Consciousness is not a thing. It is a process, as in to be conscious OF a thing. So consciousness per se, cannot be defined, because it is itself a definition of that process.
So to consider IT, is akin to treating it as if it had an objective existence.
Sure it is described as such, but it doesent equal to it. Equivocation is beyond the sense of description.
Remote recognition of linkages is based on re-cog nizeable qualitative attributes of resemblances, whereas quantifiable identities of formal logically formed identities are the ones based on presumtions.
James, regardless of the above it is understandable of how identifiable and identity can become conflated, just as in the sense that psychologists define developing process.
In the origin of consciessness, in a baby, there is no individual sense of difference, in what has come to be termed as primary and secondary process.
If you look at identity, based on remotely recognizable instances, of objects, the practical aspect of such differences are not at all obvious. Hence to look for differentiatable qualities within specs of thousands of a millimeter are trite, and hence differences attributed to similar things have to be traced toward the origin. But at the origin of any similar things there are no conscious differences about any things, even the difference between a baby and it’s mother are unre-cognizable, since the newborn considers no difference. Very shortly can the basis for the absence of the mother be appreciated, but even so at the earliest level, it only appears, as if part of the baby’s plenum was missing, in a different sense as a clean cut away logical distinction.
If it would be objected that the psychological involvement is akin to a dog chasing it’s own tale, whereby giving no rise to the assertion that a psychology of consciousness would be inseparable from the underlying process of consciousness described in physical terms, it would make sense.
But at the same time, it would strengthen, not weaken the argument for the conflation at the origin.
Any analysis in purely in terms of the physical scientific methods of description, would be a-posteriori, and the analysis presumably introducing unwarranted terms of logical significance, bypassing the so called presumption of the necessity for identification.