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promethean75 wrote:
i'd say you two neither agree or disagree on a grander scale than maybe regarding a few single statements scattered throughout (on account of them making sense). but there wouldn't be, couldn't be, actually, general agreement or disagreement because neither of you understand each other. not because you to lack the capacity of understanding, but because what you're saying can't be understood.

I disagree, I do understand Silhouettes position.
And you make a valid point about that later, a laziness in my formulation.

Your premise is: being is experience.

i don't know if he said that or not, but it's not important. what is important is that if he did say it, it's a typical metaphysical statement which makes no sense (which i'll address in a moment). or, he may have said something else which led you to believe he meant that... but then that's impossible. one, because one can't mean nonsense, and two, nothing someone says that is understoood could lead someone else into believing they meant something nonsensical. in other words, you couldn't take something he said sensibly and infer that he meant that... that premise, i mean.

It is in the end "nonsensical" - but the sport is to prove that.
I think Ive proven quite well that what Silhouette says can not be formally denied in the traditional sense, but is still untrue.

Like I said before, he is smart. Only James and I have made a serious dent in his theory.

I argue: experience when investigated leads to the conclusion that it is not its own cause, and that there are other things that do not experience of which experience is made.

now this is interesting because it assumes that the statement 'being is experience' is also stating that 'being is its own cause', or else your objection wouldn't be what it was. but, there is no way to deduce from his statement that he didn't also mean that - he doesn't state or not state it explicitly.

So this is where you have a point - Silhouette never says Experience is its own cause. He doesn't say anything about causes, he might say they're not actually there as experience is undivided - there is no thing which causes another thing. So cause isn't a thing either.

So far so good, his theory makes sense up to quite a relevant level in the discipline of philosophy. But not in the volcanic forge of ontology, which I claim only came to fruition with Archimedes.
He demonstrated, more than that he formally proved, that the measure of what is is not merely in the mind, but in nature itself.
He made the first synthetic proof, and thus created theoretical physics, meaning physics as a form of math, meaning power.

so, in addition to the statement being senseless, your interpretation of it yields a conclusion which you couldn't deduce from it. this means you re-appropriated the statement and understood it in the way you would mean it, and then disagreed with it. but here you're arguing with yourself. and this goes on much more in these debates then folks realize.

I was actually quite aware of implying Silhouette did attribute cause whereas this wasn't explicitly the case at all and he might even go on to refute it, but Ill grant you this point.

so on to the statement 'being is experience' (X, we'll call it)[

behind the indicative mood of this grammar is a hidden violation of logical form, meaning, the things about indicative statements that enable us to understand them and draw inferences from them, are absent. it appears like an empirical proposition about matters of fact, but is actually not at all such a proposition.

take a real empirical proposition: jakob owns a cheeseburger.

now in order to understand this statement, we'd not need to know if it were true or false. we know what it means even if we haven't a clue whether or not you do own a cheeseburger. but comprehending X goes hand-in-hand with knowing it is true or false. as soon as it is understood, its truth status follows immediately. which is to say, we accept or reject it solely on the basis of what its trying to express, not on any evidence (like whether or not jakob owns a cheeseburger).
the truth status of the statement will be based on the following considerations:

The meaning the words it contains, the definitions of the terms employed, a series of supporting arguments, and one or more 'thought experiments'.

and yet in each above case, the truth status of the statement will depend entirely on the supposed meaning of yet more words. no evidence is needed, and neither is it possible to devise experiments or observations that could validate the proposition, even in theory.

it is possible to reject the statement right out of hand, but that repudiation won't be based on evidence, either. most likely it will have been motivated by yet another (perhaps rival) philosophical theory. again, involving yet more words, and still no evidence.

Not all truths follow as immediately from a statement. Say, for example, action equals -reaction.
That seems intuitive now, but it took a lot of physical experimentation to verify it.
But it was falsifiable. So we could find out if it is true or not by testing it.
We cant very easy test the premise that being equals experience.
This is the point of my challenge, whether you wish to examine it or not.

now what you don't know is that i have just shamelessly plagiarized something written by the late and great rosa lichtenstein... something i have posted at least twice here at ILP. did you get the weird feeling like you've read something like that before as you were reading? if so, excellent. it means you read it. if not, excellent. this means you get to read it.

http://www.anti-dialectics.co.uk/Why_al ... nsical.htm

scroll down to 'metaphysical theses' and pick up where i left off. it gets better. well, in your case, worse. much worse.

