Moral obligation and the demandingness objection

For my PhD thesis I am writing and defending a new normative theory. Part of this process is gathering objections from many different sources and then discussing the most interesting or common ones in an objections chapter.

I have previously posted a thread here relating to the first two chapters of my thesis but it has gotten quite long so I felt it best to create a new thread for the third chapter. Below I have posted a link to the third chapter of my thesis, relating to moral obligation and the demandingness objection. Please have a read of it and, if you think I’m wrong about anything or there is any problem with what I am saying, please tell me so. If you make good or interesting points, I will include them in the objections section of my thesis and will reference you either by your forum name or your real name as you prefer.

Link: drive.google.com/open?id=0B00h0 … nJUWDBoWlk

Thanks for your time and I look forward to reading your feedback.

From my perspective, you seem to totally miss the point. If you assume that you already know good from bad, the whole issue of morality is trivial to resolve. There would be no morality discussion or debate. The entire issue concerning morality is about what is truly good and bad behavior. Without precisely defining what it is that constitutes good and bad, discussing whether one behavior is better or worse than another is presumptuous (unworthy of a doctoral dissertation).

I notice you have commented on my previous post where I posted the chapters where I specifically discuss what it is that makes an action good or bad. Did you read that section?

I apologize if I have erred, but I remember merely commenting upon a few other comments and unresolved issues in that thread. I quickly skimmed the original dissertation and felt it a little too disjointed for detailed analysis. Although perhaps I merely overlooked it, I didn’t see anything that would identify good and bad other than a few general ideas of some things considered to be good (such as “freedom”). Good and bad cannot be defined by listing and discussing in detail a few things that people usual consider to be good or bad.

If you had to define “good” with one sentence, what would that unambiguous definition be?

Defining “good” in one sentence is a little tricky without first defining “bad”.

If I were to define “bad”, used here in the sense of moral disvalue, in one sentence I would say it was: The violation of person’s freedom over that which already belongs to them; their mind, their body and their freedom.

Then I would define “good” as: The reduction or prevention of violation(s) of person’s freedom over that which already belongs to them; their mind, their body and their freedom.

I accept your apology. It would probably be a good idea to read that section first if you are having troubles with the concept of measuring the “good” and “bad” caused by an action in the categorization of that action is obligatory, permissible, impermissible or supererogatory.

This is just so abstract and fuzzy.

What is a ‘violation’? What is ‘freedom’? How can ‘freedom’ belong to a person?

And what the heck is “a person’s freedom over … their freedom”??? :laughing:

Why not use the word ‘sovereignty’ instead of the word ‘freedom’ ? Doesn’t it fit the intention better?

What is good about ‘freedom’ in itself?

You left out “belongs to” … :confused:
Many people assume that other people “belong to” them.

So food or better plumbing is not good unless it reduces or prevents a violation of freedom over someone’s mind or body. Is preventing decay or damage included in “preventing a violation”? By “their freedom”, I assume that you mean “their spirit”. And if so, everything impedes free spirit, including moral codes (which is their whole point). All laws would be “not good” regardless of how much more freedom those same laws might promote in other ways. The presence of other people would definitely be “not good”.

Perhaps it would be better to say, “Good is whatever decreases decay of mind, body, and spirit”.
… aka Anentropy.

Sorry, I meant “Their mind, their body and their property” Rather than “Their mind, their body and their freedom” Had been working on a paper on the existence of free will for quite a while when I wrote that post and brain was a little fried.

No I very much don’t mean spirit. By freedom I mean the ability to understand and make choices, in this case those choices over that which already belongs to the person; their mind their body and their property.

Yes, people assume all sorts of things that are wrong.

“Sovereignty” and “freedom” both come with baggage I don’t want. We could talk about “The ability of persons to understand and make choices” instead if you wish.

Hope that clears up some of the confusion.

So, I take it by “property”, you are referring to government ordained property. And of course, that makes morality dependent upon government politics. Your morality could sharply change from Obama to Trump.

… and you apparently don’t understand what “spirit” means, so we will let that one go.

No I do not mean government ordained property. I mean that which rightfully belongs to a person, assuming that property of that kind is even possible.

“Spirit” means lots of things in lots of contexts. It can be used to refer to a demeanor, a ghost, an alcoholic beverage, in conjunction with other terms to indicate a common feeling or set of ideologies. How are you using the word?

Then you remain horribly ambiguous and undefined.

In your context, it means a person’s urgings, their “pursuit of happiness” (to put it in Constitutional terms). In general the word merely means one’s essential behavior identified as a conceptual being in itself, much like saying that rotation is the spirit of an electric motor.

Can I ask exactly which doctorate you are to be granted?

