The Grand Scheme

To ‘problematize’ “value”.

Too vague. Elaborate.

It may be hard to decipher for a bored, untested mind because it is the very opposite of vague.

It is an aphorism that is as sharp as aphorisms get.

But it remains an aphorism; one needs the carry powerful weight in philosophy to address it (to be addressed by it).

And yet it’s not even a sentence.

Okay, how is to ‘problematize’ “value” different from to problematize value?

And how is that different from to not problematize value?

And can you provide us with a particular value of your own to which this is applicable.

Also, if another suggests that what you value is wrong how more or less problematic will/can that discussion become?

I’d say the single quotation marks are “scare quotes” whereas the double ones mark an actual quotation–which in this case, with no information about the source of the quote, must simply mean the word “value”. (I personally don’t distinguish between different kinds of quotes in this way, using single marks only for quotes within quotes.) So what I think Fixed Cross is suggesting here is that we turn the term “value” into what certain minds outside of the in-group addressed by him would consider a problem. His address may be titled “The Grand Scheme” because “problematizing” “value” is a “scheme” which is “grand”, and/or because such “problems” are not really problems in the grand scheme of things; they are only problematic for the small-minded.

It is the “scheme” of “creating value” to promote “value”.
… " ".

Maybe, but the part that interest me most still revolves more around this:

And can you provide us with a particular value of your own to which this is applicable.
Also, if another suggests that what you value is wrong how more or less problematic will/can that discussion become?

That way we can bring the words out into the world of actual human interactions and explore the extent to which whatever meaning he aims to impart in them might be made relevant to that which is of most interest to folks like me: How ought one to live?

Is there or is there not anything remotely the equivalent of a “grand scheme” here? And are there or are there not ways in which to make a rational distinction between the “small-minded” and the “high-minded”?

I think this calls for a quote:

“When President Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union ‘the evil empire’, right-thinking persons joined in an angry chorus of protest against such provocative rhetoric. At other times Mr. Reagan has said that the United States and the Soviet Union ‘have different values’ (italics added), an assertion that those same persons greet at worst with silence and frequently with approval. I believe he thought he was saying the same thing in both instances, and the different reation to his different words introduces us to the most important and most astonishing phenomenon of our time, all the more astonishing in being almost unnoticed: there is now an entirely new language of good and evil, originating in an attempt to get ‘beyond good and evil’ and preventing us from talking with any conviction about good and evil anymore. Even those who deplore our current moral condition do so in the very language that exemplifies that condition.
The new language is that of value relativism, and it constitutes a change in our view of things moral and political as great as the one that took place when Christianity replaced Greek and Roman paganism.” (Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind, “The German Connection”.)

Christianity–the preparation of whose replacement of Greek and Roman paganism already began around the time of Socrates, by the way–provided a simple answer to the question how one ought to live: “by being good as opposed to evil–i.e., by accepting Christ as one’s Saviour, etc.”

One “problematizes” “value” by showing–as you do, because you see it–that there is no obvious (self-evident) reason for valuing, say, life over liberty (“choice”) or vice versa; in other words, that there is no simple answer to the question how one ought to live. Even the simplest answer is paradoxical:

When the question how one ought to live is not answered before it is raised, the simplest answer to it is the following: “Until the answer to that question is found, the most rational answer to it is: ‘One ought to live in the service of the quest for that answer.’” Hence “Philosophical Supremacism”.

But this supposes that there is such an answer. Is there an indisputable value? Valuation itself is a rational value, but reason rests on a merely axiomatic self-identical “A”. Thus “knowledge” undermines itself; the only Being we know is the self-asserting Being…

We, the philosopically royal we, contend that high-mindedness consists in asserting one’s own high-mindedness, in asserting the assertion of one’s own high-mindedness, in asserting the high-mindedness of one’s self-assertion! The problematicness of our value does not scare us off…

Ave Sauwelios

Independently of your work, a phrase that comes up explaining my position on quantumprocessing to Pezer (on which he agrees);

“yes-gradient”

How pretentious.

There does not appear to be a moral foundation – a transcending font – that mere mortals can turn to in a Godless universe. Yet even that can only be a subjective assumption. After all, what particular mere mortals have any of us here come across who are actually able to demonstrate that a God, the God does or does not in fact exist?

