Moderator: Only_Humean
Meno_ wrote:James S Saint wrote:Meno_ wrote:Can molecular intelligence be inferred from the way photons behave in a two slit experiment?
No. Young's Double-Slit Experiment is no longer a mystery for some of us.
Thanks for that, but further the point of re-defining intelligence in terms of affectance, not limited to basic organic material still has relevance in progress and planned studies in cybernetics ? The implantation of intelligence microchips is in the works, where the aim not only restricts the development of higher artificial intelligence, but a fusing with existing human intelligence, as well.
vocativ wrote:
Correlation does not imply causation. It’s is one of the bedrocks of science—of rationalism...
...But now, a new study in the Journal Of Machine Learning Research may change that, with an innovative statistical trick that can determine cause and effect based solely on observational data. The results suggest that correlation not only implies causation, but that correlation can prove causation—under the right conditions.
Source: vocativ.com
Wikipedia wrote:Saussure posited that no word is inherently meaningful. Rather a word is only a "signifier", i.e., the representation of something, and it must be combined in the brain with the "signified", or the thing itself, in order to form a meaning-imbued "sign".
Meno_ wrote:I think I do that's why decoding is a lot more guess work then coding. The question of probable schema is retroactively a structural problem, where as determination correlates basically by formative alignments between what has been caused by a. Hain of determinants based on originalintention and most likely outcome. This outcome is commonly misunderstood within its own sense of signification. I too hope I put it right.
The ontogenesis of intentionality within the flow of time.
Pandora wrote:*sigh* ...just when I came across this...
https://www.sciencealert.com/physicists ... modynamics
encode_decode wrote:Meno_ wrote:I think I do that's why decoding is a lot more guess work then coding. The question of probable schema is retroactively a structural problem, where as determination correlates basically by formative alignments between what has been caused by a. Hain of determinants based on originalintention and most likely outcome. This outcome is commonly misunderstood within its own sense of signification. I too hope I put it right.
The ontogenesis of intentionality within the flow of time.
You do understand what I am saying - I am so happy. A guess as it turns out is a fairly simple process with very few steps involved and the neocortex is able to perform this function with ease - the preceding networks are also able to perform this function albeit with less agility.
Meno_ wrote:I think I do that's why decoding is a lot more guess work then coding. The question of probable schema is retroactively a structural problem, where as determination correlates basically by formative alignments between what has been caused by a chain of determinants based on original intention and most likely outcome. This outcome is commonly misunderstood within its own sense of signification. I too hope I put it right.
Meno_ wrote:The ontogenesis of intentionality within the flow of time.
Meno_ wrote:Its almost like a coincidence that perception has taken a center fold between Dasein and atomism, in the current staging of the first three posts in philosophy course that could change by the time its read. In fact reading it changes its sequence so one would never know.
Meno_ wrote:Such is with picking up signals consequential or rather sequential reference, causation may be reinterpreted as causal determinants are interchanged, between signs and signaling. The ontogenisis may not really base on a determinate syntax.
Meno_ wrote:This is a psycho philosophical exchange very early based on my conversations with Hobbes' Choice. Really, though , I was still fishing as would a big fish in a small pond, but that was a while ago.
Magnus Anderson wrote:My own theory of signs (or semiotics) is similar to de Saussure's semiology in that I accept his signifier-signified dyad as being fundamental. This is also where I differ from Peirce who thinks that his sign-object-interpretant triad cannot be reduced to a dyad. I certainly don't understand Peirce's obsession with triads. Where I am similar to Peirce is in my broad understanding of the concept of sign. To me, every relate-correlate relation can be considered a signifier-signified relation. Every relate can be considered a signified and every correlate can be considered a signifier. A light bulb, for example, being a correlate in relation to a light switch, can be considered a sign of a light switch. Whenever you press the light switch, the lights turn on. By reasoning in a backward fashion, the process that Peirce calls "abduction" or "retroduction", we can say that whenever the lights are on there was someone in the past who pressed the light switch. The lights thus become a sign of someone pressing the light switch in the past. A sign is basically any piece of information that we can use to make an accurate assumption regarding something unknown. That's what a sign is in the general sense of the word.
Wikipedia wrote:Saussure posited that no word is inherently meaningful. Rather a word is only a "signifier", i.e., the representation of something, and it must be combined in the brain with the "signified", or the thing itself, in order to form a meaning-imbued "sign".
Meno_ wrote:Another interesting tie in is the difference between connotive and a denotive uses of language. Connotations are a mixed breed using many forms, unrelated to or, related variously, sometimes mixed with emotive fragments, which minimize the differences between reality and perception.
encode_decode wrote:Can we say that perception is a part of reality?
We are a part of reality and we perceive so perception is a part of reality.
I have frequently heard it contended that the truth isn't so easily defined, that every individual has his own particular view of reality. The suggestion is that in light of the fact that each of us sees the world through our own particular eyes, reality itself is distinct to each one of us.
The suggestion is that in light of the fact that each of us sees the world through our own particular eyes, reality itself changes from individual to individual.
While it's a fact that everybody sees reality in an unexpected way, reality does not care about our observations. Reality does not change to adjust to our perspectives; the truth is what it is. The truth is reality. The truth will be truth.
Reality, be that as it may, isn't generally a known, which is the place that an impression of reality comes in. While the truth is a settled factor in the condition of life, each view of the truth is a variable.
There is no competition between reality and perception, only between each individuals perception.
Each of us is a part of reality and so is our perception.
encode_decode wrote:Meno_ wrote:High again.
I think that has been clarified to an extent sufficient to our purposes. (As far as. I can gather) Thanks
I knew you were going to say that - I had already composed that post prior to the comments that Magnus and yourself last made and was not going to post it but I do read back over these threads when I come to composing/writing up material for my website so I thought I had better conclude with it.
Sorry about the ambiguity.
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