Did Heidegger Define 'Dasein' in Being and Time?

Define:

  1. to state or set forth the meaning of (a word, phrase, etc.):
  2. to explain or identify the nature or essential qualities of; describe:
  3. to fix or lay down clearly and definitely; specify distinctly:

If we refer to Dictionary meanings; we get

Dasiein =
existence : self-conscious human individuality
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Dasein

(in Hegelianism) existence or determinate being; (in existentialism) human existence.
en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/dasein

In wiki:
Dasein (German pronunciation: [ˈdaːzaɪn]) is a German word that means “being there” or “presence” (German: da “there”; sein “being”), and is often translated into English with the word “existence”.

I believe the above do not represent an accurate representation of the term ‘Dasein’.

While in Being and Time Heidegger did describe ‘Dasein’ with various statements, I believe Heidegger did not define what Dasein is precisely.
Basically Heidegger do not believe in definition when discussing ontology, i.e. to make definite and to limit something in words. Heidegger’s approach to ontology is hermeneutical and phenomenological.

So, do you agree/disagree with the above?

If you think Heidegger did define ‘Dasein’ what is his definition of Dasein [provide reference from BT] and explain how such a definition is sufficient to represent the concept of Dasein?

[quote=“Prismatic567”]
Define:

  1. to state or set forth the meaning of (a word, phrase, etc.):
  2. to explain or identify the nature or essential qualities of; describe:
  3. to fix or lay down clearly and definitely; specify distinctly:

If we refer to Dictionary meanings; we get

Dasiein =
existence : self-conscious human individuality
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Dasein

(in Hegelianism) existence or determinate being; (in existentialism) human existence.
en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/dasein

In wiki:
Dasein (German pronunciation: [ˈdaːzaɪn]) is a German word that means “being there” or “presence” (German: da “there”; sein “being”), and is often translated into English with the word “existence”.

I believe the above do not represent an accurate representation of the term ‘Dasein’.

While in Being and Time Heidegger did describe ‘Dasein’ with various statements, I believe Heidegger did not define what Dasein is precisely.
Basically Heidegger do not believe in definition when discussing ontology, i.e. to make definite and to limit something in words. Heidegger’s approach to ontology is hermeneutical and phenomenological.

So, do you agree/disagree with the above?

If you think Heidegger did define ‘Dasein’ what is his definition of Dasein [provide reference from BT] and explain how such a definition is sufficient to represent the concept of Dasein?[/quote

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Who am I?

I basically agree about the phenomenological genesis , in as much he considers the a priori ground that Kant categorically accepted, but hermeneutically found the transcendence , all the way from Aristotle’s logics incapable to unite all the different modes of being which made such transcendence present through time.

How could it be defined other then the various ways You listed them through the various references, because again, the semantic descriptions can not totally describe Being in, the structural changes that signify the passing of time.

Semantics and syntax are the current method to describe the different meanings associated with it.

I guess this is why he was reluctant to explain it, since he had reservations about a Sessaure who could not be envisioned post scriptively, nor sign theory .

My point is, that people who try to understand Heidegger’s intention, can not bypass this difference because simply, they will then generate A neo platonic model, as did Kant.

Heidegger tore into it, but he reverted to an analytic, whereas Kierkegaard I believe posed it as such, and such, but using an aesthetic mode of unification.

Seem to recollect this much from existentialism.

And for the same reason, I would imagine, you will omit most of it, where Heidegger was reluctant, such structural analysis by way of hermenautical analysis, is equally difficult. But who am I to argue, and an existential ‘hole’ defeats Dasein other than in a non singular way.

Sartre failed to use a social ground, because of the disillusionment he had with socialism .ca.1956, and that left the New Left to evolve out of that disillusion in the 1960’s, leaving those convinced, that it can still mean something objectively.

What is this objectivism?

Descartes reaffirmed the objective being, the reasonable man, where the subjective notion of who he-man, is, could be reasonably constructed, by by the ground of his being, the logos , which states, or assumes the basic idea: ’ I am who I am’

That basic idea, of self identity, appears simple enough, and in Greek drama, that identity was defined by the wearing of a mask , which defined a role, of who that character was, or was SUPPOSED to be. The character was assigned that role, probably by the gods, as Narcissus was assigned the role of self recognition, failing, punished by same gods.

