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I enjoy using my mind and reading philosophy and metaphysics in my old age, but have only a formal 9th grade education (self educated). Trying to fill one of the many large gaps in my understanding here. Been trying to figure out what kind or category of thing truth is considered to be in? Some say it's a quality, others a relation and yet others a property. If it is a property, would it be primary or secondary? I take there to be smart folks here who might be gracious enough to explain this. Thanks.

Blake

Anomaly654

Posts: 146
Joined: Mon Oct 23, 2017 6:55 pm

i will speak on behalf of the epistemological nihilists whom among the ranks i shall stand. there is not a single philosophy of truth which has not suffered its share of criticism, and even correspondence theory and verificationism are not without problems. but perhaps we have always thought 'truth' was something it wasn't... which is to say, maybe there is 'truth' but it's not what we mean when we say 'this is true'. or maybe there are too many things going on at once to be accounted for in producing the nature of 'truth'. wittgenstein liked to say that what and how something can be true is not a matter of a simple logical function that a statement performs. simply following mathematical rules is not enough to produce it. instead it's production involves what he called a 'form of life', something that employs/follows rules and takes steps in many different ways at once... so that when we agree to say 'this is true', we don't move to that conclusion from one simple direction. you could say we make the word 'truth' meaningful by participating in several kinds of conventions... and outside of these conventions, which structure our understanding, there is no truth with a capital T. on that note i think the deflationary theory of truth is where i'll put my money.

here's a great paper written by a dude named david. yup, he's.... black.

*an uneasy silence falls over the eurocentric audience*

https://medium.com/@daviddepriest/on-wi ... 7ea600409e

here's a cool clip too. and that's real shit, bro. W would literally plop right down in the middle of battle and right shit in his notebook. like you know you're having a eureka moment when the bullets flying by you don't even matter.

soundcloud

Harris vs. Peterson; a wittgensteinian exercise in philosophical comedy
promethean75
Philosopher

Posts: 2331
Joined: Thu Jan 31, 2019 7:10 pm

What's true for one person, is not necessarily true for another.

And so, for any worthy theory of true, what is true must be true for all people, and for all time.

Truth has connection to the term 'Gravitas', meaning, that which cannot be denied. In other words, people live with, feel, and experience Gravity everyday of life. Thus it must always be true. However, even this is now refutable, with Astronauts and space-exploration, by which there are now experiences of life without Gravity, and that such a thing could be common in the future. So what is true for all, and for all time, is very elusive and hard to pinpoint.
Urwrongx1000
Philosopher

Posts: 2347
Joined: Mon Jun 19, 2017 5:10 pm

On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense
Frederich Nietzsche

1

In some remote corner of the universe, poured out and glittering in innumerable solar systems, there once was a star on which clever animals invented knowledge. That was the highest and most mendacious minute of "world history"—yet only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths the star grew cold, and the clever animals had to die.

One might invent such a fable and still not have illustrated sufficiently how wretched, how shadowy and flighty, how aimless and arbitrary, the human intellect appears in nature. There have been eternities when it did not exist; and when it is done for again, nothing will have happened. For this intellect has no further mission that would lead beyond human life. It is human, rather, and only its owner and producer gives it such importance, as if the world pivoted around it. But if we could communicate with the mosquito, then we would learn that he floats through the air with the same self-importance, feeling within itself the flying center of the world. There is nothing in nature so despicable or insignificant that it cannot immediately be blown up like a bag by a slight breath of this power of knowledge; and just as every porter wants an admirer, the proudest human being, the philosopher, thinks that he sees on the eyes of the universe telescopically focused from all sides on his actions and thoughts.

It is strange that this should be the effect of the intellect, for after all it was given only as an aid to the most unfortunate, most delicate, most evanescent beings in order to hold them for a minute in existence, from which otherwise, without this gift, they would have every reason to flee as quickly as Lessing's son. [In a famous letter to Johann Joachim Eschenburg (December 31, 1778), Lessing relates the death of his infant son, who "understood the world so well that he left it at the first opportunity."] That haughtiness which goes with knowledge and feeling, which shrouds the eyes and senses of man in a blinding fog, therefore deceives him about the value of existence by carrying in itself the most flattering evaluation of knowledge itself. Its most universal effect is deception; but even its most particular effects have something of the same character.

The intellect, as a means for the preservation of the individual, unfolds its chief powers in simulation; for this is the means by which the weaker, less robust individuals preserve themselves, since they are denied the chance of waging the struggle for existence with horns or the fangs of beasts of prey. In man this art of simulation reaches its peak: here deception, flattering, lying and cheating, talking behind the back, posing, living in borrowed splendor, being masked, the disguise of convention, acting a role before others and before oneself—in short, the constant fluttering around the single flame of vanity is so much the rule and the law that almost nothing is more incomprehensible than how an honest and pure urge for truth could make its appearance among men. They are deeply immersed in illusions and dream images; their eye glides only over the surface of things and sees "forms"; their feeling nowhere lead into truth, but contents itself with the reception of stimuli, playing, as it were, a game of blindman's buff on the backs of things. Moreover, man permits himself to be lied to at night, his life long, when he dreams, and his moral sense never even tries to prevent this—although men have been said to have overcome snoring by sheer will power.

