulation of why is there something instead of nothing as why is there nothing instead of something, is precicely the superstition of a pre-existing power standard. God, physics, whatever. These do (we'll, in God's case did) exist. But as a by-product of will to power.

What continuity does exist, and we call that continuity genealogy, is due to the chain produced by will to power willing will to power.
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby Mitra-Sauwelios » Sun Feb 11, 2018 12:58 am

Pedro I Rengel wrote:"...a valuing of that very valuing."

This elegantly explains the operation of will to power willing not power but will to power.

The problem I have is this. The valuing operation is static. There is already a completeness here, the valuing exists and for its own sake. Also, what it values must already exist. Where is the genesis?

Oliver wrote earlier that the poet brings the world into being, but that the creation, the genesis, is responsability of an underlying abyss that already exists and contains, if I underdtand, the substance of being sans entity.


That was a reference to my post on page 37 of this thread, where I quoted from an older post:

"You [Fixed Cross] say: 'The self is not given by anything except its need for consistency and its success in establishing that.' But before the self 'exists', it cannot have anything, including a need for its existence or success in establishing that. If the self-identical 'A' is a value, and not necessarily a fact, then the demand 'But values must be posited by _something_ (or someone)!' is undercut by the notion that it's just our human, all-too-human logic demanding that, or at most the logic of all living beings; there may then well be an abyss at the source, whether it be pure flux, nothing, or--a circularity. Is that why you present self-valuing as circular? Because it does not matter whether the self is valued by 'nothing' or by itself?" (http://ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?p=2692205#p2692205)

The abyss is what, in that same post, I called the Nothing/Chaos/Ginnungagap. It may be what Heidegger called "Being". It has no substance; there can be no substance without entity (subject).
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby Mitra-Sauwelios » Sun Feb 11, 2018 2:06 am

Zoot Allures wrote:"What are the properties then? What goes for "tiger" goes for "whiskers," "violent" and "four legged." You can split properties apart all you want, but there will always be an assumed substance."- pedro

hume is critiquing the aristotelian concept of substance, which i believe nietzsche was referencing in that quote. aristotle believed that a substance was a kind of being that was different from a property. he goes on to say that properties can change while the substance of the being does not. hume is asking how this substance can be perceived if we only know things by the impressions we get from the substance's properties.

recall:

"In order that the concept of substance could originate--which is indispensable for logic although in the strictest sense nothing real corresponds to it--it was likewise necessary that for a long time one did not see or perceive the changes in things."- nietzsche

but the concept of substance is NOT indispensable for logic, i'm saying. for one thing, it would be unnecessary to qualify the notion of the law of identity (a=a) by this concept of substance, since substance by its very definition cannot change (only properties change). so there would never be the question: 'could substance ever be anything other than substance', see. it goes without saying that substance is substance and that it can't be anything else. this isn't the case for properties, though, or the things that have properties.

moreover, the origination of the idea of substance is not something that occurred because 'for a long time one did not see or perceive the changes in things.' the idea of substance is completely a priori, is a rational concept that is not formed after the perception of anything, whether changeable or not. but the idea of a property is a posteriori; it relies on perception and experience.

probably, the idea of substance was originated to treat the various paradoxes created in the arguments between the eleatic school, the pluralists, heraclitus, and the atomists. aristotle was probably moved to come up with an idea that was compatible, hence, something that is immanent and unchanging (substance) while also being the ground of change and impermanence (properties). if you have a moment, check out 'substance theory'.

at any rate:

"I don't think Nietzsche meant that logic logically needed this or that, I think he was explaining what it needed genealogically, what led to its existence."- pedro

nietzsche thought that logic was inconceivable until the error of positing the 'subject' was committed, but it wasn't. this is a bit complicated to explain and would require a lot more time than i'm willing to give in a post at the moment. i'll just give you a briefing.

logic... the propositional kind which is the relevant kind for our purposes here... is nothing more than a set of rules which are used to determine whether or not an assertion is valid, sound, valid and sound, true or false. propositions are about things in the world, but are NOT parts of the world itself. the question which has challenged philosophers for centuries is whether or not the world can be represented by propositions so that propositions indicate something more than their own logical consistency. that is, if a proposition is true, does it necessarily follow that it says something true about the world rather than only being deductively or inductively true because it is logically valid and sound. consider this example:

dizzle wopters are incredibly haptonetic, and exist in a trollic place.
this world is trollic.
therefore, this world consists of haptonetic things.

this argument meets all the criteria for logical coherency, and yet it is nonsensical. the fact that the argument is logical says nothing about the world.