This self recognition originated the notion of self doubt, hence the premise of the dialectic of development from the self as a subject to one of object.

How other to to use this process as a gain of objectivity by the only tool available, that is thought, particularly , the thoughtful , man, as the object of his own self, by the use of his reason

He is , after all reasonable, this whole idea evolving out of his being, that he can transcend hos subjective mode of representation(the Narcissus problem) into a recognition that he is not who he thought he was, (the other)

This deep recognition , the primal dynamic behind reflection , is the motive behind all transformative dynamics between the empirical and the analytic -logos. And at every moment in life, it appears as an instantenious idea, the assumed idea of the subjective basis of man. The object , or the 'realness of man as a thinking, reasonable object of his own, PARTICULAR being, is objective through his own self representation, as existing in time.

But this time is complex, because its at once the here and now, and at the same time. back when. Its both: now(timeless) and back then, or eternal.

The reasonable man can assume that the object(I’ve) of Being, is to gain eternity through individual existence, and man can actually arrive there, by the ideals inherent by the gods original intention to be good, just, beautiful, wise men.

The irrationality of this argument created a schism in men, that of what men appears to BE, as subjects sometimes disobedient to the godly laws, and what men ought to be, as prescribed by some inbred category of these ideals, as they ought to be. That’s Kant.

Heidegger emphasizes that the reasonable of man is questionable, and man as an object to his own self awareness is due merely to the perception of him as the other, and although he does not throw away the notion of an ideal self, be places it on a level of freedom of choice leading to the approbation of the will to be.

Man is thrown into this realization of his dual nature, a god perhaps who places him into a position of responsibility for his own being. Man is neither good or bad, basically he merely exists to gain the ground of his own objectivity.

Confession: I merely stumbling in the dark to presently find my own ground, my own reason for living: apart from, but at the same time, in comerade-ship with other searchers., and Lambigious comes to mind here.

Its not that I am not in the hole, as well, but I try to look in the history of thought, major theme which relate with generic congruence, to my particular existence here and now.

I can not be satisfied by a total mobilization of prior structural elements, just because of the failure of Descartes to do so.

Finally, as regards to intellectual contraptions, as a side note , perhaps an obswrvation could be helpful here:

We arrived at nihilism through these very contraptions, and without them we wouldn’t be in them in the first place. Getting out has been the concern of all modern and post modern thought, and I can’t see getting out without at least utilizing some of said same ideas: For instance, a reversal of religious motives on the basic level of contradiction may help is look at the Antichrist, as an anti hero, beyond evaluating that idea in terms of good or evil , useful , here and now?

Or basically the floating idea of anti philosophy reaffirm a trenched in new consciousness?
That may be useful, as the tenuous and doubtful opinions on anti-psychiatry has reduced the mentally challenged into total drug reliant zombies in many cases.

These, and many other concerns will occupy men’s minds for a long time to come.

Noted the rest of your points.

nb: Other than direct reference to BT, at present I only have 70% confidence level to represent Heidegger’s views in my own words. So let me know if I am wrong.

According to Heidegger the idea of Being is so universal that it cannot be defined based on any preceding and existing knowledge. Since Dasein is the exemplary representation [model] for understanding Being, Dasein cannot [should not] be determine specifically and definiteness.

The study of Being and Dasein is ontology, thus;

The approach to the Meaning of Being has to phenomenological;

The phenomenological approach do not address the ‘what’ [definition - what is] but the ‘how’;

I believe the above are some reasons why Heidegger did not provide a overall specific definition for ‘Dasein’. There are various reasons to justify the point but it is very tedious to present all at once.

I believe You pretty much covered it, in fact, Your H quote is pretty parallel to the notes above.

Actually, its a good example of the addage, that sometimes the most complex ideas are the simplest and conversely.