What, indeed, does man know of himself! Can he even once perceive himself completely, laid out as if in an illuminated glass case? Does not nature keep much the most from him, even about his body, to spellbind and confine him in a proud, deceptive consciousness, far from the coils of the intestines, the quick current of the blood stream, and the involved tremors of the fibers? She threw away the key; and woe to the calamitous curiosity which might peer just once through a crack in the chamber of consciousness and look down, and sense that man rests upon the merciless, the greedy, the insatiable, the murderous, in the indifference of his ignorance—hanging in dreams, as it were, upon the back of a tiger. In view of this, whence in all the world comes the urge for truth?

Insofar as the individual wants to preserve himself against other individuals, in a natural state of affairs he employs the intellect mostly for simulation alone. But because man, out of need and boredom, wants to exist socially, herd-fashion, he requires a peace pact and he endeavors to banish at least the very crudest bellum omni contra omnes [war of all against all] from his world. This peace pact brings with it something that looks like the first step toward the attainment of this enigmatic urge for truth. For now that is fixed which henceforth shall be "truth"; that is, a regularly valid and obligatory designation of things is invented, and this linguistic legislation also furnishes the first laws of truth: for it is here that the contrast between truth and lie first originates. The liar uses the valid designations, the words, to make the unreal appear as real; he says, for example, "I am rich," when the word "poor" would be the correct designation of his situation. He abuses the fixed conventions by arbitrary changes or even by reversals of the names. When he does this in a self-serving way damaging to others, then society will no longer trust him but exclude him. Thereby men do not flee from being deceived as much as from being damaged by deception: what they hate at this stage is basically not the deception but the bad, hostile consequences of certain kinds of deceptions. In a similarly limited way man wants the truth: he desires the agreeable life-preserving consequences of truth, but he is indifferent to pure knowledge, which has no consequences; he is even hostile to possibly damaging and destructive truths. And, moreover, what about these conventions of language? Are they really the products of knowledge, of the sense of truth? Do the designations and the things coincide? Is language the adequate expression of all realities?

Only through forgetfulness can man ever achieve the illusion of possessing a "truth" in the sense just designated. If he does not wish to be satisfied with truth in the form of a tautology—that is, with empty shells—then he will forever buy illusions for truths. What is a word? The image of a nerve stimulus in sounds. But to infer from the nerve stimulus, a cause outside us, that is already the result of a false and unjustified application of the principle of reason. If truth alone had been the deciding factor in the genesis of language, and if the standpoint of certainty had been decisive for designations, then how could we still dare to say "the stone is hard," as if "hard" were something otherwise familiar to us, and not merely a totally subjective stimulation! We separate things according to gender, designating the tree as masculine and the plant as feminine. What arbitrary assignments! How far this oversteps the canons of certainty! We speak of a "snake": this designation touches only upon its ability to twist itself and could therefore also fit a worm. What arbitrary differentiations! What one-sided preferences, first for this, then for that property of a thing! The different languages, set side by side, show that what matters with words is never the truth, never an adequate expression; else there would not be so many languages. The "thing in itself" (for that is what pure truth, without consequences, would be) is quite incomprehensible to the creators of language and not at all worth aiming for. One designates only the relations of things to man, and to express them one calls on the boldest metaphors. A nerve stimulus, first transposed into an image—first metaphor. The image, in turn, imitated by a sound—second metaphor. And each time there is a complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different one. One can imagine a man who is totally deaf and has never had a sensation of sound and music. Perhaps such a person will gaze with astonishment at Chladni's sound figures; perhaps he will discover their causes in the vibrations of the string and will now swear that he must know what men mean by "sound." It is this way with all of us concerning language; we believe that we know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things—metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities. In the same way that the sound appears as a sand figure, so the mysterious X of the thing in itself first appears as a nerve stimulus, then as an image, and finally as a sound. Thus the genesis of language does not proceed logically in any case, and all the material within and with which the man of truth, the scientist, and the philosopher later work and build, if not derived from never-never land, is a least not derived from the essence of things.