Ah okay you were in fact being a bit of a bookworm (I didn't see the quotations as I was in reply mode) but, my dude, philosophy has had an inductive nature since the enlightenment and is never reducible to past thinkers. Nietzsche was the first to make this explicit by urging to surpass him, being a philosopher of the future, his Magnum Opus carrying the title of prelude - that was not merely about what is coming for mankind, but about a method of thinking which has been developed from the spark Machiavelli and then the grand arranger Francis Bacon onwards into Schopenhauer who produced the first inductive ontology meaning the first cohesion of ontology and epistemology.

Valuator logic is a technical means to employ this Schopenhauerian synthesis. Nietzsche stands between as an Existentialist, as basically a Sphinx.

Who is I?

I doesn't exist as a subjective experience. Identity, this whole modern "don't let others tell you who you are" is obviously a lie. Identity is identity of other people. Experiencially, that's why it exists and how it makes sense. That's why some people could be god kings. It doesn't mean they thought they were god kings, but that that was what was made of them given the circumstances. A course, identity can be experienced in the sense that certain mechanisms were built for that partial identity, like genes, that can be inhabited experiencially. There is a reason we do not choose our own names.

Subjectivity is experienced. Or experience is subjective. Therefore there IS something that experiences that is not itself experience. This is true. The question for philosophy is: what is that thing? Valuator logic does a good job here, which is a praise that will only be understood by the go-deepers of philosophy. Nietzsche himself felt philosophy had better things to do with its time. Whatever it was, he felt, it was meant to be lived and not defined. Battle as the only form of consciousness that can fully encompass all the relevant elements.

He asked another question. He actually managed to make the subject of experience itself an experience.

A human self valuing in the terms you posit - cosmopolitan terms of inter-human meaning giving which, as despicable as it was, was the inevitable result of Athens' maturity (it was the wine that was produced, sour or not) - includes every one he ever encounters to the extent that this encounter had an impact on either. In the Presocratic paradigm the selfvaluing relates not to other people but to nature and a select few minds (which as minds are like snowflakes, are never remotely comparable, comparable minds emerge only in large pools, in the cosmopolis) and hereby they relate to themselves in more expansive ways - I would argue that social meaning is the strongest meaning giver but not the kingly one. Kingship is in the stars, everything that matters about being a king is to understand the stars.

I don't mean their patterns, I mean them.
This is the way humans properly understand each other - by their respective understanding of the stars. And only some people really attempt such magic as proper understanding.

Who is "I" - it is what resists the social, what offers up a different role any time something places it somewhere - it is simply the snake and the eagle, whichever is required to free itself of the great dragon Thou Shalt which is mankind in most of its form.

Cats, eagles, snakes...
I use Odin. Whatever of him is in me I use, to become more and more something resembling an "I".

The path of the righteous man is indeed beset as the Book has it.
Ecmandu proven wrong - the Torah does not lie, at the very least not in this case.

It, too, is experience, of the densest material.
Experience made of self responsive experience, something of great importance. It was made important by the degree to which it valued.
This book, as do many books, discloses experience - it identifies experience.

Fixed Cross wrote:

Bayesian view of scientific virtues

A number of scientific virtues are explained intuitively by Bayes' rule, including:

Falsifiability: A good scientist should say what they do not expect to see if a theory is true.
Boldness: A good theory makes bold experimental predictions (that we wouldn't otherwise expect)
Precision: A good theory makes precise experimental predictions (that turn out correct)
Falsificationism: Acceptance of a scientific theory is always provisional; rejection of a scientific theory is pretty permanent.
Experimentation: You find better theories by making observations, and then updating your beliefs.

I do not consider any philosophy serious if scientific rigour invalidates it. Philosophy is the very rigour of science.

Value Ontology is all round falsifiable and accurately and universally predictive. Thats why I like it so much.

Scientific virtues are particularly important for refining concepts and conceptual models in terms of discrete experience.