Instead, each of us starts with one or another rendition of God or No God. And, if No God, one or another rendition of Reason. And, if Reason, one or another rendition of a deontological contraption [philosophical realism] or one or another rendition of ideology [political idealism].

And this [in my view] is rooted largely in dasein.

Nietzsche for example connected the dots and “thought up” the idea of the “Uberman”. But all this is [in my view] is Nietzsche’s own existential rendition of how men ought to live “naturally” given that there is no God able to embody the one and only one “supernatural” narrative/agenda.

It is just one of hundreds of political agendas that have been passed down to us through the ages. As were the more “scientific” agendas of Darwin and Marx and Freud.

But doesn’t it always come down in the end [b]to[/b] that which we are able or not able to demonstrate as “true for all of us”? After all, we can claim to believe or to know…anything. And we can create either more or less sophisticated arguments that are said to be true or not true depending almost entirely on conflicted sets of dueling definitions and deductions.

Which just brings me back to this:

1] …can you provide us with a particular value of your own to which this is applicable?
2] …if another suggests that what you value is wrong how more or less problematic will/can that discussion become?

And that’s the part embedded largely in conflicting goods and political economy. Or so it seems to me.

Same here.

What “on earth” do you mean by this pertaining to your own interactions with others?

Or is it – the Grand Scheme itself – meant merely to be ironic?

I disagree with you about Nietzsche, because I don’t think there’s a (fundamental) difference between his “there is no God” and your “(in my view) it’s all largely rooted in dasein”. His Übermensch is a largely open concept. What’s clear, however, is that, unlike you, an Übermensch will not wallow in the infirmity of dasein, but affirm it and thereby sublate it.

Your wallowing is clear from your last paragraph, your conclusion, your “what it always come down to in the end” (which however your infirmity forces you to phrase as a question): you’ve halted at “what it seems like to me”; you’re halted before the threshold which one must will oneself across, have the strength of will to cross, muster the strength to cross–again and again.

We’ve had this discussion before. If, say, aborting you baby furthers philosophy more, you should abort it; if keeping it furthers it more, you should keep it. But how do you know? You don’t, you have to consider how it seems to you and then make a decision

It means I value self-assertion insofar as it’s self-aware–i.e., aware of the “fact” that it’s an assertion. What this means pertaining to my interactions with others I will leave, in part, to your imagination: what do you think happens when one asserts oneself as high-minded for such a self-aware self-assertion? But I won’t just leave it to your imagination, as this correspondence is itself an interaction of mine with another…

What does “merely ironic” mean when irony both means what it says and its opposite?

To ‘problematize’ would involve ‘problem-solving.’
To apply problem-solving techniques to “value” we need to quantify ‘value’ in some effective approaches to establish some initial grounds and bases for relative comparisons.
There are many ways to quantify “value” e.g. axiology.

Over and again I make it clear that dasein can educe either positive or negative embodiments of nihilism. Yes, to the extent that I am entangled in my dilemma, I recognize the essential futility of any particular political prejudice that I might have come to embrace existentially. There are no necessarily moral or immoral behaviors. And the extent to which I embrace one or another personal opinion is rooted subjectively/subjunctively in the life that I have lived. Rather than through, say, a philosophical analysis a la folks like Plato or Descartes or Kant.

Or Nietzsche. The Übermensch is no less a political prejudice derived from a set of subjective assumptions that Nietzsche made regarding human interaction in Godless universe. Just as are all the political contraptions concocted by those who reject it.

But there is clearly a distinction to be made between “there is no God” and “largely rooted in dasein”. In other words, as this pertains to moral and political values. After all, someone might reject God but then merely replace Him with one or another rendition of Reason:

1] a dogmatic political ideology or
2] a deontological philosophical agenda

But, from my perspective, both approaches become embodied psychologically in this:

[b][i]1] For one reason or another [rooted largely in dasein], you are taught or come into contact with [through your upbringing, a friend, a book, an experience etc.] a worldview, a philosophy of life.

2] Over time, you become convinced that this perspective expresses and encompasses the most rational and objective truth. This truth then becomes increasingly more vital, more essential to you as a foundation, a justification, a celebration of all that is moral as opposed to immoral, rational as opposed to irrational.