Let us still give special consideration to the formation of concepts. Every word immediately becomes a concept, inasmuch as it is not intended to serve as a reminder of the unique and wholly individualized original experience to which it owes its birth, but must at the same time fit innumerable, more or less similar cases—which means, strictly speaking, never equal—in other words, a lot of unequal cases. Every concept originates through our equating what is unequal. No leaf ever wholly equals another, and the concept "leaf" is formed through an arbitrary abstraction from these individual differences, through forgetting the distinctions; and now it gives rise to the idea that in nature there might be something besides the leaves which would be "leaf"—some kind of original form after which all leaves have been woven, marked, copied, colored, curled, and painted, but by unskilled hands, so that no copy turned out to be a correct, reliable, and faithful image of the original form. We call a person "honest." Why did he act so honestly today? we ask. Our answer usually sounds like this: because of his honesty. Honesty! That is to say again: the leaf is the cause of the leaves. After all, we know nothing of an essence-like quality named "honesty"; we know only numerous individualized, and thus unequal actions, which we equate by omitting the unequal and by then calling them honest actions. In the end, we distill from them a qualitas occulta [hidden quality] with the name of "honesty." We obtain the concept, as we do the form, by overlooking what is individual and actual; whereas nature is acquainted with no forms and no concepts, and likewise with no species, but only with an X which remains inaccessible and undefinable for us. For even our contrast between individual and species is something anthropomorphic and does not originate in the essence of things; although we should not presume to claim that this contrast does not correspond o the essence of things: that would of course be a dogmatic assertion and, as such, would be just as indemonstrable as its opposite.

What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.

We still do not know where the urge for truth comes from; for as yet we have heard only of the obligation imposed by society that it should exist: to be truthful means using the customary metaphors—in moral terms: the obligation to lie according to a fixed convention, to lie herd-like in a style obligatory for all. Now man of course forgets that this is the way things stand for him. Thus he lies in the manner indicated, unconsciously and in accordance with habits which are centuries' old; and precisely by means of this unconsciousness and forgetfulness he arrives at his sense of truth. From the sense that one is obliged to designate one thing as red, another as cold, and a third as mute, there arises a moral impulse in regard to truth. The venerability, reliability, and utility of truth is something which a person demonstrates for himself from the contrast with the liar, whom no one trusts and everyone excludes. As a rational being, he now places his behavior under the control of abstractions. He will no longer tolerate being carried away by sudden impressions, by intuitions. First he universalizes all these impressions into less colorful, cooler concepts, so that he can entrust the guidance of his life and conduct to them. Everything which distinguishes man from the animals depends upon this ability to volatilize perceptual metaphors in a schema, and thus to dissolve an image into a concept. For something is possible in the realm of these schemata which could never be achieved with the vivid first impressions: the construction of a pyramidal order according to castes and degrees, the creation of a new world of laws, privileges, subordinations, and clearly marked boundaries—a new world, one which now confronts that other vivid world of first impressions as more solid, more universal, better known, and more human than the immediately perceived world, and thus as the regulative and imperative world. Whereas each perceptual metaphor is individual and without equals and is therefore able to elude all classification, the great edifice of concepts displays the rigid regularity of a Roman columbarium and exhales in logic that strength and coolness which is characteristic of mathematics. Anyone who has felt this cool breath [of logic] will hardly believe that even the concept—which is as bony, foursquare, and transposable as a die—is nevertheless merely the residue of a metaphor, and that the illusion which is involved in the artistic transference of a nerve stimulus into images is, if not the mother, then the grandmother of every single concept. But in this conceptual crap game "truth" means using every die in the designated manner, counting its spots accurately, fashioning the right categories, and never violating the order of caste and class rank. Just as the Romans and Etruscans cut up the heavens with rigid mathematical lines and confined a god within each of the spaces thereby delimited, as within a templum, so every people has a similarly mathematically divided conceptual heaven above themselves and henceforth thinks that truth demands that each conceptual god be sought only within his own sphere. Here one may certainly admire man as a mighty genius of construction, who succeeds in piling an infinitely complicated dome of concepts upon an unstable foundation, and, as it were, on running water. Of course, in order to be supported by such a foundation, his construction must be like one constructed of spiders' webs: delicate enough to be carried along by the waves, strong enough not to be blown apart by every wind. As a genius of construction man raises himself far above the bee in the following way: whereas the bee builds with wax that he gathers from nature, man builds with the far more delicate conceptual material which he first has to manufacture from himself. In this he is greatly to be admired, but not on account of his drive for truth or for pure knowledge of things. When someone hides something behind a bush and looks for it again in the same place and finds it there as well, there is not much to praise in such seeking and finding. Yet this is how matters stand regarding seeking and finding "truth" within the realm of reason. If I make up the definition of a mammal, and then, after inspecting a camel, declare "look, a mammal" I have indeed brought a truth to light in this way, but it is a truth of limited value. That is to say, it is a thoroughly anthropomorphic truth which contains not a single point which would be "true in itself" or really and universally valid apart from man. At bottom, what the investigator of such truths is seeking is only the metamorphosis of the world into man. He strives to understand the world as something analogous to man, and at best he achieves by his struggles the feeling of assimilation. Similar to the way in which astrologers considered the stars to be in man 's service and connected with his happiness and sorrow, such an investigator considers the entire universe in connection with man: the entire universe as the infinitely fractured echo of one original sound-man; the entire universe as the infinitely multiplied copy of one original picture-man. His method is to treat man as the measure of all things, but in doing so he again proceeds from the error of believing that he has these things [which he intends to measure] immediately before him as mere objects. He forgets that the original perceptual metaphors are metaphors and takes them to be the things themselves.

