Opposing Determinism

I would like to present a brief argument that enables the possibility of freedom and free will. The following paragraph includes a summarization of how determinism is flawed due to several simple aspects of contingency and transformation.

Causal determinism, and all branches of determinism, have attempted to reveal the ‘illusion’ of free will. In doing so, determinism has obstructed the possibility of a reality of freedom. However, determinism has failed to recognize certain aspects of contingency and transformation which negate its freedom destroying theses. If every person does belong to their own individual perspective of reality, than causality is not necessarily objective because of the way causal patterns are uniquely formed, transformed and acted upon. But even though this subjectivity may be dismissed by contrarians, the faculties which influence causal patterns are contingent and subject to transformation. In addition, these faculties may have unintentional, and more importantly - intentional influences - originating from mankind’s unique ability to adapt (intentionally or unintentionally for necessity).If we can possibly prove the premise of subjective causality between each person’s perspective of reality and at the same time understand that the faculties of causality may be influenced intentionally and accidentally (or unintentionally) to cause this subjective perspective to freely transform, there is no longer anything to obstruct the possibility of a reality of freedom.

i) Causal patterns are subjective and hold unique value as they exist separately from anything else in space and time

ii) No two things can be identical because they are distinct from each other no matter the congruence of primary or secondary qualities (identity of indiscernibles)

iii) The faculties which govern causal patterns are forever in flux because everything is distinct from each other while in a constant state of becoming

iv) Human consciousness not only has the ability to perceive these contingencies and transformations so much so that we can intentional influence transformation while we also take part in perpetual becoming

Here’s the thing though with arguments like this…

The argument itself is thought to be sound by others only to the extent that they agree with the definition and the meaning that you give to the words that comprise the argument itself. There is an agreement that the analysis is reflective of the way in which the world [reality, existence] is objectively.

But how then would the argument be tested empirically?

How could it be determined/demonstrated substantively that this very exchange we are having is the embodiment [in some measurable way] of free will?

In, for example, the manner in which many scientists argue that, through fMRI experiments, it has been shown – or at least clearly suggested – that the things that we choose are already set into motion chemically/neurologically in the brain?

And then the part that most interests me…

Even making the assumption that our will is free, to what extent is our sense of identity and our value judgments then rooted largely in dasein, conflicting goods and political economy?

Thank you for the reply. I’m grateful you stated “The argument itself is thought to be sound by others only to the extent that they agree with the definition and the meaning that you give to the words that comprise the argument itself. There is an agreement that the analysis is reflective of the way in which the world [reality, existence] is objectively.” I would like to acknowledge that this gives me the benefit of the doubt in replying to your initial doubts regarding my opposition to determinism.

I am not trying to exemplify a determinate way that we can all understand and take a side for the opposition of determinism. What I want to stress is how we are obligated to be ‘free’. My use of the terms freedom, free will, and free initially appear doubtful. Let me explain like this:

If two things are identical in both primary and secondary qualities in whichever way you could possibly imagine and exemplify, they still exist as two distinct things. This separation allows both things to exist as separate entities, and therefore be bound by this difference. This separation gives both entities subjectivity. These entities can be inanimate or animate, but are also never eternal. No thing can be given the determination of ‘eternal’, because this implies that it exists outside of time and space. No thing can exist outside of space and time because it is a ‘thing’ that exists. When an entity is in fact an entity, it assumes a distinction that gives it determinate existence. Once it exists as a real thing within space time, it earns the characterization of contingency.

Regarding your statement of neurological predetermination, it should be noted that the faculties which govern these chemical predeterminations are also subject to contingency and transformation. Allow me to elaborate. No to sets of genetics are the same. Once this is paired with the messy issue of adaptation and consciousness, we as humans to understand and maintain subjective causal patterns for the individual. Genetic makeup is subject to the accidental, and perhaps intentional, influences of environmental evolution and own a unique point in space and time to exist and act subjectively (whether intentionally or accidentally subjective) because no two sets of genetics are the same. This separation is tied to my above statement.