The point I was trying to make, that it took thousands of years to find out that, which is currently understandable at first glance, intuitively. But intuition and backwards look encapsulated thoughts in abbreviated ideograms, as is the case as well with mathematics. Equations like the quadratic equation are nowadays derived by high school students, once, and forgotten as proof and become facts without proof. That’s the same kind of thing which is present here, in time, the flow of ideas becomes hypothetical truisms for the person who tackles problems in what we call current time. It is topically loaded with information , but reduced to a linear diagram, just like computers whose memory is laid out on linear diagrams…

This is the empirical imminent plane, but it does contain the transcendence which is nothing else but millions of planes compressed onto fewer and fewer ones… calling them planes, and the derivation for the sale of simplicity have been symbolized as two fold: transcendence and Imminance.

The thing is, sure we can recapture the calculus of functional progressive acceleration of imminent ideas, but they become more and more metaphorical toward a mythological base: in that way, a retro logic of the old Kantian either or, or even further , the Greek dialectical reasoning, captures time backwards.

I think this is the essence of Dasein, and your demonstration does capture its what-ness, nut the how ness alludes, not because of misunderstanding, but the approach to the absolute state of totally abbreviated quantum slice, whose further and further effective de-materialization of these symbols(languages); can not appreciatively nail down the ‘what’.

This problem didn’t start today , it has started in ancient times when Arisroreles and Plato took different routes. Its intriguing that this study of meanimg can be reconstructed for an argument filled with more and more metaphoric content . The metaphore . ingeniously had come to be used , particularly by Nietzsche, to express the ideas into the future, thereby kind of extend the field of symbolic significance to the meaning of Dasein.

This is why the constant checking of imminent variables reminds one of the continuous integration that inputs the next output and so on. Leibniz was instrumental in this.

In a sense there is a huge debt of H to Leibniz through Kant.

Meno, noted your points.

I wrote this in the OP;

While Heidegger did not intend to define Dasein ontologically and existentially, he did make a few statements on Dasein ontically and existentielly, e.g.

The above appear to be ‘definition’ of Dasein but they are only superficial designations given to ‘Dasein’ and it not meant as definition in the ontological sense.

I believe the above and many similar statements related to Dasein e.g. mentioned of “I” and “mineness” has seduced many to regard ‘Dasein’ as related specifically to a human individual, e.g. what Iambiguous is doing.

I have collected 20 pages of statements [there are more] where the term ‘Dasein’ is specifically mentioned. Actually we could say these 20 pages of narrations related to Dasein represent what is essentially ‘Dasein.’

Specificity and universalism can not be related , because specific contextual or partial descriptions take away from the universal concept , whereas the sum total of the singular ideas, as compared to the planes of reference cut through time, existentially suspended, and can only infer the existence of other planes of particular referential contexts.

That is why any description of any particular existence cannot offer a universally continuus designation . They can not be indexed with the same language because separation can not entail totality, a totality of Dasein which is a continuum of various planes of.reference flowing through time.

This appears rather simple , but an apparent simplicity is bought at a price of hidden costs.

Agree.

Heidegger avoided the ‘whatness’ of Dasein, i.e. not a thing of substance and stated Dasein is appropriately ‘possibilities’ or ‘potentiality.’

The point here is when reading BT one should not jump at any statement that one fancy about Dasein and claim it to be the final definition of ‘what is Dasein.’ Rather one should read the whole of BT and understand [not necessary agree] fully what [the central theme] Heidegger is actually driving at within BT.

What is critical is one should resist the pull of the inherent and natural temptation to reify Dasein as something of substance [like Descartes’ reifying the ‘I AM’].

But the thing is seemingly the ‘fact’ which represents all misinformation over the intentional writing of the German philosophers, having pointed to them already, who they were extremely influential in very specific ways, - to be misprepresented.

I think they were aware, of this singular weakness, and there really is no cure, because the way reification sets in as a process and not as an idea. That is the crucial difference some may not be able to get on account of the way mindsets work.

From what I have read of Kant and Heidegger they did denounce and warn of reification in various ways.
The point is the reification tendency is a very primal instinct and Kant warned;

When Kant wrote his Critique of Pure Reason [CPR], I believe the writers then were not mindful of the good traits of writings, i.e. his one statement run into almost half a page before a full_stop. However despite the difficulty of reading the CPR, the substance and logic of the whole CPR is impeccable of one solid argument with premises that follow one after another to its conclusion.

One of the best German philosopher with good presentation was Schopenhauer.

Heidegger’s logic was also solid but he had no choice but to use loads of neologisms to get his ideas across [which was not very successful].