However, there is a crucial problem inherent to all methodologies: that they necessarily cannot arrive at themselves.
What this means with respect to science is that the scientific method was not first founded as a result of implementing the scientific method, as before the scientific method was founded it did not yet exist to found itself.
This is the kind of thing I'm referring to when I'm talking about circular logic.
It's the same as for any logically valid statement, they require at least one given premise to apply logic to.
It's the same as in set theory, for either the set of all sets that do not contain themselves leading to Russell's Paradox, or for a solution to naive set theory such as by Zermelo and Fraenkel that cannot prove itself according to Godel's incompleteness theorems.

There is a remainder - always and necessarily.
It's the same problem as with tautologies not being valid definitions: definitions have to be in terms of something else circularly to have meaning relative to one another.

Given that some knowledge is better than other knowledge, we know for sure that there's a fundamental standard against which all knowledge can be compared non-circularly and without any paradox.
This standard can only be singular in order for the standard to be non-circular, it has to precede everything plural to be non-circular - including all knowledge and scientific method, and it has to be undeniable and unavoidable.
Non-plurality is undivided unity: continuity. It has to encompass everything, or it's leaving out some aspect of existence: it has to be all existence in its entirety in continuous unity.
It has to either exist, or for there to be no possible way to propose any kind of existence. In concrete rather than abstract terms: this is experience.

So you see, scientific virtues like everything else that's discrete and definable come from something else more fundamental, and if there is to be any foundational basis for anything, "coming from something else more fundamental" must not reduce infinitely - there must be a singular starting point. So we see that there is no other possible foundation than Continuous Experience to found everything else - including scientific virtues. To hold Continuous Experience accountable to scientific virtues is either backwards or circular. Logically, there can be no other conclusion than Continuous Experience. Even illogically you can't escape direct experience whilst retaining any grounds of existence at all - Continuous Experience exists unaccountably, and must do however you slice it up.

There is no dent in this theory, by James, yourself or anyone - there literally can't be.

It's not its own cause, continuity defies cause.
You can deconstruct it into causes, but then it's something else: discrete experiences.
But even doing this, as explained above, you physically and logically cannot avoid the inevitability of Continuous Experience.

You're really missing the points Im making. Its not about virues, it is about certainty. We can be absolutely certain that experience is not all there is. And yes, this certainty is also experience. This is what Im getting at; experience shows us certain things.

It is only through faith in the literal truth of language that we can pull of an argument like yours and convince ourselves.

But no one would bet his life on the premise that being equals experience. Not even you, I bet.

Let me make it very explicit and straightforward.

Your theory only works if we abstract "experience" (the word is abstraction) and make it itself a "discrete thing"; the word "experience".

Both "experience" and "continuous experience" and even "non-discrete" are discrete things.

I didn't want to go for this easy refutal as I found it more interesting to refute it through phenomenalist-positivist approach, which I did. But this also works.

surreptitious75 wrote:I would also say that being is experience because being is existence and all experience is existence too
So from an ontological perspective these three words - being / experience / existence - are exactly the same

This is very easy to refute: all living humans have a head, but not all beings who have a head are living humans.

Yes, experience is a form of being.
But it is proven that experience results from a non-experiencing being.

If we want to say that reality ends with our proof and does not include what is proven, then we are making those artificial breaks in existence which experientialism presumes to resolve.

One could also equally say either of the following is true as they mean exactly the same :

Experience is the continuous situation in which discrete situations appear and disappear /
Existence is the continuous situation in which discrete situations appear and disappear /
[ Experience is Existence / Existence is Experience ]

Yes, existence is the situation in which experiences appear, but there is absolutely no argument to be made that existence is sufficiently defined as experience.

Fixed Cross wrote:But dude, you've no addressed my arguments at all!

Yeah I know, I'm just explaining how whatever you think you're arguing, it necessarily can't be valid if it denies Experientialism.

Fixed Cross wrote:Your theory only work if we abstract experience (the word is abstraction) and make it itself a "discrete thing".

The theory works whether we abstract or don't. Experience is directly and concretely unavoidable and undeniable whether or not you abstract it into discrete things. Continuous Experience is the absence of abstraction - it's not a discrete thing - even the words used "continuous" and "experience" respectively imply concrete and fundamental. It's what happens before abstraction, whether you abstract from it or not.