3] Eventually, for some, they begin to bump into others who feel the same way; they may even begin to actively seek out folks similarly inclined to view the world in a particular way.

4] Some begin to share this philosophy with family, friends, colleagues, associates, Internet denizens; increasingly it becomes more and more a part of their life. It becomes, in other words, more intertwined in their personal relationships with others…it begins to bind them emotionally and psychologically.

5] As yet more time passes, they start to feel increasingly compelled not only to share their Truth with others but, in turn, to vigorously defend it against any and all detractors as well.

6] For some, it can reach the point where they are no longer able to realistically construe an argument that disputes their own as merely a difference of opinion; they see it instead as, for all intents and purposes, an attack on their intellectual integrity…on their very Self.

7] Finally, a stage is reached [again for some] where the original philosophical quest for truth, for wisdom has become so profoundly integrated into their self-identity [professionally, socially, psychologically, emotionally] defending it has less and less to do with philosophy at all. And certainly less and less to do with “logic”.
[/i][/b]
And, in a more positive vein, once you come to recognize the extent to which your values are the embodiment of dasein [in a world of conflicting goods and political economy] you recognize that you are afforded considerably more options. After all, to the extent that you embrace one or another “value ontology” is the extent to which you always judge your own behaviors [and the behaviors of others] is either Reasonable or Unreasonable, Right or Wrong.

Instead of beyond both. You come to a particular conclusion regarding the “natural” way in which to live [in sync with the way in which you construe the world to be] and then you set about making that crucial distinction between “one of them” and “one of us”. Call it the Satyr Syndrome. But there are any number of folks here who are just like him. They simply argue that, “no, Satyr is wrong because he does not think like I do”.

Again and again: What on earth does something like this mean? Can you cite a particular context enabling you to demonstrate how it is not applicable to you?

Do you honestly imagine that when folks embrace either of the conflicting goods embedded in the abortion wars, they are concerned with furthering or not furthering philosophy?

Instead, my point is that “how it seems to you” is embodied existentially in dasein. And to the extent some folks recognize this and try to “make a decision” they construe to be the most rational or virtuous [using the tools of philosophy], they are still entangled in the conflicting goods.

What are your own views on abortion? And when you bump into others who argue that your views are wrong [because they are not the same as their views] how is “how it seems to you” not entangled in my dilemma?

You say things like this:

Note to others:

How is this relevant to the points that I raise? What do I keep missing?

It means that one notes the existence of a Grand Scheme but their tongue is firmly in cheek.

In other words, they are really mocking the idea of any Grand Scheme relating to value judgments.

And I certainly do not construe my own arguments here as anything other than an existential contraption/fabrication — a subjective analysis rooted in “I” rooted in the manner in which I have come [here and now] to construe the meaning of all my accumulated experiences and relationships and sources of information/knowledge.

No. The God whose “death” Nietzsche proclaimed is “the God of the philosophers” (“des philosophes et des savants”, as Pascal put it).

As I said, this particular context–this very discussion of ours–is an example.

Before playing the incredulity card, try to follow the argument:

  1. When the question how one ought to live is not answered before it is raised, the simplest answer to it is the following: “Until the answer to that question is found, the most rational answer to it is: ‘One ought to live in the service of the quest for that answer [i.e., of philosophy].’”

  2. If, say, aborting your baby furthers philosophy more, you should abort it; if keeping it furthers it more, you should keep it.

Do you see how it says “Philosophical Supremacist” right under my name? Now compare this to my “Hence ‘Philosophical Supremacism’” remark.

You seem to keep missing the fact that this correspondence is itself an interaction of mine with another

You’ve become a true hammer, Sowilo.

Iamb - I was surprised to hear you are a Nietzschean - Pezer wasnt.

Okay, with respect to morality on this side of the grave and immortality and salvation on the other side of the grave, how is the God of the savants different from the God of mere mortals?

In my view, what’s crucial is that if No God then there is no transcending font available in which to obviate the idea/praxis embedded/embodied in “beyond good and evil”. In other words, “any aim is lacking, any answer to the question ‘why’ is lacking. What does nihilism mean?—that the supreme values devaluate themselves.”

Moral nihilism [as I have come to understand it] is derived precisely from the assumption that no Gods exist.