Only by forgetting this primitive world of metaphor can one live with any repose, security, and consistency: only by means of the petrification and coagulation of a mass of images which originally streamed from the primal faculty of human imagination like a fiery liquid, only in the invincible faith that this sun, this window, this table is a truth in itself, in short, only by forgetting that he himself is an artistically creating subject, does man live with any repose, security, and consistency. If but for an instant he could escape from the prison walls of this faith, his "self consciousness" would be immediately destroyed. It is even a difficult thing for him to admit to himself that the insect or the bird perceives an entirely different world from the one that man does, and that the question of which of these perceptions of the world is the more correct one is quite meaningless, for this would have to have been decided previously in accordance with the criterion of the correct perception, which means, in accordance with a criterion which is not available. But in any case it seems to me that the correct perception—which would mean the adequate expression of an object in the subject—is a contradictory impossibility. For between two absolutely different spheres, as between subject and object, there is no causality, no correctness, and no expression; there is, at most, an aesthetic relation: I mean, a suggestive transference, a stammering translation into a completely foreign tongue—for which I there is required, in any case, a freely inventive intermediate sphere and mediating force. "Appearance" is a word that contains many temptations, which is why I avoid it as much as possible. For it is not true that the essence of things "appears" in the empirical world. A painter without hands who wished to express in song the picture before his mind would, by means of this substitution of spheres, still reveal more about the essence of things than does the empirical world. Even the relationship of a nerve stimulus to the generated image is not a necessary one. But when the same image has been generated millions of times and has been handed down for many generations and finally appears on the same occasion every time for all mankind, then it acquires at last the same meaning for men it would have if it were the sole necessary image and if the relationship of the original nerve stimulus to the generated image were a strictly causal one. In the same manner, an eternally repeated dream would certainly be felt and judged to be reality. But the hardening and congealing of a metaphor guarantees absolutely nothing concerning its necessity and exclusive justification.

Every person who is familiar with such considerations has no doubt felt a deep mistrust of all idealism of this sort: just as often as he has quite early convinced himself of the eternal consistency, omnipresence, and fallibility of the laws of nature. He has concluded that so far as we can penetrate here—from the telescopic heights to the microscopic depths—everything is secure, complete, infinite, regular, and without any gaps. Science will be able to dig successfully in this shaft forever, and the things that are discovered will harmonize with and not contradict each other. How little does this resemble a product of the imagination, for if it were such, there should be some place where the illusion and reality can be divined. Against this, the following must be said: if each us had a different kind of sense perception—if we could only perceive things now as a bird, now as a worm, now as a plant, or if one of us saw a stimulus as red, another as blue, while a third even heard the same stimulus as a sound—then no one would speak of such a regularity of nature, rather, nature would be grasped only as a creation which is subjective in the highest degree. After all, what is a law of nature as such for us? We are not acquainted with it in itself, but only with its effects, which means in its relation to other laws of nature—which, in turn, are known to us only as sums of relations. Therefore all these relations always refer again to others and are thoroughly incomprehensible to us in their essence. All that we actually know about these laws of nature is what we ourselves bring to them—time and space, and therefore relationships of succession and number. But everything marvelous about the laws of nature, everything that quite astonishes us therein and seems to demand explanation, everything that might lead us to distrust idealism: all this is completely and solely contained within the mathematical strictness and inviolability of our representations of time and space. But we produce these representations in and from ourselves with the same necessity with which the spider spins. If we are forced to comprehend all things only under these forms, then it ceases to be amazing that in all things we actually comprehend nothing but these forms. For they must all bear within themselves the laws of number, and it is precisely number which is most astonishing in things. All that conformity to law, which impresses us so much in the movement of the stars and in chemical processes, coincides at bottom with those properties which we bring to things. Thus it is we who impress ourselves in this way. In conjunction with this, it of course follows that the artistic process of metaphor formation with which every sensation begins in us already presupposes these forms and thus occurs within them. The only way in which the possibility of subsequently constructing a new conceptual edifice from metaphors themselves can be explained is by the firm persistence of these original forms That is to say, this conceptual edifice is an imitation of temporal, spatial, and numerical relationships in the domain of metaphor.