Meno_ wrote:I don't understand why levels of meaning can withstand the charge, that such 'meaning' is somehow at par with other interpretations. Just because it's not understood, the levels of interpretation may correspond with no underlying ' deeper ' lacks between them: efforts to make such claims may murky, or collude them.
As difficult it is to pry for connections, even in such colluded waters, the are merely existentially reduced into epochs where no further clarification can be squeezed out. ( of meaning) Hence this is the reason for the weary effort to separate the phenomenologically patent understanding from the ideas Being inherent, since they patently are colluded within differential sets of continuous functions overlapping in variable sets.
The logic and the logistics are two such sets, and although the differences reside in a grey structural area -they harbor the underlying variations between subjective OR objective criteria, by which they are attempted to qualify, ( with or without 'understanding'), whereby that bounded grey area is loaded into the reduction of the dialectic into substantial, ....
That the failure of that is historically uncontested, -------resulted in the CONCLUSIVE political reality stood on it's head today.
The material substantiality of the ideas underneath, is no example of a double talk, ideas do manifest prior
necessity before literally applying for the after the fact necessity of developing variability in the incorporation of sets belonging even in a set that incorporates it's self, in the continuum.

This is why I observed and remarked to Sil that experience investigates itself (to which he objected that to posit a self is unwarranted, to which I clarified that I did not posit a self but merely observe the concept of experience which his theory seems to leave entirely uninvestigated) and comes to the conclusion that it has a certain place in a greater order.
We can infer this positively from the actual reality of experience.

This is why people are easily mislead by politics, too - they do not really study the implications of words, but only go by the explicit "meaning" (reference).

"Experience" absolutely implies discontinuity. But one has to think about it for a while to realize that.

This is why one cant make an ontology out of a single term.

(VO uses three terms: being is self-valuing and valuing in terms of self-valuing. It extends into modulation, i.e. in a "cosmos", so that process, such as thought, can occur on its account, and from there on, certainty can be established. Certainty isn't as quickly attainable as S, again quite cleverly, suggests.

Paradoxically, it s precisely because synthetic experience is required to establish certainty, that we can not posit experience as an "arche".

How are why are auxiliary questions, and translate as totally redundant saturated sets in an absolute sense.
That sense and sensation are pivotal in this sense, draw analogy with the concept of tautology.
Sure, but that is not the field into which such descriptive apologies can be fitted, in an entropic attempt to handle them in the way Sartre describes Being and Nothingness.
The nothingness is what the abyss represents under the phenomenological existence of the uncertainty, later minimally, in quantum theory.
That the have not been able to find the absolute minimal particle in the 'god-particle , is an irony in disguise, for if god did 'exist' , wouldn't he be capable to cover his tracks? After all he does not play with dice of uncertainty?

In fact, the self-valuing, the "integer" out of valuator logic, takes on he role of "god particle" but not as a physical particle. Why Im rapped Im a "big Higgs boson player"
What coheres the atom is simply - its coherence.

Because, hear this - let me end all the nonsense pseudo-science has been engaging in; everything larger than atoms is uncertain definite. Everything smaller than atoms is uncertain, indefinite. Only the atom itself is certain, definite.

The atom is actually the smallest discrete particle.
Consistency with that, it also lives by far the longest, can in fact exist eternally.

Subatomic physics is like predicting the weather inside of the atom.

We can surely predict heat at the equator, which is like working with electricity.

We work with electrons, but without knowing what or where precisely they are. We can get them moving in directions, but that doesn't mean we grasp their existence.

know google claims otherwise, but Alpha Zero, its chess engine, turns to to be fake as well. Someone just replayed the matches vs Stockfish using the actual Sockfish engine and Sockfish just makes very different moves in reality than in the matches reported to have occurred against Alpha Zero.

Safe to say Im skeptical about Googles claim to have developed Qubits.

This is why the differential is infinitely extended, and the last unit of differencealways have to 'exist', even toward the infinitely variable substantial number.
Why? -
Logic and language and math are such continua, that necessarily always connect at a level, that if it did not 'exist' existence it's self could not exist, could not.

