Making iambiguous's day

[iambiguous]

I'm not sure how you meant "#1 revolves around human consciousness itself [the nature of it]" but it definitely doesn't requiring an understanding of my theory of consciousness (otherwise I'd be the only one who could potential be caught in prong #1). Again, though my theory is certainly my "ism", these conflicts you're talking about--whether prong #1 or prong #2--have nothing to do with it. I mean, I'm sure the nature of consciousness has a lot to do with it, but it doesn't hinge on my "ism"--you could have an entirely different theory of consciousness, and you will still have prong #1 and prong #2 as "dilemmas" that we all have to deal with in this world, and if this other theory of consciousness turns out to be true, I'm sure you could draw some pretty substantial links between it and prongs #1 and #2. But even given that, prong #1 has way more to do with your theory than mine--it has to do with the self "fragmenting"--not consciousness being the foundation of being (<-- though that obviously has implications for everything <-- Literally!).

My problem remains...

I read all of this about prong#1 and I am still fuzzy -- really fuzzy -- regarding how the conclusions that you have come to [here and now] are relevant out in a particular world in which conflicting behaviors are precipitated by conflicting value judgments.

For me, the "self" fragments only to the extent that "I" becomes embedded in moral and political conflicts. It is more or less whole -- intact -- regarding those aspects of your life that are embedded/embodied in objective reality. For example, I at any given point in time is embedded in a body that, in accordance with biological laws embedded in the evolution of life on earth, is what it is. It may riddled with cancer, it may be on the brink of death. Those are facts about I the body -- as regarding all other empirical facts about your existence -- that [at any point in time] are substantially real.

Does a pro-choice advocate feel herself "fragmenting" every time she disagrees with a pro-life advocate? I would think when it comes to conflict with others, we do everything in our power to keep ourselves together--we would need to in order to feel we are right (thereby allowing ourselves to argue our point). So in a sense, not only is there a distinction to be made between prong #1 and prong #2, but they might be polar opposites--prong #2 being the dilemma of how to win when pitted against the other, prong #1 being the dilemma of how to deal with one's own self-destruction (i.e. fragmentation) when submitting to the other.

Moral objectivists do not feel fragmented precisely because they have managed to convince themselves that 1] they are in touch with their true self and 2] that their true self is in sync with the objective reality of the world around them.

It is only when your own value judgments do come into conflict with others that prong#1 encounters the possibility of being fragmented. Or so it seems to me. You could live alone on an island totally apart from everyone else and come to encompass a wholly unfragmented sense of self. Why? Because it is just a mental contraption in your head that is never challenged regarding the things you choose to do.

Only if you believed in God, is there a possibility of fragmentation here.

You've rejected objectivism and arrived at nihilism. I've rejected objectivist and arrived at subjectivism. It seems that in order to backtrack, you have to embrace some form of objectivism once again just in order to attempt a different path--and you seem to realize this on a semi-conscious level which is why you're always on the lookout for a convincing objectivist argument.

I would have to be convince that when the behaviors of two or more individuals come into conflict over value judgments, there is a philosophical argument available to them such that they do not become entangled in my dilemma.

This will either happen or it will not. But there is little or no possibility of it occuring if I do not come into places like this and encounter the arguments.

With you, the quandary revolves more or less around my inability to understand how your "subjectivism" would be any more effective when your own value judgments come into conflict with others given the manner in which I construe these conflicts as -- existentially -- the embodiment of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy.

And yes, at this point in my life, being effectively cut off from others [other than virtually] my motivation does revolve more around curiosity: is there a way out of my labyrinthian dilemma -- the maze -- that I simply have not thought of yet?

What do you think would work better in a conflict between an atheist and a theist? Should the atheist attempt to convince the theist that God doesn't exist? Or will he have more success if he convinced the theist not to cast the first stone?

Here, I always make the distinction between what someone believes is true "in their head" and what they are able to demonstrate as true for all rational human beings. And since it is the theist who believes in the existence of God, it is incumbent upon the theist to demonstrate that this is in fact true. Otherwise one can argue that God exists at the center of the universe and then challenge the atheist to prove that He does not.

Yes, it is embedded in the distinction between arguing about something [scientific or otherwise] and demonstrating it. It's just that for scientists this is almost always relating to the world of either/or. What is the nature of reality? And not "ought it to have been something else instead"?

But: whether one set of behaviors is "healthier" than another is true [from my point of view] only to the extent that particular people in a particular context [here and now] can agree that they are. Whatever "works" in other words. But that's not the same as demonstrating that they are "in fact" healthier.

I know, but most of the time, those who are in conflict would probably agree that resolving their issues and arriving at a peaceful settlement between them is "healthy"--or at least it's something they most likely both want.

And yet among the objectivists, an issue is almost never resolved until you agree to become "one of us". And that rarely revolves around moderation, negotiation and compromise. Many here detest democracy precisely because it is said to be out of sync with the only "natural" way to behave. The way that they do.

Finally, whatever I might personally believe about the morality of abortion, out in the world with others what counts is the extent to which I am able to enforce my own values if they do come into conflict with others.

This seems to be the most telling of the nature of your dilemma. I'm guessing that by "enforce" you mean "convince"--to demonstrate objectively that your values are correct (and if that doesn't work to convince the other, then at least you know you're right).

There appear to be two ways in which to enforce your values in a non-democratic context:

1] via brute force [autocracy]
2] in sharing a conviction that right makes might [theocracy or one or another political/ideological "Ism"]

It would make sense, therefore, that you're ever on the lookout for an objectivist argument to actually demonstrate a true morality, for in that case, you'd feel like you actually have something with which to enforce your values.

But: Is there one? And how exactly would they go about obviating conflicting goods? How, for example, can we live in a world where babies have the right to be born and women are not forced to give birth?