2

We have seen how it is originally language which works on the construction of concepts, a labor taken over in later ages by science. Just as the bee simultaneously constructs cells and fills them with honey, so science works unceasingly on this great columbarium of concepts, the graveyard of perceptions. It is always building new, higher stories and shoring up, cleaning, and renovating the old cells; above all, it takes pains to fill up this monstrously towering framework and to arrange therein the entire empirical world, which is to say, the anthropomorphic world. Whereas the man of action binds his life to reason and its concepts so that he will not be swept away and lost, the scientific investigator builds his hut right next to the tower of science so that he will be able to work on it and to find shelter for himself beneath those bulwarks which presently exist. And he requires shelter, for there are frightful powers which continuously break in upon him, powers which oppose scientific truth with completely different kinds of "truths" which bear on their shields the most varied sorts of emblems.

The drive toward the formation of metaphors is the fundamental human drive, which one cannot for a single instant dispense with in thought, for one would thereby dispense with man himself. This drive is not truly vanquished and scarcely subdued by the fact that a regular and rigid new world is constructed as its prison from its own ephemeral products, the concepts. It seeks a new realm and another channel for its activity, and it finds this in myth and in art generally. This drive continually confuses the conceptual categories and cells by bringing forward new transferences, metaphors, and metonymies. It continually manifests an ardent desire to refashion the world which presents itself to waking man, so that it will be as colorful, irregular, lacking in results and coherence, charming, and eternally new as the world of dreams. Indeed, it is only by means of the rigid and regular web of concepts that the waking man clearly sees that he is awake; and it is precisely because of this that he sometimes thinks that he must be dreaming when this web of concepts is torn by art. Pascal is right in maintaining that if the same dream came to us every night we would be just as occupied with it as we are with the things that we see every day. "If a workman were sure to dream for twelve straight hours every night that he was king," said Pascal, "I believe that he would be just as happy as a king who dreamt for twelve hours every night that he was a workman." In fact, because of the way that myth takes it for granted that miracles are always happening, the waking life of a mythically inspired people—the ancient Greeks, for instance—more closely resembles a dream than it does the waking world of a scientifically disenchanted thinker. When every tree can suddenly speak as a nymph, when a god in the shape of a bull can drag away maidens, when even the goddess Athena herself is suddenly seen in the company of Peisastratus driving through the market place of Athens with a beautiful team of horses—and this is what the honest Athenian believed—then, as in a dream, anything is possible at each moment, and all of nature swarms around man as if it were nothing but a masquerade of the gods, who were merely amusing themselves by deceiving men in all these shapes.

But man has an invincible inclination to allow himself to be deceived and is, as it were, enchanted with happiness when the rhapsodist tells him epic fables as if they were true, or when the actor in the theater acts more royally than any real king. So long as it is able to deceive without injuring, that master of deception, the intellect, is free; it is released from its former slavery and celebrates its Saturnalia. It is never more luxuriant, richer, prouder, more clever and more daring. With creative pleasure it throws metaphors into confusion and displaces the boundary stones of abstractions, so that, for example, it designates the stream as "the moving path which carries man where he would otherwise walk." The intellect has now thrown the token of bondage from itself. At other times it endeavors, with gloomy officiousness, to show the way and to demonstrate the tools to a poor individual who covets existence; it is like a servant who goes in search of booty and prey for his master. But now it has become the master and it dares to wipe from its face the expression of indigence. In comparison with its previous conduct, everything that it now does bears the mark of dissimulation, just as that previous conduct did of distortion. The free intellect copies human life, but it considers this life to be something good and seems to be quite satisfied with it. That immense framework and planking of concepts to which the needy man clings his whole life long in order to preserve himself is nothing but a scaffolding and toy for the most audacious feats of the liberated intellect. And when it smashes this framework to pieces, throws it into confusion, and puts it back together in an ironic fashion, pairing the most alien things and separating the closest, it is demonstrating that it has no need of these makeshifts of indigence and that it will now be guided by intuitions rather than by concepts. There is no regular path which leads from these intuitions into the land of ghostly schemata, the land of abstractions. There exists no word for these intuitions; when man sees them he grows dumb, or else he speaks only in forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of concepts. He does this so that by shattering and mocking the old conceptual barriers he may at least correspond creatively to the impression of the powerful present intuition.