Well that is the Analytical, I would call it early-Wittgenstein fallacy.
Heidegger causes no such problems, for him logic isn't a closed system, and being an open system it can actually resemble reality. (and not end up in entropy, as Experientialism does)
But neither does Aristotle.
I will go into that soon, in The Philosophers thread.

Here , the naturalistic fallacy is a string of near infinite weakness, holding up a mass of near infinite mass of the universe.
This merely an analogy that presents the pressures of a curve of time and space.

The particles and the gaps between them always pre determine their flow, or, their continua, which are nothing else then their functional representation, in the logic-mathematical Sense, and are Similar to the bricks which subsist in the finished building,
The flow is calculated in a calculation of near infinite sets of possible functional derivitives, minus one, creating two identical spheres.
That one is immeasurable in time space, and it does exist in time space, and it does not. It consists in absolute antithesis, of variable synthesis.
Sense resides in non-sense, but not in nonsense.

Indeed.
"A entails B only if A and B share at least one non-logical constant."
-Alan Ross Anderson.

Silhouette wrote:

Fixed Cross wrote:But dude, you've no addressed my arguments at all!

Yeah I know, I'm just explaining how whatever you think you're arguing, it necessarily can't be valid if it denies Experientialism.

Yes I know thats what you're attempting. But one can never explain a dogma - you have simply decided that it is the case and reason from that axiom.
But your axiom would require that you investigate the term of your axiom first, and flesh out its implications.

You never bothered to check the implications of the term.

Fixed Cross wrote:Your theory only work if we abstract experience (the word is abstraction) and make it itself a "discrete thing".

The theory works whether we abstract or don't. Experience is directly and concretely unavoidable and undeniable whether or not you abstract it into discrete things. Continuous Experience is the absence of abstraction - it's not a discrete thing - even the words used "continuous" and "experience" respectively imply concrete and fundamental. It's what happens before abstraction, whether you abstract from it or not.

Actually, all words are abstractions, so all this is, unfortunately, perfectly untrue. Here we can see that Prometheans "outsider" criticism of your theory was quite valid. Yet I like to go a bit deeper and disproved it from the inside.

Valuator logic produces implications.

QED: In classical philosophy a premise was only considered valid if something follows from it;
and it was considered therefore that no one premise can stand alone.

Premise 1: valuing exists. (this is cogito ergo sum stripped of the superstitions of "I" and "think" - I just know that there is willing, requiring, wanting, desiring. I am witnessing it in the first degree.)
Premise 2: valuing as I know it requires a plurality of separate objects which all have their terms of being, under which they were born. (an ashtray is born under the terms of cigarettes, cigarettes under terms of pleasure, pleasure under the terms of valuing.)
Premise 3: valuing is an experience for me, where "me" is the very experience of valuing. Valuing thus experiences itself and this results in the idea of a "self".

"The theory works whether we abstract or don't. Experience is directly and concretely unavoidable and undeniabl"

Yeah, we know experience works whatever the case. What we are discussing here is your abstraction of it, which fails. It dont take a philspher really, for that first part to hold. As you say, it just holds. It is then what you say about it, or your abstraction, which holds just enough to be delicious to refute it. Because it does not hold.

HOOOOOOoooooldddddddd!

Fixed Cross wrote:Yes I know thats what you're attempting. But one can never explain a dogma - you have simply decided that it is the case and reason from that axiom.
But your axiom would require that you investigate the term of your axiom first, and flesh out its implications.

You never bothered to check the implications of the term.

One can never explain a dogma is correct - for the very specific reasons that I've covered.
Yet operating without a dogma is always either baseless or circular, as I've covered, and the only way to reconcile this with the fact that some knowledge is better than others is to have a founding dogma, as I've covered.

In this way, we know a dogma exists by trying to explain around it or without it. This doesn't mean we've explained the dogma, because the dogma necessarily has to be void of explanation. If it wasn't void, it would be part of the explanation and not the inevitable dogma that all knowledge must necessarily regress back towards. You cannot require then that the dogma must be explainable by its implications, because this inverts the dogma to discrete experiences that premise Continuous Experience: committing the fallacy of reverse causation.

Explaining presupposes a dissection, so cannot be a fundmental: explanation can only exist after the existence of a fundamental to ground it. This is why Epistemology must follow Ontology, because knowledge must first of all exist before it can develop. Continuous unity therefore has to be the nature of a fundamental axiom.