There are indeed similarities, connections and inferences to be made between causal patterns and faculties, yet people often mistake these connections (especially if these connections are made through empirical/scientific experiment or discovery) as absolute explanations for why everything is as it is. It is a much more complex way of saying that history holds all-encompassing, predetermined outcomes and actions to everything through categorical comparisons. For example, foreign affairs issues centuries ago live and breathe in the identical manner of modern foreign affairs issues because of the category of ‘foreign affairs issues’. This forgets the principles that were briefly elaborated in my above two statements, while simultaneously forgetting the principles of contingency and transformation accidentally or intentionally… It assumes that every moment in space and time occur and develop through identical predeterminations of categorical comparisons of empirical evidence. Acknowledging similarities and causal occurrences on very specific, supposedly empirical, elements does not negate the affects of contingency, transformation and subjectivity.

In conclusion, you have misunderstood my goal when you state that I have assumed that our will is free. Our will is not ‘free’ in the way free, freedom and free will is accepted to be understood in a modern, contemporary context. Our will is subjective, contingent and in accordance, transformable - accidentally or intentionally. I love your last question. The problems of identity and value judgement could definitely apply to this discussion. I will leave you with these questions along with my above reply to consider.

1. What constitutes an identity?

2. What constitutes a value judgement?

3. How are the above ideas predetermined or free (subjective, contingent and accidentally/intentionally transformable) in any way?

4. How do the answers to the above questions affect our human activity within the branches of political economy and conflicting goods?

5. In my view, if the only permanence is subjectivity, contingency and transformation, does this statement take an objective stance and in turn collapse on itself?

Thank you for your reply. I really enjoyed reading your response and look forward to any replies which attempt to tear apart my arguments. The answering of the above questions is not a necessity for this topic but should only serve as a possible point of departure for anyone who needs something consider. The only recommendation I could make is for further elaboration and discussion of any perspective of anyone who wants to take part in this discussion. Thank you again and hopefully I didn’t exemplify the persona of being a complete douche knob.

Cheers!

Great analysis.

I think we should get deeper in, which would mean defining a few things more precisely. We need to ask what the following really mean:

-certain aspects of contingency and transformation

-intentional influence

-the faculties which influence causal patterns

Your ideas about causal patterns, transformation and the irreducible flux of unique subjectivities-in-relation are solid ideas. Nice work.

If what you have proposed was true, then nothing that you proposed could be true.

This [and the analysis above] is still entirely too abstract for me. I am trying to discern what goes through your mind “out in the world” when you are faced with a particular context in which you must choose to behave in a particular way in order to be in sync with something that you have come [existentially] to value. And, in particular, when someone else chooses to stop you because what you have chosen is not in sync with that which she has come to value.

What does it mean to choose “freely” here? Or are both choices merely the illusion of freedom in a world in which we all behave only as we cannot not behave given that all matter [even mind] behaves only in accordance with the immutable laws of matter.

Well, there is who and what you think you are that you are then able to demonstrate empirically as in fact who and what you are. And then the part that seems to revolve instead more around subjective experiences and/or moral/political prejudices.

There are things that you come to value: beliefs and behaviors. And then there are different things that others come to value. They often come into conflict. And most folks will pass judgment on this. Freely, they will insist.

Well, we don’t really know the answer to that. We merely take a leap to either “free will” or “determinism”. Or to so-called “compatibilism”. Which [to this day] I still don’t really understand.

Now, some things – mathematics, the laws of nature, the logical rules of language, empirical facts – seem to be true objectively [for all of us] whether or not we have “free will” or not.

Out in the “real world” wealth and power seem of considerable importance when it comes down to enforcing particular sets of behavior. Especially when they come into conflict. You can either impose your “will” [if you have a “free” one] on others or they can impose theirs on you.

How “for all practical purposes” would we discuss this pertaining to actual human behaviors that come into conflict? Either subjectivity, contingency and transformation [relating to our behaviors existentially] embody merely the illusion of free will or [up to a point] human autonomy is present.

I still struggle with the whole determinism/freedom bit.

Can someone perform a novel action…? Yes, theoretically, because quantum.

Can someone actually choose to perform that novel action prior…? Still not sure.