There are ages in which the rational man and the intuitive man stand side by side, the one in fear of intuition, the other with scorn for abstraction. The latter is just as irrational as the former is inartistic. They both desire to rule over life: the former, by knowing how to meet his principle needs by means of foresight, prudence, and regularity; the latter, by disregarding these needs and, as an "overjoyed hero," counting as real only that life which has been disguised as illusion and beauty. Whenever, as was perhaps the case in ancient Greece, the intuitive man handles his weapons more authoritatively and victoriously than his opponent, then, under favorable circumstances, a culture can take shape and art's mastery over life can be established. All the manifestations of such a life will be accompanied by this dissimulation, this disavowal of indigence, this glitter of metaphorical intuitions, and, in general, this immediacy of deception: neither the house, nor the gait, nor the clothes, nor the clay jugs give evidence of having been invented because of a pressing need. It seems as if they were all intended to express an exalted happiness, an Olympian cloudlessness, and, as it were, a playing with seriousness. The man who is guided by concepts and abstractions only succeeds by such means in warding off misfortune, without ever gaining any happiness for himself from these abstractions. And while he aims for the greatest possible freedom from pain, the intuitive man, standing in the midst of a culture, already reaps from his intuition a harvest of continually inflowing illumination, cheer, and redemption—in addition to obtaining a defense against misfortune. To be sure, he suffers more intensely, when he suffers; he even suffers more frequently, since he does not understand how to learn from experience and keeps falling over and over again into the same ditch. He is then just as irrational in sorrow as he is in happiness: he cries aloud and will not be consoled. How differently the stoical man who learns from experience and governs himself by concepts is affected by the same misfortunes! This man, who at other times seeks nothing but sincerity, truth, freedom from deception, and protection against ensnaring surprise attacks, now executes a masterpiece of deception: he executes his masterpiece of deception in misfortune, as the other type of man executes his in times of happiness. He wears no quivering and changeable human face, but, as it were, a mask with dignified, symmetrical features. He does not cry; he does not even alter his voice. When a real storm cloud thunders above him, he wraps himself in his cloak, and with slow steps he walks from beneath it.

-End-

Pedro I Rengel
Philosopher

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Fuck you, Ludwig.

Pedro I Rengel
Philosopher

Posts: 4291
Joined: Mon Feb 05, 2018 2:55 pm

Truth has been badly abused by philosophers. I will tell you the truth about truth, but it's not likely to be helpful in studying philosophy.

One of Nietszche's points, above, is that truth is one of those nouns... there are some adjectives that we insist on giving a noun form. This works well enough in common parlance for the word "true" and it's noun form. But philosophers have really fucked this up. The first thing to know is that "true" applies only to statements (in the general sense in which we are discussing this) and that its noun form is, in philosophyat, a reification.

This is one factor in the birth of philosophical metaphysics. Metaphysics is a violent rape of language.

Faust
Unrequited Lover of Wisdom

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Faust wrote:Truth has been badly abused by philosophers. I will tell you the truth about truth, but it's not likely to be helpful in studying philosophy.

One of Nietszche's points, above, is that truth is one of those nouns... there are some adjectives that we insist on giving a noun form. This works well enough in common parlance for the word "true" and it's noun form. But philosophers have really fucked this up. The first thing to know is that "true" applies only to statements (in the general sense in which we are discussing this) and that its noun form is, in philosophyat, a reification.

This is one factor in the birth of philosophical metaphysics. Metaphysics is a violent rape of language.

When I consider what truth is,
it is basically a way of saying yes to what you are.

We experience our experiences, and call those experiences truth.
As we experience the self, we feel it.
The feeling feels like truth.

Instinct is different than knowledge,
but some animals have some serious instinct capacities.

Behavior and choice is the act of saying yes to instinct.

Alligator mothers take their hatchlings to the river in their mouth.
They don't chew/eat their babies.
This isn't because their parents trained them,
or god told them this or that.
Instinct is a way of guiding the being in its life.
Instinct is close to knowledge, reason, and truth.
https://dannerz.itch.io/ -- a new and minimal webside now hosting two of my free game projects.

Dan~
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Location: May the loving spirit of papa hitler watch over and bless you all.

Truth is only a reification if you don't have the stones to hold it as a description of what is true.

Of course there is truth.

Anything else is nihilism.

Nietzsche said it, when addressing Kant. Cannit be really known? No. And a certain type celebrates this.

That's why we have wisdom. If truth could be known, we wouldn't have wisdom. Sophia, saber. ¿Saber qué? Haha!

Nietzsche thought similar to you, but with a crucial difference. Whereas you see the rapists and go: the woman is ruined, Nietzsche said, if truth is a woman, have all philosophers so far not been really awkward and embarrasing? It speaks not of truth, but of philosophers. Also not of philosophy.

Truth applies only to statements? Well I guess in the sense that food applies only to teeth. Your putting the pussy up on a pedestal. The pussy here being semantics, or language if you don't want to be all pedanditc.

Pedro I Rengel
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Often the roots of words have jokes on those who "reify" the words. Language just means toungueage. Latin just says lengua, toungue. You are talking about toungue like it's all reified and shit, joke's on you. Or philosophy having love in it, and being touted by all these loveless bastards. Good joke, really.

Greeks were mastrs at this. Not the joke part, the words part.