And how [realistically] is a distinction to be made between "applying" one's values and "enforcing" them? The law is going to have to draw the line somewhere, right? At some point, women are going to be forced to give birth or face the possibility of sanctions from the community. Otherwise, it becomes "abortion on demand". And that will surely enrage those in the pro-life camp. Indeed, many want to charge women with murder once the point of conception itself is reached.

Even regarding the homeless there are political arguments hurled back and forth: http://www.debate.org/opinions/should-w ... e-homeless

Indeed, some argue that rather than just feed and house them we should bring them into a political movement that brings down the capitalist political economy. And then embraces socialism instead. Then the conflicting arguments arise regarding the extent to which this can or ought to be accomplished through revolutionary stuggle. To use or not to use violence.

Since my interactions with others has now more or less ground to a halt, I'm less concerned about these things than I am curious as to how others react to my dilemma. And thus in exploring how it is not deemed to be a dilemma in their own life.

Then I take it that, as a matter of mere curiosity, this isn't really a dilemma for you (at least not one you lose sleep over); the real dilemma, I take it, is captured in what you said above: the fact that you live in a world in which your values must be enforced (despite having no firm grasp on a solid objective foundation for your values). And given that your interactions with others has (more or less) ground to a halt, I take it this dilemma is a thing of the past. Am I wrong?

For many, many years I was active in the political struggle to change people's minds. A veritable alphabet soup of organizations: CP, RCP, SWP, NAM, DSOC, DSA. Back then in other words I was still more or less an objectivist myself. There was no dilemma to contend with.

Now, due largely to health issues, I am no longer "out in the world" politically. But: As I disengaged from political activism, I came more and more to embrace moral and political nihilism.

So: Is that a fortunate or an unfortunate thing? Well, one would have to be inside my head and think about these things as I do now to grapple with that. And trust me: I do still grapple with it. If for no other reason that I still react subjunctively to the news from day to day to day.

Rationalizing a behavior because you believe that in a godless universe any behavior can be rationalized is a frame of mind that many, many, many individuals literally act out from day to day. And, in particular, when, first and foremost, you strive above all else to satisfy your own wants and needs.

How then does the philosopher come up with an argument able to demonstrate that this sort of reasoning is necessarily wrong?

Well, I'm not sure what you mean by reasoning here, or "rationalizing a behavior"? In a world sans God, if there really is no grounds for morality (as you say), what's being rationalized? The sociopath can't be arguing for the moral righteousness of his pursuit of self-gratification. What is he rationalizing then? The fact that it's not immoral? The fact that he can't help it? The fact that it could be beneficial to others as well? What?

I construe rationalization here more as a psychological defense mechanism. You come up with a reason for doing what you do that allows you to feel the least critical about yourself.

Again, as I noted to Faust on another thread, here the sociopath is either more or less self-conscious in choosing self-gratification as a moral font.

Any reason at all will do. Or no reason at all. You need God here or the sociopath's frame of mind would seem to fit snuggly into this: "in the absense of God, all things are permitted".

And are you seriously going to listen to that? In a dark grungy basement while he has you cornered with a knife?

He is either a psychopath, someone way, way beyond reasoning with, or I can attempt to ferret out the reason if he is not. Then I am either able to convince him of a better reason not to or I can't.

My point though is that I am not able to concoct an argument such that whatever he does I have at least established that which he is morally obligated to do.

And I suspect many react to my arguments here such that a concern begins to creep into their head. A concern that I might be right. And, if I am, what does that tell them about their own value judgments?

[iambiguous]

But this basically reflects the subjunctive reaction that most will have to behaviors that are deemed to be particularly ghastly. We ourselves simply cannot imagine not being appalled morally by those behaviors.

What does "morally appalled" mean?

Here and now, I think it means this: that, aside from any philosophical argument that we might come up with pertaining to particular human behaviors we construe to be immoral, there is almost always an emotional and psychological reaction as well. Thus there are those that are appalled by the aborting of human babies, while others are appalled by the thought of forcing women to give birth.

Doesn't this connote a subjunctive frame of mind? Is there a way [realistically] to separate out a purely intellectual -- philosophical -- reaction to human behaviors?

Yet had circumstances been such in my life that I came to embrace a sociopathic frame of mind, then any and all behaviors are sanctioned if 1] it gratifies me and 2] I am willing to accept the consequences of being caught by those who are in fact appalled by what I do.

Sociopaths are irrelevant to the argument. People can behave immorally; it's not a law of physics we're dealing with.

There are sociopaths who are more or less self-conscious about being called a sociopath. If you are convinced that, in a world sans God, acting out your own perceived self-interest is a rational frame of mind, what some will insist are immoral behaviors on your part, you will not. And, precisely because mere mortals are not able to circumscribe the world of is/ought as physicists are able to circumscribe the world of either/or, morality is only able to be stuffed into one or another deontological intellectual contraption.

Or [as always] so it seems to me. Though I am always open to being persuaded otherwise.

But: What is the philosophical argument [in a world sans God] establishing that setting fire to the orphanage and blocking the exits is necessarily irrational and immoral?

What would count as a valid philosophical argument, to you? Hypothetically, that is. What criteria of success are you demanding?

An argument able to demonstrate that the reasons someone might use to do this [rooted existentially in dasein] are necessarily irrational and immoral.

With God there is no question of this. God is said to be omniscient. There is no question of a behavior either being or not being a Sin. And He said to be everywhere. There is no question of not getting caught. And He is omnipotent. There is no question of not being punished.

Are you arguing that philosophers [using Reason] are able to concoct a frame of mind [or a legal system] anywhere near the equivalent of this? In fact, I have always seen this as the reason that folks like Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky took their leap to God. Because [as with Plato, Descartes and Kant] they recognize the need for a transcending frame of mind here.

Sure, subjectively, I can think of any number of arguments for not setting that fire. And it is true that, given the manner in which existentially I have become "me", I can't imagine doing it myself. But in my view that is not the same as establishing that those who do choose to do so [for whatever personal reason] are essentially, objectively, ontologically...Evil.

