I agree with what you say about first order abstractions, and proceeding to widen the scope.
What I am trying to say is that it becomes more possible for truths to be truer, the further away they are in abstraction - just the same as if it were physical distance. You have noticed that this is at direct odds to what such truths “are true to” (i.e. reality). This is the issue that I am trying to explain: the most true things that can be said are the furthest away from the reality that they are supposed to be true to. In allowing more true things to be said, one compromises on the usefulness of truth - i.e. its applicability to reality. I think you in fact agree with this, from what I understand from what you’ve said.
The distinction that I started developing a few years ago is that between truth and utility - that they are inversely proportional. It may not be clear from what I’ve said so far that I am replacing truthfulness to reality with utility so as to make a distinction between this kind of “truth” and increasingly syntactically true statements such as those of maths and logic. In more familiar philosophical terminology, I am proposing an inverse proportionality between synthetic and analytic truths. The analytic truths are the more distant sounding and they are more able to be true. The synthetic truths are closer to reality and more useful, but more and more flawed and untrue.
My issue is with referring to both truthfulness to reality and internally consistent truths is that they are both referred to as truth. That they both increase in opposition to one another can only be confusing, so I decided to only call one direction truth and the other utility. Since the closer and closer one gets to reality, the more dependent one is on interpretation, and the further and further one gets into abstraction the more clearly true statements can become, I decided to reserve the term “truth” for the latter. The further back towards reality you bring these truths the more useful they are, hence the naming of its opposite as “utility”.
It can seem a little anti-intuitive according to the contemporary usage of the two terms - and things like Socratic reasoning tended to align truth and utility - but I find it more valuable to distinguish the two for the purposes of solving philosophical disputes about the nature of truth.
Hopefully that helps explain my position a little better - I did suspect it might have been my fault for explaining things insufficiently. Feel free to continue to disagree though, if you still do.
As a tangent, I do enjoy correcting heliocentrism (and obviously geocentrism too) in light of relativity. Since there is no absolute space (or time), there are no points in space from which to definitively state speeds up until the speed of light: relative to a particular perspective, the planet hasn’t moved at all. So according to your analogy, I am not insane - neither clinging to the status quo like a geocentrist nor smoking too much like the heliocentrists… that’s my proof and I’m sticking to it :-"