But my point is in making the distinction between 1] those things expressed as “what it seems like to me” able to be demonstrated as that which is in fact true for all rational human beings and 2] those things that are embodied only in subjective personal opinions and political prejudices. It would be the distinction between demonstrating that this discussion is in fact unfolding here at ILP and demonstrating which of our narratives is more in sync epistemologically with the whole rational truth.

Between saying “it seems to me that Mary had an abortion” [she either did or did not…applicable to all of us] and “it seems to me that abortions are immoral” [some argue yes, others no]. With [in my view] no “value ontology” able to demonstrate that it either is or is not. Instead, value judgments, are embedded existentially in the manner in which I have come to construe the meaning of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy.

What I am curious about regarding you is that which you think is reasonable or unreasonable when your own value judgments come into conflict with others.

Again, I can only imagine you in the middle of any particular confrontation among any particular group of people. One side embracing the “natural right” [God given or otherwise] of the baby to live, the other side embracing the “political right” of the women to choose to kill it.

What I am imagining is the incredulity in their faces as they respond, “what on earth does that have to do with the life or the death of this baby?”

And how would whatever rational argument given [from either side] not be embedded in dasein? How is a purely “philosophical argument” to be derived that obviates the manner in which we are brainwashed as children to think one thing rather than another; and how, over the course of the life that we live, we become embedded in experiences that predispose us to one or another political prejudice?

Thus, what I am looking for from you [and others] is your own rendition of this:

1] I was raised in the belly of the working class beast. My family/community were very conservative. Abortion was a sin. Both in and out of church.
2] I was drafted into the Army and while on my “tour of duty” in Vietnam I happened upon politically radical folks who reconfigured my thinking about abortion. And God and lots of other things.
3] after I left the Army, I enrolled in college and became further involved in left wing politics. It was all the rage back then. I became a feminist. I married a feminist. I wholeheartedly embraced a woman’s right to choose.
4] then came the calamity with Mary and John. I loved them both but their engagement was foundering on the rocks that was Mary’s choice to abort their unborn baby.
5] back and forth we all went. I supported Mary but I could understand the points that John was making. I could understand the arguments being made on both sides. John was right from his side and Mary was right from hers.
6] I read William Barrett’s Irrational Man and came upon his conjectures regarding “rival goods”.
7] Then, over time, I abandoned an objectivist frame of mind that revolved around Marxism/feminism. Instead, I became more and more embedded in existentialism. And then as more years passed I became an advocate for moral nihilism.

Thus when someone asks me about my own value judgments here, I can note this particular existential trajectory.

In other words, why, with respect to conflicting value judgments, I am now entangled in my dilemma above. Ever and always I am curious to note how others manage not to be.

And yet when I try to pin this down…

I get this…

That is your answer?!!!

Note to others:

Try, if you will, to reconfigure this point into an argument that I might begin to grasp more clearly. How is it an effective rebuttal to the points I make above?

Wouldn’t it have been easier to just make a video? :wink:

Just joshing.

Why don’t you join the discussion? You know, when you are finished “chatting” with mr reasonable.

And, sure, invite Pezer.

Simply put, the God of the philosophers was pure Reason.

Sounds like this is coming from the “pro life” side. The “pro choice” party no less than the “pro life” party appeals to a supposed natural right. The one appeals to the natural rights of the baby, the other rather to those of the mother. The antonym of “natural right” is “positive right”, not “political right”, by the way.

I’ve provided a rational standard for deciding whether or not to have an abortion. You’re just saying “I can’t imagine a group of protesters and counterprotesters would be swayed by reason”.

To be sure, the problem isn’t limited to protests and the like, when emotions heat up. Most people will never be swayed by my argument, because they just don’t value philosophy; they will prefer to insist that they’re already wise (or their God is), that they don’t need philosophy. But saying that they can’t help acting like that because their minds are embedded in dasein is no excuse; with that, they deserve to be overpowered by force or by guile or both. Tigers can’t help eating people when they encounter them, but that doesn’t mean tigers are accepted in society as the equals of men…

Yes, because that should make it clear to you–if you’ve been paying attention to what I’ve been saying–that my view on abortion is this: “if aborting your baby furthers philosophy more, you should abort it; if keeping it furthers it more, you should keep it.”