Who said anything about immoral acts requiring the actors be "ontologically evil"?

Something would seem to be evil or not. And it is either evil universally or it can be established as being evil in each and every particular circumstantial context.

Please cite example of behaviors you deem to be immoral. And if this is not rooted in one or another ontological font [which most call God], how on earth do you establish that it is in fact immoral?

[gib]

My problem remains...

I read all of this about prong#1 and I am still fuzzy -- really fuzzy -- regarding how the conclusions that you have come to [here and now] are relevant out in a particular world in which conflicting behaviors are precipitated by conflicting value judgments.

You're essentially saying: I'm still fuzzy, really fuzzy, regarding how prong #1 is relevant to prong #2. But this is something you need to sort out for yourself, as I've been defining prong #1 based on an interpretation of your own words. So you tell me how the self "fragmenting" is relevant to a world in which conflicting behaviors are precipitated by conflicting value judgments.

For me, the "self" fragments only to the extent that "I" becomes embedded in moral and political conflicts. It is more or less whole -- intact -- regarding those aspects of your life that are embedded/embodied in objective reality. For example, I at any given point in time is embedded in a body that, in accordance with biological laws embedded in the evolution of life on earth, is what it is. It may riddled with cancer, it may be on the brink of death. Those are facts about I the body -- as regarding all other empirical facts about your existence -- that [at any point in time] are substantially real.

And what's the point you're making here? What's the relevance here to how we're defining prong #1 and how that relates to prong #2? I would completely agree that one can identify the 'I' with something more substantial and enduring (like the body) and thereby obviate the fragmentation of the 'I'. If this works for a particular individual, it would effectively solve the dilemma of prong #1. But obviously, prong #2 would remain. Having a strong, cohesive sense of self doesn't make the world's problems go away, let alone inter-group conflicts precipitated by dasein-based value judgements. I'm not saying it should. Rather, if anything, it would work the other way around--solve prong #2 first, then the resolution of prong #1 becomes simple if not automatic. Remember, prong #1 is a consequence of recognizing the existential implications of prong #2 (which not everyone does)--recognizing that if we live in a world in which our dasein nature results in conflicting values and beliefs and prejudices, etc., then it stands to question whether anyone's values, beliefs, prejudices are grounded on anything solid (i.e. objectively real/demonstrable), including one's own. This leads to the undermining of one's own "ism", and insofar as one identifies one's self with one's own "ism", it undermine's one's sense of self--the 'I' fragments. <-- Prong #1.

Moral objectivists do not feel fragmented precisely because they have managed to convince themselves that 1] they are in touch with their true self and 2] that their true self is in sync with the objective reality of the world around them.

True dat.

It is only when your own value judgments do come into conflict with others that prong#1 encounters the possibility of being fragmented. Or so it seems to me. You could live alone on an island totally apart from everyone else and come to encompass a wholly unfragmented sense of self. Why? Because it is just a mental contraption in your head that is never challenged regarding the things you choose to do.

That's exactly what I'm trying to say--prong #1 depends on prong #2.

Only if you believed in God, is there a possibility of fragmentation here.

^ Well, that part I'm not so sure about. Surely one can believe in a particular moral "ism" without being a theist, can't they? I mean, you might mean to say that you can't imagine how an atheist could possibly believe in an objectivism moralism, but that doesn't mean it can't happen in the real world. There are tons of atheists out there who firmly, objectively, believe in a certain moral "ism". <-- Their "ism" doesn't have to be perfectly rational per se, they just have to believe in it. You may see the flaws in their reasoning, but that doesn't mean it's impossible to cling to an objectivist, atheistic morality as a means of identifying one's sense of self with an "ism".

I would have to be convince that when the behaviors of two or more individuals come into conflict over value judgments, there is a philosophical argument available to them such that they do not become entangled in my dilemma.

Two or more individuals? Two or more individuals come up with philosophical arguments that resolve their difference all the time. You don't think a methodist and a protestant can't resolve their religious differences by way of philosophical argumentation? I know it's rare, but are you really saying it's impossible?

How to come up with an argument that the resolves conflict between all Methodists and all Protestants is more of a challenge, and even then, that's just a stepping stone toward resolving conflict between any two or more groups of people who happen to be in conflict over their beliefs and values.

And even that doesn't guarantee that such an argument will be, in the final analysis, the "objective truth".

I think ^that's^ what you're looking for, isn't it? The objective truth?

This will either happen or it will not. But there is little or no possibility of it occuring if I do not come into places like this and encounter the arguments.

With you, the quandary revolves more or less around my inability to understand how your "subjectivism" would be any more effective when your own value judgments come into conflict with others given the manner in which I construe these conflicts as -- existentially -- the embodiment of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy.

Do you mean when I enter into a situation in which my values are inevitably pitted against those of another, and that the other stands obstinately steadfast against compromising his values? As in, the guy simply will not listen to why my values are the right values to have, values I arrive at by starting from my subjectivism and doing a sort of logical deduction to arrive at them?

Look, what if my "ism" was "reverse-psychology-ism"? What if I believed, objectively, that the truth about human psychology, human consciousness, was that people are swayed way more by reverse psychology--that is, you can influence people to do what you want them to do way more effectively by telling them to do the opposite of what you want them to do--you tell them to do this and they do that instead--than you can by, I guess, "direct" psychology (the belief that the most effective way to get people to do what you want is just to tell them to do it)? How would you answer your own question: how do you think "reverse-psychology-ism" might possibly be more effective in resolving interpersonal conflicts that are based on dasein instigated value judgements and prejudicial conflicts?

And yes, at this point in my life, being effectively cut off from others [other than virtually] my motivation does revolve more around curiosity: is there a way out of my labyrinthian dilemma -- the maze -- that I simply have not thought of yet?