Pedro I Rengel
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You know how we know there's truth?

Because there's lies. This is where zoot gets it backwards. He says if blang is bleng and bleng is skurt, then skurt is blang and so "is" is not constitutively true. But because we know that blang is not bleng and skurt not blang, since we know it is a lie, we know there is truth, that is is in some meaningful sense. That something actually is. Because we know the other to be a lie, really beyond a shadow of a doubt. That is a retarded statement, bleng is blang.

Pedro I Rengel
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Maybe on acid bleng is blang. But if bleng can be blang, that only furhter proves the point.

Pedro I Rengel
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I guess that's the main point here. People love doubting truth, but who have you ever seen doubt lie?

Pedro I Rengel
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There are no truths, so we create our own truths but when you create your truth so do other people create their own truths also which becomes a problem overtime concerning legitimate consensus and because of such there is a competition of whose truths gets to be the ultimate truth. The dominant ones establish dominant social orders and out of that what is dominant prevailing truth . So as the dominant one you eliminate those people by civil debate, cultural absorption, religious conversion, war, political persecution, slavery, intimidation, or even murder and then establish your own created truth as the ultimate truth which then amongst your followers overtime becomes objective.

After several generations it just becomes objective established fact.
"I'm sorry, but the lifestyle you've ordered that you've grown accustomed to is completely out of stock. Have a nice day! "-$$Zero_Sum Evil Neo-Nazi Extraordinaire. Posts: 2876 Joined: Thu Nov 30, 2017 7:05 pm Location: U.S.S.A- Newly lead Bolshevik Soviet block. Also known as Weimar America. ### Re: Question about truth I thank each of you for your response. Have read them all--except could only get through about 1/3 of 3rd post...time constraints. But the question remains unanswered: is truth from the philosophical perspective a quality, property, relation or something else? Or is truth a thing in its own category? Thanks. Anomaly654 Posts: 146 Joined: Mon Oct 23, 2017 6:55 pm ### Re: Question about truth Anomaly654 wrote:I thank each of you for your response. Have read them all--except could only get through about 1/3 of 3rd post...time constraints. But the question remains unanswered: is truth from the philosophical perspective a quality, property, relation or something else? Or is truth a thing in its own category? Thanks. Truth is what power makes it to be for truth requires enforcement along with equally enforced perception and the elimination or restraining of all skeptical mental doubts of it by others. "I'm sorry, but the lifestyle you've ordered that you've grown accustomed to is completely out of stock. Have a nice day! "-$$\$

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I understand that the notion of the absolute is abhorrent to many within philosophy and without. Further comments on the presentation below are welcome.

Absolute_02.jpg (8.18 KiB) Viewed 2381 times

The graphic above represents absolute values A through E. These are arranged in bundles of existents on the left labeled 1-4. An observer occupies arrow on the right, and observes the bundle changes through a timeline. Can start from either top or bottom.

I maintain that all the observer is able to perceive is the mutability of existents as they undergo change through time. In the fluid world of change, the absolute elements don't stay put long enough to be observed. But if mutability consists in the rearrangement of absolute components into ever-evolving configurations, it is mutability itself that is illusory, right?

Anomaly654

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Anomaly654 wrote:I thank each of you for your response. Have read them all--except could only get through about 1/3 of 3rd post...time constraints.

But the question remains unanswered: is truth from the philosophical perspective a quality, property, relation or something else? Or is truth a thing in its own category? Thanks.

The question is flawed. It's a value placed on a statement, or in other words, a claim. Statements are either true or false. Statements are the only things that are either true or false. To determine which they are, you need a theory of truth, and there are several to choose from. Your observations about the statement are applied to the theory. Or, youy must make a seperate judgment about the observations of others.

There is no direct answer to your question because it contains way too many assumptions for there to be an answer.

This is difficult. You may never understand this, but you can try. Hint: there is no "philosophical perspective." There are many, most of them useless.

Faust
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Faust wrote:
Anomaly654 wrote:I thank each of you for your response. Have read them all--except could only get through about 1/3 of 3rd post...time constraints.

But the question remains unanswered: is truth from the philosophical perspective a quality, property, relation or something else? Or is truth a thing in its own category? Thanks.

The question is flawed. It's a value placed on a statement, or in other words, a claim. Statements are either true or false. Statements are the only things that are either true or false. To determine which they are, you need a theory of truth, and there are several to choose from. Your observations about the statement are applied to the theory. Or, youy must make a seperate judgment about the observations of others.

There is no direct answer to your question because it contains way too many assumptions for there to be an answer.

This is difficult. You may never understand this, but you can try. Hint: there is no "philosophical perspective." There are many, most of them useless.

I think somehow, instinct can relate.
Without instinct, we would not find the opposite gender appealing.
Without instinct, food would not be desirable.