now, there is no question as to whether or not dizzle wopters and trollic places are nietzschean 'subjects', because the very notion of them is nonsensical to begin with. hence, a proposition can be logical without representing a real subject... hence, the belief in a real subject is not required for logic to exist.

and finally, nietzsche would be caught in a kind of self-referential contradiction if he were to assert that belief in a subject was required for logic to exist. the very statement itself is either true or false, and if it is, it is such because it either met or violated the rules of logic. if what he said was true, then logic does exist, because his statement wouldn't be correct, much less meaningful, without it. if what he says is false, it is false because it was neither deductively nor inductively coherent, in which case he's said nothing about logic in the first place.

i will concede that the 'subject', in the way that he meant it (which has nothing to do with the existence or validity of logic) is still a legitimate point. he means to dismiss the notion of the cartesian subject, the 'doer that is distinct from the deed', as he put it. of course this is correct, but being correct- that there is only the deed, the doing, the striking that IS the lightening... and NOT the lightening that is DOING the striking- does not say anything about logic. granting that there is no subject, there is still a logic of process here... which is to say, understanding even this notion of there being no subject, and only process instead, is possible because there is logical consistency within the set of propositions that contain it.

but remember, this set might only contain deductive truths, tautologies, in which case they would not necessarily say anything about the world. on the other hand, if the set contained inductive claims, how would these be proven? how do i prove there is no 'subject' and only process? well it depends on what i mean when i say 'subject' and 'process'. in this particular case i mean to say that there is no cartesian second-substance. well how do i prove that? you guessed it... through another series of claims: a second-substance could not casually interact with a first-substance (material) since they were ontologically different (see spinoza). but how do i prove THAT?

where is this going, pedro? nowhere, that's where. and it's going nowhere because i'm asking metaphysical questions... using specialized, a priori philosophical terminology... creating circles of reasoning. i can create all kinds of premises that would lead to conclusions that were true so long as the premises were granted. but granting the premises does not mean my statements reflect or represent what is in the world or anything about the world.

logic is mysteriously transcendent, pedro. asking, as nietzsche did, about the genealogy of logic... how we beings began to think logically... does not say anything about logic's true beginnings. such reasoning uses a logic that was already there, already working.

note: i've started my own forum: http://pathos-of-distance.forumotion.com

i'll post this there as well. come holla at me, dude.
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby Fixed Cross » Sun Feb 11, 2018 5:10 pm

Zoot, paraphrased:

God exists and he tells me what to think. Now, what did God say exactly? This, I don't know.

I cringe when I see someone avoiding his own existence in a philosophical question.



Descartes.
"I think, therefore I am."

Uh, yeah dude. You posit an "I" and conclude that therefore, this "I" exists.
Oh wow
how philosophical. Have some cufflinks.


But thats exactly what intellectuals will do. Not posit existence in the whole of the life, but in a couple of letters they're taught.
No wonder this world is ruled by criminals.

Philosophy is either the primordial crime that sets the fundamental law, or it is frolicking in front of a mirror.

Now, what law have you set, Zoot?
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Re: The Philosophers

Postby iambiguous » Sun Feb 11, 2018 9:11 pm

Zoot Allures wrote:to get out of that hole you have to dismiss any motivist or deontological theory of ethics and just become a consequentialist. now all these have their own problems, but the latter is completely free of any objectivism so long as you don't try to evaluate a specific consequence according to whether or not it's good or bad... rather useful or not useful, convenient or not convenient, advantageous or not advantageous.


Sure, that's more or less what I do. But that doesn't make the consequences any less the product of a particular political prejudice/leap embedded in the manner in which I construe the meaning of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy.

It doesn't make my dilemma go away. Why? Because, given another set of experiences, I might have leaped in the opposite direction. And, whatever direction I do leap [existentially], there are always going to be arguments able to persuade others not to.

Zoot Allures wrote:don't ask yourself 'would it be wrong to rob this bank', since that's a nonsensical question. instead ask yourself 'what kind of risk is this and what are the possible consequences.'


We're on the same page here. I agree. It's just that, for me, nothing of what I note above really goes away. It's not like any particular individual can think through the question "should I rob this bank?" and come up with a moral narrative that settles it. At best she can come to believe that her own narrative is the most reasonable. And then in a world of contingency, chance and change, her experiences, relationships, sources of information etc., evolve/devolve and she comes to think differently about it.

I'm still back to grappling with my own intellectual contraption: That in an essentially absurd and meaningless world that ends in oblivion, there is no way [philosophically or otherwise] to know how one ought to live.

Unless of course there is and I am just not privy to it here and now.