Yeah I thought you meant something like that… Now I can say with clarity that I don’t mean that.

Yes property is a bit ambiguous by necessity because it isn’t well justified really. How come person can come to count external stuff, such as some land, among those things that they ought to have the ability to decide what is done with, is not really justified well. There are attempts such as “we can come to own unowned property by mixing our labor with it” or “we can come to own unowned property by staking a claim to it so long as we leave as much and as good for everyone else”, but these don’t really work. I discuss this in those chapters you skimmed. My response is to just assume it’s possible and talk about it as if it is, and leave the caveat that if it turns out it isn’t possible, we can just ignore all references to freedom over property and carry on without it.

Also, as it is now after midnight here: Merry Christmas.

The “ability to understand and make choices” sounds like ‘reason’ or ‘the ability to reason’. While ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ are good, can they be called moral goods? It seems to be a useful tool but not a moral good.
One can use ‘reason’ to be immoral.

How does mind “belong” to a person? How does body “belong” to a person? Who/what is the person if not the mind and body?

A person is indeed a mind, saying that a mind belongs to a person is little more than that a person owns themselves. Body almost ditto though I suppose we should make the small concession that it is at least logically possible that the dualist is right.

Understanding choices is indeed about reasoning, but being able to make them isn’t. I can understand that choice to not chop my hand off and keep it attached to my body, but I can’t make that choice for myself if you show up wielding a cleaver and hack it off.

It’s easy to operate a machine which one does not own. One may be controlling the body without owning it.

All I’m saying is that if your thesis is based on a concept of ‘ownership’ or ‘rightful ownership’ then that’s an assumption - one that should be removed in order for your theory to have greater validity.

One needs to be able to reason in order to recognize the available choices. And one needs the ability to reason in order to effectively decide on a choice.
If one cannot reason, then one is not morally responsible … that’s the insanity defense in the legal system.

I guess that I don’t get your ideas about freedom and how it fits in with morality.

No matter what the situation, there will be limits and constraints on a person. Which of them are moral/good and which are immoral/bad?

If I can’t fly by flapping my arms, does that mean that I don’t have freedom? No

Do I have more freedom at an ice cream store which sells 20 flavors compared to one which sells 5 flavors? It doesn’t seem so.
What if some ice cream sells for more money than I have in my pocket? Even that doesn’t seem to be a limitation on freedom. (It seems to me, personally, because the only real freedom is in your mind - freedom of thought. :smiley: )

Of course, there are those who say that ice cream should be available to everyone without cost. Is that possible or practical? :evilfun:

Except that it seems that one is one’s body, not a separate entity from it.

That isn’t insanity, that’s something quite different, but yes obviously one needs to be able to reason in order to be a moral agent.

Yes, that is where the freedom “over that which belongs to the person; their mind, their body and their property” comes in. It’s not the case that one ought to be as free as possible, it is only the case that one ought to be able to understand and make their own choices.

Yes it would be practical and possible to have free ice cream for all, so long as you have enough resources and don’t mind losing them to others, but it isn’t (at least on the surface) a morally relevant issue. Whether you have ice cream or not is not a choice that belongs to you if you don’t have any ice cream, there is no moral obligation to ensure you can have ice cream if you want it.

Instead of ice cream , substitute free food, shelter, electricity, heat, internet …

Then it’s morally relevant. Right?

How does it work for something like adultery? The adulterer understands and makes a choice. (As does the non-adulterer.)

How does freedom come into it?

It doesn’t, adultery isn’t morally relevant except to the extent that they might be risking diseases to their partner. But apart from that and possible niche cases involving contracts, what you have there is a personal issue, not a moral one.

As for free food, well sort of. Food itself isn’t a moral issue, but it affects several bodily freedoms as well as the freedom to continue living. So yes, it is a moral issue but something of a complicated one. Is it best to give everyone free food? What about those who don’t need it? Should we perhaps give free food to those who ask for it? What about studies showing that giving out money tends to be more effective? Should we then give out money to everyone, and how much? Will that be affordable to the state and will it create perverse incentives?

Essentially these are all practical questions relating to how we deal with the fact that some people in our societies are starving, I have an opinion on what ways would be effective, but it is essentially a question of facts not values. My answer to the question of value you seem to be asking, that is, should we help those who are starving or do not have a place to live, is yes, we should.

I’m asking you to show how your proposed moral system handles the situation.

It has been a moral issue for thousands of years and in various societies. It seems odd that you can toss it aside as a non-issue. Any interaction between two or more people is in the realm of ethics.

What about monogamous sexual relationships? You’re going to say that it’s not a moral issue?

Do you have a list of moral issues that you can discuss? Can you explain how your system works in some specific examples?