What purpose do you think this curiosity is serving? If you believe that human beings are curious by nature, and that nature bestows us with the features and mechanism and propensities that we have for the purpose of survival, then what purpose do you think your curiosity in this matter is serving?

If just a bit of intellectual frivolity--just something to pass the time (which can serve a survival function: avoiding stagnation/atrophy from inactivity)--then what is the nature of your dilemma at this juncture in your life? Is it just that you need some kind of intellectual stimulation? Something to kill the boredom? Or is it to figure out a way to get back into the fray of engaging with others despite the conflict and aggravation that it causes--to get back into prong #2 and truly overcome it?

Here, I always make the distinction between what someone believes is true "in their head" and what they are able to demonstrate as true for all rational human beings. And since it is the theist who believes in the existence of God, it is incumbent upon the theist to demonstrate that this is in fact true. Otherwise one can argue that God exists at the center of the universe and then challenge the atheist to prove that He does not.

The burden of proof argument is way more about philosophical etiquette than it is about resolving conflict. You really think that if an atheist and a theist got into conflict with each other, the conflict will be resolved way more effectively if the theist took on burden of proof than if the atheist did?

Besides, this evades my point, which was that if the atheist simply grants the theist the existence of God, that belief can then be used as leverage to persuade the theist.

Yes, it is embedded in the distinction between arguing about something [scientific or otherwise] and demonstrating it. It's just that for scientists this is almost always relating to the world of either/or. What is the nature of reality? And not "ought it to have been something else instead"?

Hmm... then maybe I'm misunderstanding what you mean by "demonstrate". <-- So far, I've been taking you to mean "prove" in the vein of the traditional objectivist approach (that term again), meaning to exhaustively and thoroughly illustrate an immaculate logical deduction from a set of premises you and your contender both agree upon and arriving at a conclusion that matches your objectivist beliefs and values. But when you say "it is embedded in the distinction between arguing about something [scientific or otherwise] and demonstrating it," I'm not sure whether the traditional objectivist approach falls into the one category of the other. For a scientist, "demonstration" is certainly not the same as just "arguing"--to demonstrate, according to a scientist, doesn't require uttering a single word, it just requires doing something out in the empirical world that, sans any contending theories, can only be explained by the theory the scientist is trying to convince his contender of (coupled with the assumption that his contender will consequently "connect the dots"--which of course won't always happen even then).

So when you say you're looking for a "demonstration" of one moral "ism" in contrast to another, what exactly do you mean?

And yet among the objectivists, an issue is almost never resolved until you agree to become "one of us". And that rarely revolves around moderation, negotiation and compromise. Many here detest democracy precisely because it is said to be out of sync with the only "natural" way to behave. The way that they do.

Yes, but that's because here at ILP, there is very little danger of blood being spilled over disagreements--even angry, obstinate, fanatical disagreements--and in some cases, it might even be "healthy" (i.e. venting, catharsis, getting it out); I'll bet that if you took the members of ILP and had them argue with each other face-to-face, you'd see way less hostility and animosity arising amongst them--face-to-face confrontations work as a far stronger trigger for social instincts and impulses to arise within us, instincts and impulses that sway us more towards resolving conflict and less towards proving our point definitively--towards moderation, negotiation and compromise, and away from war and blood shed. Why? Because obviously, when the conflict becomes face-to-face, the risk of full fledged bloodshed and war breaking out becomes a lot more immanent, and we, on an unconscious level, are aware of this. <-- In this situation, I'm sure people would be far more likely to agree with each other that they ought to aim towards a "healthy" resolution (however you want to define that) to their conflict.

There appear to be two ways in which to enforce your values in a non-democratic context:

1] via brute force [autocracy] <-- No convincing necessary.
2] in sharing a conviction that right makes might [theocracy or one or another political/ideological "Ism"] <-- Convincing totally necessary.

But: Is there one? And how exactly would they go about obviating conflicting goods? How, for example, can we live in a world where babies have the right to be born and women are not forced to give birth?

Well, I kind of gave a crude answer to this question in an earlier post, but to answer your present question: I don't know if there is a demonstrably correct moral outlook on life, but that doesn't mean you can't be convinced that there is one and thereby return to the prior state of mind you were once in, at least not in principle. I do realize, however, that this is a catch-22: you need a convincing demonstration of its objective truth (or that it is guaranteed to resolve interpersonal conflict when brought to the table; or both?) yet at the same time you know that whatever form of objectivism you return to will inevitably be just another existential contraption/fabrication. I don't think you need a convincing demonstration of the truth of just any objectivism--you seem to be quite content with believing in the objective reality of at least the empirical world--just of one or another moral objectivism.

Here I have to admit, I don't have a satisfactory answer for you--not when you set the bar impossibly high--but most of us can live with the fact that we are immersed in a world where prong #2 will always be a dilemma that we all have to deal with, and this without feeling like we absolutely must have in our philosophical tool belt a moral objectivism that is the demonstrably correct one and/or that can be brought to the table in the midst of conflict with others as a guaranteed solution by which all such conflicts will be resolved. We kind of just accept things the way they are.

And how [realistically] is a distinction to be made between "applying" one's values and "enforcing" them? Giving to the poor vs. forcing others to. The law is going to have to draw the line somewhere, right? At some point, women are going to be forced to give birth or face the possibility of sanctions from the community. Otherwise, it becomes "abortion on demand". And that will surely enrage those in the pro-life camp. Indeed, many want to charge women with murder once the point of conception itself is reached.

Well, all I'm saying is that not all values have to be "enforced"; some just need to be practiced (sometimes with little resistance from others).

Even regarding the homeless there are political arguments hurled back and forth: http://www.debate.org/opinions/should-w ... e-homeless

Well, until a law is passed barring you from helping the homeless, I hardly think people disagreeing with you, or even hating you, means you have to "enforce" your values.

