Meno's lucky suggestion

[Guide]

Meno has suggested that in the service of public-spirited courageous and diligent effort to seek wisdom I should consider things as a judge. A judge must hear out, and allow to speak, all those with something to say. However, by ancient rule, there is a limit to the breachy absurdities of the legists, for they must not extend their liberty to contumacious obstruction of the investigation. Ergo, there must be, reserved, the possibility of contempt of court.

[Guide]

The issue of the basic principle of discourse saved.

[promethean75]

motion to continue, your honor.

[Meno_]

motion to continue, your honor.

Second the motion

[Carleas]

The suggestion is a good one, but I agree with Guide's critique. Judges are able to rely on the power of the state, and they are most effective when there is a strong and presumptively legitimate force backing them up. That implicit threat alone tends to rein in some of the "breachy absurdities", made credible by the actual exercise of that power by holding in contempt those who aren't reined in. Without the backing of a strong state, one can only be so judge-like.

But in terms of disposition, there may be desirable ways of being judge-like without power. The first that comes to mind is keeping the larger picture in mind when discussing a specific case. This means, first, applying general principles to specific cases, aligning the principles across cases, and considering how various principles that may resolve this case would work in other cases (or have worked in previous cases).

But it also means keeping in mind the role of a specific case in maintaining the institutions of the law, and conducting oneself (and, where one wields the power of a strong state, requiring that others conduct themselves) in a way that bolsters legitimacy and enforces norms that are conducive to the broader truth-seeking. Real world examples of this are courts making narrow rulings, deferring to administrative interpretations, strictly enforcing standing requirements, and following precedent. All of these can sometimes lead to sub-optimal resolutions in specific cases, but across many cases they tend to support the integrity of the court as an institution, and gives them more political capital to act in those cases where they must take more decisive action.

How this might apply for a non-state-backed individual in the real world is to increase the weight given to following rules of decorum, declining to employ some more brutal tactics when not necessary, avoiding the scorched earth even if it means only partially responding. One example might be avoiding dishonest or even misleading arguments. A scrupulous adherence to truth can be a liability in specific instances, obligating one to use less effective framings and to acknowledge weaknesses in ones own position. But it supports the institution of truth-seeking as a whole. One facet of being judge-like is to give things that support the broader truth-seeking mission, despite their effects on local disagreements or discussions.

[Meno_]

scrupulous adherence to truth can be a liability in specific instances, obligating one to use less effective framings and to acknowledge weaknesses in ones own position. But it supports the institution of truth-seeking as a whole. One facet of being judge-like is to give things that support the broader truth-seeking mission, despite their effects on local disagreements or discussions.


This is true. However primciple. and application often diverge, and it is the duty of the tryimg judge to be honest in weighing this difference in fact, if not exterraniously only by subtle reference to both parties.

In fact , not everyone can be a Solomon, not less any judge of merit who can underestimate or over value the juror's ability to comprehend the implications. Nevertheless , it is with the higher standard, that he has.to view it, in order to set down some kind of precedence for some future occasion that could honestly hold up.


What is significant in this age old judgement?

How is an equitable judgement determined in a changing social environment?

Lets start with such quickly changing standard tenets of a few decades ago, when the Catholic dictum of the value of life totally left unprepared for such issues as : abortion, termination if life, artificial implantation and trade in organs, and the list goes on.

Is Solomon's Judgement appear less outlandish today, when coincidentally there presents a world wide occurance of trading body parts out of actually murdered personages includinkg children, where euthanasia can be prescribed by doctors open to solicitation by increasing fees? (and even unperscribed?)

These issues chime into Solomon's judgement as dialectically reactive with the value of life as receptive to negotiation?

And finally, what could precipitate such reactions? Well, for one in cases where revenge, jealousy correspond to instigation of these feelings, upsetting and reversing civil versus criminal elements, it becomes highly argumentative weather justice can fairly be upheld.
In today's politically uncertain reality, where justices suffer the intrusion of extra judicial forces, such formal application of the ideals which previously served as adequate basis for equal justice, can no longer guarantee them.

Precedents could , very well adhere to unprecedented j value judgements, with varying interpretations as to their local and universal dispositions.

Therefore, if a few decades can do this, then such reliance may prove useless even in the quest to integrate local and universal adjudications.

Therefore generally, to a tourist, equivocation is much more difficult to attain than previously., and that is not employing a luck based situation where venue, competent jurists and sensible instructions tend to convey an optimal judgement. The reasonable man is far tougher to find,.

[Meno_]

A scrupulous adherence to truth can be a liability in specific instances

While the apparent failure to negate a falsehood may serve a higher purpose as an asset , as well..