Determinism and freedom are the same thing.

Freedom comes from being determined… from being determined in a certain kind of way.

And the idea of freedom as “agent causation” and as some kind of perfect metaphysical absolute freedom, is a stupid idea. Obviously that kind of freedom does not exist.

Everything that happens has reasons/causes for happening. Principle of Sufficient Reason. Nothing “just happens” for no reason at all.

So if I had a really big computer, could I predict everything…?

Action prior? If you gave credence to Your intuitions, yes, you could, backwards. You could pick and choose after every step back, otherwise you’d be stuck, like jack Nicholson in shining.

No, because “able to predict” doesn’t equal “has a cause”.

Just because some things are unpredictable does not mean that some things don’t have causes. To be able to predict something is an entirely different sort of operation than that of basic causality via the PSR.

If you were a universal God with absolute knowledge of Everything, then yes of course you could predict anything. But no computer will ever be like that. The whole idea of such a God is just a thought experiment, nothing more.

Okay, I’ll take everyone’s word for it. Tired tab is tired.

Think about chaos theory: it is possible for totally unpredictable systems to develop that are nonetheless entirely causal. The issue here is with what we call “randomness”: randomness means that two causalities are sufficiently dissimilar and removed in scope from each other so that when they happen to interact, that interaction cannot be modeled within either of those two casual systems themselves… think of a brick falling on an anthill. The ants have no way of understanding or modeling the brick or the causality that led to it (say a construction worker dropped it on accident), nor does that worker have any understanding of modeling of the causality that led to the ant hill to happen to be right underfoot.

It is entirely “coincidence” that the brick landed on that particular ant hill, and the effect of this on the ants is undeniable, although the ants of course have no comprehension of the what or why of it. The event, from the perspective of the ants, is entirely random, unpredictable; but the event itself is nonetheless entirely causal.

In this particular instance, what it means to choose freely is the very idea that we have a choice. That we can intentionally alter the agents of causation towards any particular end. In accordance, if we have accidentally altered an agent of causation that is not empirically congruent with the exactitude of the end, the ultimate end may transform and diverge from the original expectation unknowingly. The intentional influence is not necessarily being able to do whatever you want, but acknowledging that we have a choice between a plural amount of agents of causation and acting in accordance to what end we create intentionally or perhaps accidentally. This is essential to the main theses of compatibilism.

When I first stated that my opposition to determinism can enable the possibility of a reality of freedom and free will, I wanted, first of all, to consider the idea that inanimate objects have freedom. The idea of a ‘free will’ will be elaborated upon in my response to Wyld. The ultimate end of any object is non-existence. Because all objects are distinct from each other regardless of their primary or secondary qualities, there is a possible doubt as to what differences every distinction can grow into within time and space. In accordance with this doubt, there is contingency from subjectivity and the limitations of existence. With this in mind, I will respond now to Wyld’s request.

The main aspect of contingency should be considered as the mere possibility of any thing to become different from its prior distinction in any possible way. When any thing is doubtful, distinct and/or subject to any sort of change in accordance to its primary or secondary qualities, it becomes contingent. Once this contingency is realized, there lies only actual action and change between its current state and its future transformation.
The intentional influence over the aspects of contingency and transformation rely on the choice between plural agents of causation to achieve the end of transformation we are willing to meet through this choice. Not only is this choice intentional, but the end which we intend to achieve in regards to transforming inanimate objects to our will is also intentional. We may not acknowledge that we have a choice between two agents but have already made a choice because of our subjective beliefs and behaviors. In addition, if we accidentally choose the means and end of any given contingent circumstance, we still experience a free will because our will has intention to transform itself unknowingly.

The faculties which influence causal patterns are any of those agents of causation which are experienced subjectively. When pairing this idea with the irreducible flux of subjective existence, agents of causation must be experienced subjectively because they only exist within the subjective limits of whatever the faculty is influencing.
I thank you all for your replies and welcome anyone to engage in this fruitful discourse. I hope more elaboration comes to this topic so all of our ideas can form more completely regarding my perspective of compatiblilism which most formally opposes determinism.