Indeed, some argue that rather than just feed and house them we should bring them into a political movement that brings down the capitalist political economy. And then embraces socialism instead. Then the conflicting arguments arise regarding the extent to which this can or ought to be accomplished through revolutionary stuggle. To use or not to use violence.

Yes, you can take any set of moral values and conceive of certain hypothetical (or actual) scenarios in which one comes up against resistance in one's efforts to practice them. But I'm just saying there exist people out their who hold certain moral values that don't inevitably come up against resistance in their efforts to practice them. My point merely stems from my reply to you regard my own values and how I wouldn't say I need to "enforce" them in order to practice them. True, I can imagine living an alternate life in an alternate world--a different time, a different culture, with a different historical background--one in which people not only recognize when I'm trying to practice my values but actively fight against me in those efforts. But this is not the world I'm living in, and it is not my experience. It is possible to practice your values without inevitably having to "enforce" them.

[iambiguous]

My problem remains...

I read all of this about prong#1 and I am still fuzzy -- really fuzzy -- regarding how the conclusions that you have come to [here and now] are relevant out in a particular world in which conflicting behaviors are precipitated by conflicting value judgments.

You're essentially saying: I'm still fuzzy, really fuzzy, regarding how prong #1 is relevant to prong #2. But this is something you need to sort out for yourself, as I've been defining prong #1 based on an interpretation of your own words. So you tell me how the self "fragmenting" is relevant to a world in which conflicting behaviors are precipitated by conflicting value judgments.[/color]

All that I am now interested in here at ILP is this: the manner in which, however someone defines the meaning of a particular word, they note the relevance of that definition in a particular context in which human behaviors come into conflict over value judgments.

Someone is either able to explain to me what they mean by "consciousness" here or they are not. But I am not arguing that if 1] I don't understand them or 2] I don't agree with them, the problem is with them. I readily acknowledge that the problem may well be with me.

All we can do here is to struggle [century after century after century] to pin these things down. But: Epistemologically and existentially.

For me, the "self" fragments only to the extent that "I" becomes embedded in moral and political conflicts. It is more or less whole -- intact -- regarding those aspects of your life that are embedded/embodied in objective reality. For example, I at any given point in time is embedded in a body that, in accordance with biological laws embedded in the evolution of life on earth, is what it is. It may riddled with cancer, it may be on the brink of death. Those are facts about I the body -- as regarding all other empirical facts about your existence -- that [at any point in time] are substantially real.

And what's the point you're making here? What's the relevance here to how we're defining prong #1 and how that relates to prong #2? I would completely agree that one can identify the 'I' with something more substantial and enduring (like the body) and thereby obviate the fragmentation of the 'I'. If this works for a particular individual, it would effectively solve the dilemma of prong #1. But obviously, prong #2 would remain. Having a strong, cohesive sense of self doesn't make the world's problems go away, let alone inter-group conflicts precipitated by dasein-based value judgements. I'm not saying it should. Rather, if anything, it would work the other way around--solve prong #2 first, then the resolution of prong #1 becomes simple if not automatic. Remember, prong #1 is a consequence of recognizing the existential implications of prong #2 (which not everyone does)--recognizing that if we live in a world in which our dasein nature results in conflicting values and beliefs and prejudices, etc., then it stands to question whether anyone's values, beliefs, prejudices are grounded on anything solid (i.e. objectively real/demonstrable), including one's own. This leads to the undermining of one's own "ism", and insofar as one identifies one's self with one's own "ism", it undermine's one's sense of self--the 'I' fragments. <-- Prong #1.

For me, this all revolves around "demonstration". The conscious "I" believes or claims to know particular things about its "self", about its "self" out in a particular world.

But what can it demonstrate [empirically, scientifically, mathematically, logically etc.] as in fact true? One can believe that the state executes prisoners in Texas. And one can surely demonstrate it. One can believe as well that these executions are moral. But how can one demonstrate it? In other words, to demonstrate that in the same manner in which it can be demonstrated that the executions occur.

Only if you believed in God [alone on a island], is there a possibility of fragmentation here.

Well, that part I'm not so sure about. Surely one can believe in a particular moral "ism" without being a theist, can't they?

Okay, but what is crucial is that, if you are alone, isolated from all other conscious entities, there is no one to judge you. But if you are alone and believe in God then your behaviors will be judged.

But, sure, the moral struggle may unfold inside your head alone. For example, you may have convinced yourself that it is unethical to consume animal flesh. But what if on this particular island you either consume the flesh of animals or you starve to death.

I mean, you might mean to say that you can't imagine how an atheist could possibly believe in an objectivism moralism, but that doesn't mean it can't happen in the real world. There are tons of atheists out there who firmly, objectively, believe in a certain moral "ism". <-- Their "ism" doesn't have to be perfectly rational per se, they just have to believe in it. You may see the flaws in their reasoning, but that doesn't mean it's impossible to cling to an objectivist, atheistic morality as a means of identifying one's sense of self with an "ism".

There are any number of "Humanisms" out there. On both sides of the political spectrum. And to each of them I note my dilemma above and then ask them how, when their own behaviors come into conflict with others, they are not entangled in it.

Can they demonstrate it?

Also, can they demonstrate how the narcissist or the sociopath, those who root morality in self-gratification, are necessarily irrational in their thinking...immoral in their behaviors?

I would have to be convince that when the behaviors of two or more individuals come into conflict over value judgments, there is a philosophical argument available to them such that they do not become entangled in my dilemma.

Two or more individuals? Two or more individuals come up with philosophical arguments that resolve their difference all the time. You don't think a methodist and a protestant can't resolve their religious differences by way of philosophical argumentation? I know it's rare, but are you really saying it's impossible?

Yes, of course, "for all practical purposes" a consensus can be formed between two or more people. But: An existential contraption if there ever was one. One group of people can agree that abortion is moral. Another group can agree that abortion is immoral. And as long as they never cross paths....