It's not an arbitrary decision of mine that experience is this axiom - as I've covered. It's the only possible conclusion. And due to the nature of inevitable dogma, it defies terms and implications itself. And only due to the axiomatic imposition of an unaccountable dogma can you proceed to divide it up into concepts and conceptual models.

Fixed Cross wrote:Actually, all words are abstractions, so all this is, unfortunately, perfectly untrue. Here we can see that Prometheans "outsider" criticism of your theory was quite valid. Yet I like to go a bit deeper and disproved it from the inside.

What does "all" abstract from? There's nothing greater than "all" from which to abstract "all" or it wouldn't be "all". The best you can do is describe "all" tautologously, which is to say "meaninglessly" - simply rephrasing in terms of synonyms - or you can describe it as the sum of its constituent parts: in terms of discrete experiences and losing out on its gestalt. As such, "Continuous Experience" by itself doesn't tell us anything meaningful - it is tautology to meaninglessly rephrase it in terms of synonyms. The words "continuous" and "experience" only function as the remainders of all possible equations that we can construct from discrete experiences - the words may as well be "unabstractable/undefinable existence" or "all". Concretely, "all existence" directly and immediately confronts us as experience, which is unbroken such that nothing can be said about it. But is saying that nothing can be said about it through the word "continuous" really saying anything about it? And is using the concrete term of "experience" saying it's an abstraction? Words are circularly defined terms of discrete experiences, so can never suffice to encompass what they aren't, but "Continuous Experience" is just about the best you can do given the necessity of words to communicate meaningful knowledge. It's a problem even to give "Continuous Experience" a name at all, but to do so exactly fits the problem shaped hole left by dealing solely in discrete experiences - as its inevitable remainder. It doesn't need a name, as it's immediately inevitable with or without having a dissected discrete term to describe. The point is you get to "that which Continuous Experience refers" from either and any direction inevitably.

So your mention of classical philosophy where no one premise can stand alone is false. Philosophy since then, as I covered with mention of Russell, the Zermelo and Fraenkel guys who resolved his paradox, and Godel who poked a hole even in the ZF resolution, has advanced beyond classical philosophy. We already knew about circular reasoning before then (no premise standing alone requires infinite premises - "turtles all the way down" - or circular premises that all try to stand on each other and thereby stand on nothing as a whole). You have to advance on from classical philosophy once you realise its flaws. We already knew tautologies are meaningless and logic cannot exist without premises etc., but those guys formalised this whether they intended to do so or not. I'm simply coining the result as "Experientialism".

Your 3 premises of valuator logic are fine as just another way to have pre-dissected Continuous Experience into discrete experiences and connect them back together into a conceptual model. Let it do battle with other conceptual models of discrete experiences. I'm staying back a step further to address a fundamental problem of Epistemology that it cannot fundamentally be either baseless or circular, with each term relying on a previous premise either indefinitely along a line or indefinitely around a circle, and at the same time have a fundamental starting point. You need an axiom or whatever you say is either linearly or circularly baseless.

Fixed Cross wrote:Premise 1: valuing exists.

That's a declaration.

(this is cogito ergo sum stripped of the superstitions of "I" and "think" - I just know that there is willing, requiring, wanting, desiring. I am witnessing it in the first degree.)

Desiring, anting, willing...and valuing, only apply to life.
To presume that valuing, like willing, is a universal truth, applicable to the non-living, would have to also presume that because you are aware that all existence is aware.
That's a superstition.

Premise 2: valuing as I know it requires a plurality of separate objects which all have their terms of being, under which they were born. (an ashtray is born under the terms of cigarettes, cigarettes under terms of pleasure, pleasure under the terms of valuing.)

An ashtray has a utility that gives it value to the one that designed it.
If it were made from stone then the stone would acquire value to the designer, because of the need/desire ti was made to satisfy - tis utility.
A stone, not even a gold nugget, has an intrinsic value....unless it is given one by a living organism wanting to build a house with it, or a dam, or wanting to display his quality, his rarity.

Premise 3: valuing is an experience for me, where "me" is the very experience of valuing. Valuing thus experiences itself and this results in the idea of a "self".