Further topics of discussion:

Schopenhauer’s view of compatibilism - “Man can do what he wills, but cannot will what he wills.”

Hume on causality (paraphrasing) - “Causation is something that we impose upon our experience rather than something we directly experience.”

Regarding what you wrote on contingency, isn’t it easy to see change in qualities or properties of objects as being changes unfolding from necessity? This is the entire idea behind determinism, that even though things change and even though we may not know in advance how they will change this change is still governed by causal necessity. The mere fact that things change in their primary or secondary qualities is not usually associated with contingency, because it is quite possible that such changes were already-always necessary and therefore not-contingent.

I use the definition of contingency as indicating the logically opposite state of necessity: necessity means “could not have been otherwise; absolutely fixed, required, unalterable” and so contingency means “could have been otherwise; not absolutely fixed, not required, alterable”. The notions of contingency and necessity create confusion if we look at “alterable and unalterable” as if these apply to ANY change at all, in which case we would assume that if something changes it must be contingent and non-necessary, however that is not the case. Alterable and unalterable mean with regards to what actually occurs and takes place, what changes do happen. Think of an object and imagine it stretched out in time, with its many changes from moment to moment: if that temporal sequence of changes ITSELF is unalterable then we conclude that necessity is the case, but if the sequence is considered alterable then we conclude that contingency is the case.

There is also a problem with the notion of intentionality, this is a notion that philosophers like to use when discussing freedom and determination, however the notion risks begging the question entirely. “To intend” something often smuggles in a little bit of the quality of freedom, a little bit of the “could have been otherwise” that derives from the fact that a causal chain for a decision or action is supposedly dependent upon the “agent” who “intended” something, therefore the consequence of this way of thinking is as follows: “Agents have intentions, and causal sequences of actions/changes/behaviors originate either in part or in total from these intentions, therefore those actions/etc. are free with respect to the intentionality of the agent who caused them to be”. On the other hand if we assert that an agent’s intentionality can also be determined by factors entirely beyond the control of that agent, entirely determined, then the addition of the notion of intentionality is superfluous.

The notion of agent causation is not able to seriously address the problem of freedom and determination, for the same reason that notions of intentionality or “will” risk begging the question; to avoid this risk we must parse these notions very carefully, and once we do that it becomes apparent that the addition of the notion accomplishes nothing in the way of furthering our understanding of the problem at hand.

You mention “intention to transform itself”, this is interesting because you are indicating that if the causality behind an object is involved also in directed attempts to transform that object itself, namely of causality originating FROM an object is also circularly applied back UPON that object, we can think of this as pertinent to the idea of freedom. But is this really the case that self-feedback looping causality is really what freedom means? It is still entirely possible that such instances of self-reinforcing actions/effects/etc. are themselves fully determined by necessity, either a necessity latent to the actions/etc. themselves by the logical structure of these or a necessity stretching beyond those actions act beyond subjects who act.

Let’s say I intent to transform myself by taking a martial arts class. In this case my intentions are self-directed and the causality behind my action to join the class is feedback looped into myself (I cause actions that are directed back at the effect of transforming myself). But it is still quite possible that this entire setup is 100% deterministic. If I was fated to feel the way I feel and do what I did, which is the argument of “hard” determinism, then in no way can I be considered free simply because my actions originate from and aim to effect myself.

Your idea of the flux of subjectivity reminds me of the augment that philosophers sometimes make for freedom by invoking quantum indeterminacy. I would probably argue that the flux of subjectivity is closer to how chaos theory describes irreducibly complex chaotic systems that are nonetheless entirely deterministic: countless myriad subtle influences and causes all mingle and merge together in such a way where since each is influencing the other in real time a kind of irreducibility ensues and it becomes impossible to model eventual outcomes of the system. But the impossibility to know in advance (to predict) something does not translate into an ontological status of non-determinacy. Ever single of those subtle causes could be necessary and determined absolutely, but the particular way in which they come together and influence each other reciprocally leads to a state where prediction is imperfect. Note that this could mean either prediction by the system itself or prediction by something beyond the system.