I think that's what you're looking for, isn't it? The objective truth?

I'm looking for an argument that might convince me that the "objective truth" as it is applicable to "either/or" relationships is in turn applicable to "is/ought" relationships. An argument that can then be demonstrated "out in the world" and not just "up in the clouds" as intellectual contraptions.

With you, the quandary revolves more or less around my inability to understand how your "subjectivism" would be any more effective when your own value judgments come into conflict with others given the manner in which I construe these conflicts as -- existentially -- the embodiment of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy.

Do you mean when I enter into a situation in which my values are inevitably pitted against those of another, and that the other stands obstinately steadfast against compromising his values? As in, the guy simply will not listen to why my values are the right values to have, values I arrive at by starting from my subjectivism and doing a sort of logical deduction to arrive at them?

I mean this: that your values and the values of those you come into conflict with do not seem able to be resolved using the tools of either philosophy or science. They are instead rooted in dasein, conflicting goods and political economy. And calling yourself a "subjectivist" doesn't make that any less applicable. Or so it seems to me. You might convince him to change his mind and come over to your side [or the other way around] but that doesn't make my dilemma go away. Well, not if you're me.

And yes, at this point in my life, being effectively cut off from others [other than virtually] my motivation does revolve more around curiosity: is there a way out of my labyrinthian dilemma -- the maze -- that I simply have not thought of yet?

What purpose do you think this curiosity is serving? If you believe that human beings are curious by nature, and that nature bestows us with the features and mechanism and propensities that we have for the purpose of survival, then what purpose do you think your curiosity in this matter is serving?

From my perspective, the most important philosophical question is this: How ought one to live? Is there a way in which to determine this deontolgically? Some conclude that there is. And that, indeed, they have already discovered or invented the actual agenda. Then their curiosity gets shrunk down to wondering why there are those who do not agree.

The rest [for me] is now more or less embedded in "waiting for godot". Waiting to die. Finding distractions. One of which [ironically] is probing the extent to which my priorities now might possibly be nudged in another direction.

Here, I always make the distinction between what someone believes is true "in their head" and what they are able to demonstrate as true for all rational human beings. And since it is the theist who believes in the existence of God, it is incumbent upon the theist to demonstrate that this is in fact true. Otherwise one can argue that God exists at the center of the universe and then challenge the atheist to prove that He does not.

The burden of proof argument is way more about philosophical etiquette than it is about resolving conflict. You really think that if an atheist and a theist got into conflict with each other, the conflict will be resolved way more effectively if the theist took on burden of proof than if the atheist did?
Besides, this evades my point, which was that if the atheist simply grants the theist the existence of God, that belief can then be used as leverage to persuade the theist.

Not sure what you are suggesting here about leverage. But I'll stick by the argument that those who argue that something does in fact exist bear the burden of demonstrating that this is true.

Yes, it is embedded in the distinction between arguing about something [scientific or otherwise] and demonstrating it. It's just that for scientists this is almost always relating to the world of either/or. What is the nature of reality? And not "ought it to have been something else instead"?

Hmm... then maybe I'm misunderstanding what you mean by "demonstrate". <-- So far, I've been taking you to mean "prove" in the vein of the traditional objectivist approach (that term again), meaning to exhaustively and thoroughly illustrate an immaculate logical deduction from a set of premises you and your contender both agree upon and arriving at a conclusion that matches your objectivist beliefs and values. But when you say "it is embedded in the distinction between arguing about something [scientific or otherwise] and demonstrating it," I'm not sure whether the traditional objectivist approach falls into the one category of the other. For a scientist, "demonstration" is certainly not the same as just "arguing"--to demonstrate, according to a scientist, doesn't require uttering a single word, it just requires doing something out in the empirical world that, sans any contending theories, can only be explained by the theory the scientist is trying to convince his contender of (coupled with the assumption that his contender will consequently "connect the dots"--which of course won't always happen even then).

So when you say you're looking for a "demonstration" of one moral "ism" in contrast to another, what exactly do you mean?

Someone argues that something either is or is not true. They argue, for example, that Hillary Clinton is campaigning to become president of the United States. Can they demonstrate that? Next they argue that Hillary Clinton ought to be elected to the office because her values are more rational and more ethical. Can they demonstrate that?

It seems rather clear to me: the first proposition can in fact be demonstrated to be true objectively for all of us. The second can only be construed [if I am right] to be a personal/subjective opinion rooted in dasein and in conflicting goods.

Yes, you may be successful in "convincing" others that her values are "in fact" the most rational and ethical. But is that then the same thing as demonstrating that they are?

And I am not arguing that "we absolutely must have in our philosophical tool belt a moral objectivism that is the demonstrably correct one and/or that can be brought to the table in the midst of conflict with others as a guaranteed solution by which all such conflicts will be resolved."

On the contrary, my argument is that this almost certainly does not exist; and, if not, what then is our best hope to sutain the least dysfunctional social, political and economic interactions?

Well, my own "political leap" here is in the general direction of "moderation, negotiation and compromise"; embodied politically in one or another rendition of democracy and the rule of law.

And here there is really no room for the objectivist mentality. In fact, moral objectivists ever and always pose the danger of forming or becoming a part of an autocratic, authoritarian polity. A regime hell-bent on imposing their own dogmas on everyone else. Or in eliminating those not perceived to be "one of us".

I just recognize in turn that moral nihilism can be equally dangerous and destructive. I have absolutely no illusions about that.

[Faust]

iam - I am puzzled as to why you want consciousness defined epistemically or ontologically but "I" defined scientifically. Science is attempting to define consciousness. We know that science exists - that scientists, following the scientific method (which is simply controlled observation). But how do we know that epistemology or ontology is anything but pie-in-the-sky ancient "philosophy"? These fields are outmoded, part of a mystical and metaphysical past. Why the double standard?