When we affirm / say yes to our instincts,
that is part of the expression of "my truth".
Without instinct, nothing is important.

I was hoping you would like my posts, Fausto.

Yay for holism.
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But if mutability consists in the rearrangement of absolute components into ever-evolving configurations, it is mutability itself that is illusory, right?

this sounds like something parmenides might say.

but let me give you some inside info on this infatuation a lot of philosophers have with the concept of 'change'. to be perfectly clear, we don't know enough about the universe to talk about 'change' on such a grand philosophical scale. locally we observe it all the time, but in order to say it's a fundamental characteristic of all that exists, we'd have to be able to prove that no past or present 'state' of the universe has ever existed more than once... and we sure as shit can't do that.

when we think about shit like this it's difficult to avoid a brain freeze. we can, however, make sense out of one simple line of reasoning: if energy is finite - meaning no new energy can be introduced into the system from outside the system (even in talking about 'inside' and 'outside' systems, we're already fucked) - and time is infinite, not only at some point will there be a repetition of some prior arrangement, but that repeat will happen an infinite number of times. see? brain freeze.

think of a box of marbles. shake the box up. now stop. observe the position of the marbles. now shake it up again. stop. observe the position of the marbles. do this over and over ad infinitem. because there are only a limited number of marbles, there's only so many relative positions all the individual marbles can ever be in. now substitute those marbles for sub-atomic particles, and the box for the universe. bada bing, bada boom. that's the whole story. this is why democritus was called the laughing philosopher.

but was he laughing because he found this absurd and expected existence to possess a little more mystique... or because all the other philosophers were making such a tremendous noise over something so simple? probably a little of both.
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promethean75
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Anomaly654 wrote:I thank each of you for your response. Have read them all--except could only get through about 1/3 of 3rd post...time constraints.

But the question remains unanswered: is truth from the philosophical perspective a quality, property, relation or something else? Or is truth a thing in its own category? Thanks.

Truth can be all, a quality, property, relation, and something else.

To Philosophy, Truth is Unknown as a premise. Philosophy is not like Science or Religion. In Science, Truth is in the process, in the Middle. In Religion, Truth is in the premise, in the Beginning. In Philosophy, Truth is in the conclusion, in the End. Philosophy starts with what is Unknown, and works toward knowing it. Philosophers don't start with "knowing Truth", but try to end with knowing Truth.

Religious types, the opposite, start with "God" and "Truth". They believe they are Righteous (Truthful) from the start.
Urwrongx1000
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I always like your posts, Danno.

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Faust wrote:It's a value placed on a statement, or in other words, a claim. Statements are either true or false. Statements are the only things that are either true or false.

Let's just look at this for a second. Just one second. Try to remember the last time you sat on a rock, a stone. You were sitting on a stone. That is true, you don't need theories to know that is true or blablabla, pretty simple, you know it is true. You were sitting on a rock. Does the truth of this apply only to my having said it? Before I said it, was there no truth value to you having sat on a rock? The fact of it, rather than the sentence?

See what I mean? It puts you in a ridiculous position.

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Thanks to all for the input. I only post occasionally and other than getting philosophy from the internet (SEP & other philosophy sites and whatever papers I can find without signing up for some membership) operate in a vacuum. It's good to hear the opinions of those who actually know philosophy from time to time. Have to say Uwrongx1000's answer comes closest to what I'm looking for...never looked at truth that way (beginning, middle, end depending on goal of the organization studying it). Makes sense. Of the options property, relation, etc. discussion has more or less confirmed my suspicion that truth doesn't fit neatly into a tidy category.

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Hi

A last shot here. I do not think one has to go to philosophy even, to find truth.
Although it would be useful to start teaching philosophy in junior high, we have to apply our individual takes on what truth is, because lets face it, the decisions we make in our teen age years that need truth to be considered, will pre-empt in most cases the university years, if we ever get there.

We must pick and choose the truthful ways of perceiving our reality at that time, and try to project that toward the ends we see as appropriate for ourselves.
Some if it comes from parent's teaching, some from our friends and neighbors, our early work environment, some from basic intuitive gut level feelings.

Lastly , we suddenly realize the need for change, irrespective what the truth is, of acting more in behalf of others then ourselves, that is the most profound rebelation ever. and it is really not a contingency at all, it dictates categorical necessity. When it is not considered in this way, the other, for whom usually, one feels and owes compelling responsibility , may be hurt, and by that token it becomes a debt, a sin of omission which comes back and hurts the owner of the debt.
Last edited by Meno_ on Sat Nov 16, 2019 5:12 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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The problem with teaching philosophy to children that young is that most children are born with, and to a great extent still possess at that age, an innate understanding of the difference between real life and make-believe. They are in no position to accept metphysics as anything but nonsense while that is the case.

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