This is how I see quantum randomness and indeterminacy, I think this sort of chaos-theory situation is literally what is taking place just below the level of our ability to measure subatomic events. To believe otherwise and assert that randomness or “uncausation” is literally the case in an ontological sense is to violate the Principle of Sufficient Reason. And I have yet to meet anyone who can explain or argue rationally for the idea of uncausation and ontological randomness, probably because any possible argument or explanation we might come up with is NECESSARILY based on the assumption of causality described in the PSR. Without the basic and necessary postulate of causal determination it becomes impossible to argue for or truly explain anything at all, because the very form of “explaining and arguing for” necessarily presupposes the existence of causal linkages between things. Even attempts at statistical analysis arguments fail because a statistical probabilistic analysis is simply a set of individual cases or values lumped together; every probabilistic argument for freedom collapses to whatever ontological status these individual cases/values might have, so we’re back at same problem as before. A probability “itself” only has reality in so far as those more individual instances exist of which we can speak of a “probability” at all, and even probabilities can be seen as nothing more an imperfections in our ability to predict things in advance, which inability could easily coexist with a situation of ontological determinism.

Anyway I don’t think any of this is the right way to look and freedom and determinism. I think we need a broader, more philosophical idea of what freedom really is and really means, within the context of determination as outlined by the PSR. In my view freedom and determinism are not categorically equatable and therefore the standard philosophical aruments that proceed from arguing either for freedom against determinism or for determinism against freedom are necessary erroneous. But I can let you respond to my points here first before I start getting into an entirely new model for approaching the “problem” of freedom and determinism.

“Cause” is merely a word for “always precedes”.

No, that is false. That totally ignores the reasons WHY it would “always precede”.

The concept of a cause means “necessity”, as I defined it in the previous post. A cause may always precede an effect (or maybe at times an effect can precede a cause, in some ideas of non-standard temporality) but that isn’t at all getting to the definition of what “cause” really means.

I’m tired of you always trying to muddy the waters. It’s obvious, and pathetic. Please go troll somewhere else.

“No”, that is true.

You are ignoring the reasons WHY it always precedes.

Irrational nonsense. It isn’t a cause if there is no effect from it.

And many are “tired of” your boasting in ignorance, “It’s obvious, and pathetic”, so what.

Change in qualities only occurs after the necessity of change itself. My argument is that because we cannot determine how they will change and what they will precisely change into, they are ‘free’ to change however which way they are causal to. I agree with the premise that change is a necessity, but the context and comprehension of the subject and the change itself is not only completely subjective, but an impossibility to fully predict. Therefore, the change is itself a necessity, but because we can cannot predict how and what the subject changes into, they are contingent.

I believe this is the linguistic error for which our ideas diverge. I simply consider contingency as a possible event. I have thought of necessity as an absolute that cannot be changed. However, in accordance to my first response, the only absolute that cannot be changed is change itself, not the context and definition we give primary and secondary qualities in their necessary causality. Hypothetically speaking, perhaps contingency (of your above example) is the case if we speculate multiple dimensions beyond our comprehension; but this perspective applies only hypothetically and is not necessarily determinate. The notion of a temporal sequence is unalterable, but the determinations - not the causation of the determinations - are alterable.

Which philosophers in particular (I would like some more personal reading)? There is a disagreement reagarding your last sentence. The notion of intentionality is not superfluous because intention is causally determined, especially in the case of morality.

In accordance to my above responses, yes this is what freedom should mean but we will discuss this further as you have requested.

Which philosophers in particular (I would like some more personal reading)? The impossibility to predict the how and what of any thing does translate into an ontological staus of freedom, and becomes a determinancy only after the fact.

Why does this assertion violate the Principle of Sufficient Reason? Personally, with consideration to your explanation here, I always stay away from statistical probabilistic analysis for these very reasons. But why, if I can ask this with a serious response, does our inability to perfectly predict things easily coexist with a situation of ontological determinism?

In this last declaration of the inevitable polarity between hard determinism and absolute freedom disregards the many factions of compatibilism. I am looking forward to an evolving and extensive discussion of this issue. Furthermore, I’ve enjoyed reading your responses and am grateful for the learning experience.