The fact that organisms evaluate existence using themselves as a standard, or they value what is part of themselves, is nothing new.
The Christians mystified the term 'love' just as you are attempting to do with the term 'value'...and for the same reasons.

What you fail to do is understand the underlying cause of willing, desiring, and valuing. You stop at the subjective experience...like cogito ergo sum....what is the 'I'. Valuing, judging, willing is its expression not its essence. It is what differentiate it from other life forms and form the non-living.
It cannot be valuing itself, for this would be circular.
Why and how do lifeforms evaluate existence?
Yes, using themselves as a standard, but what is the underlying cause of this need to evaluate and to will, and to want and to desire?

Premise 3: valuing is an experience for me, where "me" is the very experience of valuing. Valuing thus experiences itself and this results in the idea of a "self".

Isn't this just kind of a round-a-bout way of saying that by valuing we demonstrate ourselves as valuers? Descartes covered this, so why the emphasis on valuation over thought?

Pedro - What do you mean by "subjective experience"? The reverse of objective object? Identity and difference would seem to be experiential concepts.

Proofs in philosophy require something both immediate and and the loophole of being nebulous and unverifiable.

You can take whatever side you want, although it's considered disingenuous to argue the nebulous and unverifiable side… a side many posters here use.

What is the immediate part? Self evidential!

It is self evidential that nobody wants their consent violated. Consent is self evidentiary. There is no further regress here. Someone who claims they want their consent violated, would be violated by never having their consent violated. Which still solves (even in the opposite case) that nobody wants their consent violated. It's not only self evidentiary, it's a law that non-consent violation is what works for everyone in the ideal.

Since silhouette pointed this out, many other posters here have used it as well, that the phrase "nobody wants their consent violated" solves as a meaningless tautology: "people don't want what people don't want" But obviously here, logic is in it's infancy, because when uttering it's a meaningless tautology and then gets hit on the foot with a hammer, it's now the most important thing to them for this phrase to be understood as NOT meaningless. EVERYONE knows exactly what the phrase, "nobody wants their consent violated" means, and it's disingenuous to call it a meaningless tautology, it is NOT disingenuous to observe that tautologies are not always meaningless, and that logical operators haven't advanced that far for certain circular (self evident) phrases.

It's almost like seeing parrots type to each other "circular bad" "tautology bad"… I know they teach that in school, but this is the real world here.

I personally would really like it if people stopped parroting academia and look at these types of exceptions. "A banana is a banana" is an identity statement, all identity statements are tautologies… HOWEVER, there are many meaningful contexts where identity is not a meaningless way to teach about identity in terms of the existence we all share here.

If philosophy is about justifying word-games, then creativity has to be liberated from realism.
Declaring something and claiming ti is brilliant, is a start. It shows a desire, a need...a pathos.
But even a moron can do that.
How will we differentiate the true insight from the mystical manipulation of desire?
Should we use the oracles of Delphi as our muse?
Should we seek inspiration in the Old and New Testament, and its verbal seductions?
Shall we replace 'love' with 'value' or 'power', and declare it something profoundly new?

Let's do all of that....and more.
Because, I am hungry for the taste of need that has defensively inflated its ego to a theoretical bubble, just begging to be burst.

Need is the most honest expression of self. Desire must hide in pretence.
I see plenty of that on this forum.
My friend was right.

"How will we differentiate the true insight from the mystical manipulation of desire?
Should we use the oracles of Delphi as our muse?
Should we seek inspiration in the Old and New Testament, and its verbal seductions? "

Well, you know, that's the entire point of philosophy. Not relying on anything outside one's own capacity to judge.

Pedro I Rengel wrote:"How will we differentiate the true insight from the mystical manipulation of desire?
Should we use the oracles of Delphi as our muse?
Should we seek inspiration in the Old and New Testament, and its verbal seductions? "

Well, you know, that's the entire point of philosophy. Not relying on anything outside one's own capacity to judge.

Look into yourself. before valuing and willing...what is there?
What sparks willing and valuing and desiring and needing?

What is the pattern?
What does the 'ing' imply?
Value...ing….will...ing...desire...ing….want...ing….
What does a verb imply?
Before willing, valuing, desiring, wanting,...these are but expressions of a kind of this....
I'm not going to tell you.