[Faust]

iam -

From my perspective, the most important philosophical question is this: How ought one to live?

Why must this be truth-based? Why isn't the way one ought to live to believe the lies of the objectivists? Why is the criterion not objectively demonstrable proof of truth (whatever the fuck that is)?

[iambiguous]

iam - I am puzzled as to why you want consciousness defined epistemically or ontologically but "I" defined scientifically.

I try to wrap my mind around what something like this might possibly mean pertaining to that which is of most interest to me: How ought one to live?

How ought one to live in the world of "is/ought". As opposed to how one must live in the world [re the laws of nature] of "either/or".

Science is attempting to define consciousness. We know that science exists - that scientists, following the scientific method (which is simply controlled observation). But how do we know that epistemology or ontology is anything but pie-in-the-sky ancient "philosophy"? These fields are outmoded, part of a mystical and metaphysical past. Why the double standard?

More than just define, science is attempting to discover what consciousness actually is. And if they succeed will it be only as it ever could have been or they will discover an element of human autonomy in there somewhere.

All that I suggest is that if there is some capacity to choose freely on our part, that is clearly circumscribed by the manner in which [here and now] I construe the meaning of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy. As this pertains to contexts that are perceived to be one way but are argued ought to be another way instead. A way that is said to be more rational or more ethical.

And there are still those who argue that we can subsume what we think we ought to do into one or another intellectual contraption that is said to encompass in turn all that we either can or cannot know.

For me it's always the same:

Tell me what you think you know [scientifically, philosophically, theologically etc] and note the manner in which this gets translated into a particular context "out in the world with others" in which the behaviors that you choose come into conflict with the behaviors that others choose as a result of conflicted value judgments, conflicted goods.

What unfolds in their conscious mind such that they are not in turn inextricably entangled [as I am] in this:

If I am always of the opinion that 1] my own values are rooted in dasein and 2] that there are no objective values "I" can reach, then every time I make one particular moral/political leap, I am admitting that I might have gone in the other direction...or that I might just as well have gone in the other direction. Then "I" begins to fracture and fragment to the point there is nothing able to actually keep it all together. At least not with respect to choosing sides morally and politically.

[iambiguous]

iam -

From my perspective, the most important philosophical question is this: How ought one to live?

Why must this be truth-based?

Well, my point is that it does not appear to be so that it can be. Either scientifically or philosophy.

Unless, of course, it turns out that human autonomy is in fact wholly an illusion. In the sense that, while, unlike with mindless matter, we do choose our behaviors, we could not have chosen in a way that is not wholly in sync with the laws of matter.

Why isn't the way one ought to live to believe the lies of the objectivists?

But: Are the narratives/agendas proposed by one or another moral/political objectivist lies? How would we go about demonstrating that to them?

The problem here is that all one need but do is to believe that something is true to make it true "in their head".

And thus we live in a world where over the course of human history one or another objectivist [re either God or Reason] has manage to ascend to one or another throne of power. And the rest as they say really is history.

In turn, my problem here is that my own narrative [moral nihilism] is no less capable of being destructive. Indeed, the "show me the money" mentality of those who own and operate the global economy has managed to make life a living hell for untold hundreds of millions of men, women and children. Well, according to the political narrative of some.

And are they not basically nihilistic in their thinking? Are they not basically folks who live their lives as though everything revolves around me, myself and I? Somewhere perhaps between a narcissistic and a sociopathic agenda? If only "for all practical purposes?"

Why is the criterion not objectively demonstrable proof of truth (whatever the fuck that is)?

What "on earth" does that mean though? Pick a moral conflagration that we are all familiar with and note the "objectively demonstrable proofs of truth."

See if the other side can't come up with a few of their own.

[Faust]

Well, iam. You could answer my questions.

Or so it seems to me...

[phyllo]

Well, iam. You could answer my questions.

Or so it seems to me...

Our own Peter Kropotkin wrote :
K: the greatest philosopher of all time, Socrates,
he said all he did was ask questions, nothing more......
I only follow the greatest of them all by asking questions.
I have said it before, I only ask questions......
That is the only possible path of philosophy,
asking questions...... the greater the philosopher,
the greater the questions.....

Kropotkin

and

Our own Peter Kropotkin wrote :
K: so what is philosophy, if not asking questions?

Kropotkin

Learn from PK, Faust.

[iambiguous]

Well, iam. You could answer my questions.

Or so it seems to me...

Come on, you claim to be interested in discussing these relationships as a "serious philosopher"...and this is all you have by way of responding to the points I raised?

But, okay, note how the manner in which I did respond to your questions above does not constitute a legitimate answer. Give us an example of that which would be deemed a legitimate answer by a "serious philosopher".

For example, perhaps you might ask a few questions of Phyllo. Let him become the template here for how Q and A ought to unfold at ILP.

[iambiguous]

Well, iam. You could answer my questions.

Or so it seems to me...

Our own Peter Kropotkin wrote :
K: the greatest philosopher of all time, Socrates,
he said all he did was ask questions, nothing more......
I only follow the greatest of them all by asking questions.
I have said it before, I only ask questions......
That is the only possible path of philosophy,
asking questions...... the greater the philosopher,
the greater the questions.....

Kropotkin

and

Our own Peter Kropotkin wrote :
K: so what is philosophy, if not asking questions?

Kropotkin

Learn from PK, Faust.

What could be sillier in a philosophy venue than a debate about which came first, the question or the answer?

Besides, my point is always in making the distinction between questions that, in using the tools of philosophy [or science], we may or may not be able to answer.

Fully, example.

What are the limits of rational thought pertaining to the conflicts that unfold between mere mortals as this relates to the manner in which Goods/Kingdoms of ends are perceived to be conflicted?

How is the manner in which I construe the meaning of dasein and political economy either relevant or irrelevant to this among alleged "serious philosophers"?

