So freedom or choices are casually related to their substance, but directly to identifiable logical choices.
In other words it matters little if one knows there are girls at the party, what does matter is the freedom to go or abstain from going.
This leaves a divide between two types of logic. The one where it would be helpful to acquaint ones’ self with only going if there were quite girls there, is contingent upon, the ability to know. If you do not know, then it is a kind of categorical duty to find out, if, the primal reason to go would be to meet quite girls. Why would you go if they are not there?
Or is there some overbearing block why you could find out, even if you should? Perhaps your friend is like Descartes’ Evil Genius, he wants to trick you into a game of chance, that perhaps, he knows there are girls there, but in fact there are none, because he is jealous of you, and he wants to take the quite girls to a different party?
But is this realistic? Is information gathering that poverty ridden, as to prevent gaining the knowledge of the girls presence at the party only from this one person, who may hate you by now?
I think the difference lies in a richer environment, where there are several ways you should go to the party, and giving your choices more substance. Otherwise, it is not really a choice with inherent information.
Again the point is, in the later, contingency is present, giving choices real evaluative ability based on facts, while in the former it is merely a choice based on identifying your own feelings rooted in guessing. It is not a contingent choice, but a necessary one.
It’s almost like saying, with limited to none information of the whereabouts of the gurls, all you need to do is identify your own internal feelings on the matter.
A normative theory needs both necessary internal reasons, and external information to validate them.