Zoot Allures wrote:who the fuck knows why we like to do what we do? that discussion would go on forever. consider only the immediacy of your desires and the possible consequences of your actions.


True, but when we choose to live among others there are going to be "rules of behavior". We may ultimately be at a loss to understand why we do what we do but there are clearly going to be dots to connect between that and the historical, cultural and experiental parameters of the actual lives that we live out in a particular world.

I just put my own "dasein, conflicting goods, political economy" spin on that. And then go out looking for folks able to convince me that I'm full of shit.
He was like a man who wanted to change all; and could not; so burned with his impotence; and had only me, an infinitely small microcosm to convert or detest. John Fowles

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Re: The Philosophers

Postby iambiguous » Sun Feb 11, 2018 9:38 pm

Pedro I Rengel wrote:
But, for all practical purposes, how relevant is this argument pertaining to our day to day interactions with others?

You tell me.

And the world starts for mere mortals not in "value" so much as in the need to subsist from day to day.


Well, you say subsist, in my experience there are a good number of other things that matter to the most subsistentist of mortals. And I'm near certain I've lived more precarious situations of subsistence with people that have been living that way for more generations than you.


But nothing matters if you are not able to subsist from day to day. That's why there are still literally millions upon millions of folks around the globe for whom subsistence is an actual precarious component of their lives. They don't allot much time to delving into the things that we discuss here.

Pedro I Rengel wrote:I agree it's not "value." There must already be something there for it to be valued. It's not a genesis. Genesis is will to power. I wake up and make some coffee. Prepare to go to work. Wonder about that pretty girl and that guy who wants to kill me because he didn't feel I appropriately shared the loot from that mango tree he told me about. All of this is already instantly willing to power.


Right, and there must have been zillions of actual historical, cultural and experiential contexts in which the question of power had been raised. And then the folks who pick one or another philosopopher, political theorist, sociologist, psychologist, anthropologist etc., in order tp pin down the most reasonable assessment.

Like there is one given the staggering complexities embedded in human interactions over the centuries. The mindboggling implications of intertwining genes and memes in order to explain any one particular choice.

Still, in any given human community, interactions will ever revolve around one or another "for all practical purpose" combination of might makes right, right makes might or moderation, negotiation and compromise.

Pedro I Rengel wrote:Will to power is itself the death of God. Because it explains everything from the grandest to the mundanest to the subtlest. It takes the weight of God, of an external measure, off. It shifts the responsibility from Him to us. And the freedom.

What can you figure matters? What can anyone?

Forget useful. What is rewarding? The specific thing you find to be rewarding doesn't matter. What matters is that you can always determine it. Because will to power doesn't will power. It wills will to power. The mango guy doesn't want coffee for taste and alertness, he wants the state of wanting coffee for taste and alertness.


What is this but one more "general description" of the "human condition" in which a bunch of words define and defend another bunch of words.

Is it true? Well, pick a particular context in which moral and political values come into conflict and let's explore the implications of it "out in the world". A world in which actual social, political and economic interactions unfold.

Existentially as it were.
He was like a man who wanted to change all; and could not; so burned with his impotence; and had only me, an infinitely small microcosm to convert or detest. John Fowles

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Re: The Philosophers

Postby Pedro I Rengel » Mon Feb 12, 2018 2:27 am

"The abyss is what, in that same post, I called the Nothing/Chaos/Ginnungagap. It may be what Heidegger called "Being". It has no substance; there can be no substance without entity (subject)."

Two things here. First, you admit you believe in substance (once entity is). Second, substance isn't really palpable. That is why Nietzsche called it not strictly real. It is a supposition of existence of something that, strictly speaking, isn't there. This nothing or abyss has substance, even if it is not a subjective experience, because it is posited as something that exists, for its own sake, and is a catalyst for genesis. Even though it isn't really there.

Or, more simply, what gives entities substance? I can see, between your abyss and your entity subject substance, infinite explications, one after the other, each of the previous, without ever arriving at anything other than "because magic." And if magic, why bother with the abyss?



Zoot Allures:

I... I respect what you are attempting too much. No reply. I might check your forum out.


Iambiguous

Nothing matters if you don't subsist from day to day because you are dead.

If you do subsist, somehow, anyhow, you care about things other than assuring that subsistence. In the cases of most extreme precariousness, it may simply boil down to booze. In África, it is often football. And witchcraft. And innumerable other things.

You say genes and memes. Where do those come from? I don't mean substance, which doesn't exist. I mean, why are they? Why do I care?
Pedro I Rengel
 
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Joined: Mon Feb 05, 2018 2:55 pm

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