[phyllo]

For example, perhaps you might ask a few questions of Phyllo. Let him become the template here for how Q and A ought to unfold at ILP.

What would Faust ask me?

What is the airspeed velocity of an unladen swallow?

[iambiguous]

For example, perhaps you might ask a few questions of Phyllo. Let him become the template here for how Q and A ought to unfold at ILP.

What would Faust ask me?

What is the airspeed velocity of an unladen swallow?

Note to others:

Do "retorts" of this sort take us closer to or further away from "serious philosophy"?

Is it any wonder then that the Kids have practically taken over?

[phyllo]

Ooops, I forgot that I had logged on to 'I Love Serious Philosophy'. My mistake.

Carry on.

[iambiguous]

Ooops, I forgot that I had logged on to 'I Love Serious Philosophy'. My mistake.

Carry on.

Note to others:

See if you can spot the irony here.

[phyllo]

What is the purpose of this forum except to shoot some shit back and forth and learn something in the process.

Nobody here is working on a scholarly paper.

[iambiguous]

What is the purpose of this forum except to shoot some shit back and forth and learn something in the process.

Nobody here is working on a scholarly paper.

Well, one would hope that the shit that is shot on the philosophy board would be more along the lines of the exchange that Gib and I are having.

Sure, we can go back and forth regarding the extent to which it reflects a serious discussion of philosophy, but it is clearly rather far removed from merely an exchange of retorts.

You know, like we are doing here.

[phyllo]

Last time I checked, Gib wasn't sure what you are talking about and you were not sure what he is talking about. Now on page 6, you two seem to be more confused about each other's positions than you were on page 1.

But maybe I'm mistaken.

In any case, Faust came into the discussion when the sociopath problem came up. Is there any progress on that?

[phyllo]

Is the sociopath living 'the good life'? Yes, if it's self-defined.

If 'the good life' is self-defined, then who is not living 'the good life'? I guess that would be anyone who is doing something other than what he chose.

[Faust]

Well, iam. You could answer my questions.

Or so it seems to me...

Come on, you claim to be interested in discussing these relationships as a "serious philosopher"...and this is all you have by way of responding to the points I raised?

But, okay, note how the manner in which I did respond to your questions above does not constitute a legitimate answer. Give us an example of that which would be deemed a legitimate answer by a "serious philosopher".

For example, perhaps you might ask a few questions of Phyllo. Let him become the template here for how Q and A ought to unfold at ILP.

I only ask that you answer as a reasonable adult. "Serious philosophy" is not even in question.

[Faust]

iam - you are raising the same three to four points that you always have. I am merely asking that you explain why you claim that consciousness should be demonstrated epistemically/ontologically and the "I" scientifically.

For that matter, I am at a loss as to why how we ought to live is mutually exclusive to how we must live. Everything has limits.

But when I suggest that you have established a false dichotomy, you will ask what on earth I mean. Or you will wonder what it means in a world of negotiation and compromise.

What is there to negotiate in a pre-determined world?

What happened to you that you are so afraid of mere ideas?

One may live with a closed mind, or an open one. Or is that too much "serious" philosophy?

One may live obsessed with the evils of objectivism or one may recognize a set of psychological truths, biological mandates and physical limitations and make the best of it.

Or so it seems to me...

[iambiguous]

Well, iam. You could answer my questions.

Or so it seems to me...

Come on, you claim to be interested in discussing these relationships as a "serious philosopher"...and this is all you have by way of responding to the points I raised?

But, okay, note how the manner in which I did respond to your questions above does not constitute a legitimate answer. Give us an example of that which would be deemed a legitimate answer by a "serious philosopher".

For example, perhaps you might ask a few questions of Phyllo. Let him become the template here for how Q and A ought to unfold at ILP.

I only ask that you answer as a reasonable adult. "Serious philosophy" is not even in question.

Okay, in that case:

...note the manner in which I did respond to your questions above does not constitute the answer of a "reasonable adult". Give us an example of that which would be deemed a legitimate answer by a "reasonable adult".

You can choose the question.

[Faust]

"I think consciousness should be defined epistemically because...
...but the "I" should be defined scientifically because...
... and the reason why these entities are sensibly defined by very different standards is...
...and even though I don't believe that philosophy is worth shit, I invoke ontology here because...

Is this of any help?

[iambiguous]

Last time I checked, Gib wasn't sure what you are talking about and you were not sure what he is talking about. Now on page 6, you two seem to be more confused about each other's positions than you were on page 1.

Right, like that never happens in exchanges here at ILP!

Any discussion that revolves around grappling with all the variables embedded in both nature and nurture --- variables involved in exploring the relationship between human identity, human value judgments and human behaviors --- is going to engender a complexity that is not at all easily communicated back and forth.

Unless, of course, you are an objectivist. Then you simply demand that everyone must intertwine the variables as you do --- naturally, ideally, or by definition --- or be wrong.

I don't have any illusions however that my own understanding here reflects the optimal frame of mind. I merely note that given an aggregation of particular experiences, relationships and sources of information/knowledge, I have come "here and now" to think as I do.

And then I challenge those who insist philosophers are able to grapple with these intertwined variables to devise an argument that all rational men and women are obligated to espouse. And then to demonstrate this by reflecting on the manner in which their argument becomes intertwined existentially in their own conflicting behaviors with others.

Which you basically avoid like the plague.

In any case, Faust came into the discussion when the sociopath problem came up. Is there any progress on that?

Well, the sociopath, for whatever personal reason, can point a gun at Faust and Faust can try to explain to him/her why pulling the trigger is necessarily irrational and immoral.

Of course, Faust is a perspectivist. But: is he a perspectivist such that pertaining to conflicting goods and sociopathic behavior he is able to rank particular behaviors as more or less rational?

Sans God?

Of course with you God does seem to be in there....somewhere. Though you never really seem willing to discuss that "out in the world" that you actually live in from day to day.