Effect of consciousness on evolution

[BUFFALO]

Another very good book is "Conversations on Consciousness: What the Best Minds Think about the Brain, Free Will, and What It Means to Be Human" by Susan Blackmore. It does concentrate on consciousness, but what is interesting is that she interviews 21 of the most influential current researchers/thinkers on human consciousness and asks every one of them whether they think we have free will.

Having read the book I would say that pretty much none of them believe we have "Free Will" in the classic sense: i.e. that there is a "self" that somehow stands apart from the physical body/brain and controls what we do. But some of those interviewed still feel that free will is (in some ways) compatible with determinism. But here it becomes important to redefine what we mean by free will. The reason that most people assume we have free will is that our subjective experience is strongly coherent with an expectation of freedom to do what we want, moment-to-moment. And although I think science has made it obvious that this is an illusion, if we expand our definition of "self" to include the brain and body and all it contains and has experienced, we can still see ourselves as conscious agents; in some sense we are "free" to do as we choose (are not externally constrained) but what we choose is determined by who we are. In other words, at a deeper level, it is apparent that we really don't get to choose what we choose.

Rather than try to shoehorn our definition of free will into a compatibilist point of view, Sam Harris believes it is ultimately a better strategy to see free will as an illusion, because there are certain consequences (eg. for moral reasoning) that are aided by the realization that who we are is causally determined.

Here is an interesting take on "free will": http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_ariely_ask ... sions.html

Oh, and another interesting thing is that Susan Blackmore was actually a parapsychology researcher for quite some time: she now totally rejects parapsychology.

[Amorphos]

posting more replies in a mo

Moreno wrote; My point is that we do not know if consciousness has any affect in the organism or is merely an epiphenomenon. It seems like choices are made before the conscious mind is even aware a choice has been made.

As I suggested above, recognition, perception and awareness would make consciousness phenomenal. For me that means there is both a material and anti-materialist answer. Either way you got something ‘operating the switchboard’ which means its having an effect on evolution.

As to the latter, we don’t know if the consciousness experiences those unmade choices ~ do they flick through the mind and are they the final choice? Yet we do know that the consciousness makes some of the choices, the ones it makes. The physical cannot know what the info we experience is [because its not physical], but info changes [e.g what I am writing now] the output.

Here I think we should concentrate on weather or not the human machine self operates. For me its like there are a bunch of objects drawn on the blackboard [quale and info] and the conscious part of the machine [or spirit] can scan them and make a choice about what it wants to consider, or choose to abstain.

There is no reason to assume it is more than a witness. Of course choices are made by the body and they are 'watched' by the witness which is really a quale.

Well the witness experiences e.g. the colour blue, which represents the wavelength of the electrical signal, which in turn represents the wavelength of light. The brain can work by those signals, but it cannot know what the colour blue is. If the consciousness is then an extension beyond the physical, and it communicates the blue colour as a word here, then how can the brain know what it means when it is not part of it? Seems like there are two worlds here, that of the mimic [brain] and that of the experiencer [soul].

[Amorphos]

volchok

Imagine that the brain is like a switchboard, how is it operated?…

a. signals derived of external sources operate the switches?

b. consciousness is the physical [or other] subjective aspect of the brain, which operates the switches?

c. both a and b.

If b or c then consciousness must have an effect on evolution!

--------------------

You're really claiming to control your experience? Do you control or are you even aware of the processes that allow you to read this sentence and understand it's in English? Of course not. Do you control the way air vibrates and ultimately becomes what we know as sound? No. You also don't control your thoughts.

I am claiming that consciousness is the mechanism which controls the experience, but not what informs it! Note that here I am not saying that consciousness is something other than part of the machine.
The consciousness is the only thing which can understand information, and that’s where the materialist argument gets tricky. The brain can only possibly know collocative information, and that is not what you are thinking in terms of right now!

I agree that it is an important part. And I never denied that consciousness affects things. The only thing I'm arguing is that at no point does the self come into the equation. Or free will, obviously.

Lets just throw the self out of the window here. Free will however is different, it isn’t entire, the non selecting aspects of the brain can act alone, but the consciousness can select options too, so there are both parties at work here. The self isn’t fundamental to free will, its just a mechanism of worldly and societal interaction, a tool that consciousness uses. Twins for example can have very similar personas/selfs.

I definitely agree that consciousness is a function of the brain, I just don't think I would say that it centralizes anything. As far as what are the evolutionary advantages of consciousness, there are some theories out there. I think I can find you some interesting links to read if you want. I might have to read them as well.

I’d say consciousness is the aspect of the brain which centralises ~ there must be something doing that for cohesive purposes, our minds would be a mess otherwise.
There are massive advantages, but I am not just talking about being fit, I think just ‘being’ conscious gives a further need to be fit and survive.

As far as other animals go, I have no idea honestly but just the other day I was reading about how animal's mental activity has to be completely different given that they don't have language. A hungry cat doesn't think " A bit of fish now would be awesome". He just gets up and eats.

Hmm well I saw a documentary where sealions and walruses, took logic tests involving food rewards for changing sets of symbols. They out performed some humans! Dogs and dolphins take linguistic instruction from us, birds make music when their chirping is slowed down. One example showed a bird a small segment of Beethoven’s 9th. Dogs with smells millions of times stronger than ours probably have an associated language in their minds.

For me the most interesting point is that, humans probably share a similar [if more complex] ‘inner language’ which is possibly conceptual. This is important because we often fail to notice this running beneath out thoughts, and this language may know and switch a lot more switches than we do ~ in terms of our more overt linguistic thought!

Again, I don't know what the experiencer is. To me, it makes much more sense to talk about processes or consciousness.

Sure but the consciousness can be broken down into many parts [e.g. perception, awareness, recognition, cognition/thinking], and we need to break it down so as to see what’s going on ~ science. The experiencer is the thing [epicentre] which awareness, perception and memory are brought into and cognated to form our thoughts ~ both conceptual and overt linguistic, kind of like our thinking space.

That doesn’t make the experiencer a ‘thing’, or an object, nor does it need to be to remain physical [if it is]. Its an emergent property perhaps like the screen and keyboard on your phone or computer.

.

[FilmSnob]

There are several evolutionarily stable strategies that will allow gene-carrying members of a species to succesfully survive long enough to procreate.

Primates have evolved by combining the herd strategy (like goats or pidgeons) with the two-legged brutality strategy (like bears or hawks). Humans in particular have added a thick layer of logical programing capabilities that have allowed them to progressively shift to the mass colony strategy (like ants, or fish), and I think this is what quetzalcoatl is talking about.

Thinking back now, it's funny how Sawelios recoiled when I suggested the possibility of straight chemical sucking strategies (like elms, or plancton).

[volchok]

still feel that free will is (in some ways) compatible with determinism.

That point is moot. Free will is a a logical impossibility regardless of the universe being deterministic or ramdom.

And although I think science has made it obvious that this is an illusion, if we expand our definition of "self" to include the brain and body and all it contains and has experienced, we can still see ourselves as conscious agents;

I hate that holistic you can have your cake and eat it too bullshit kind of argument. It's beyond stupid. I think Dennet subscribes to it although I'm not sure.
One can expand the notion of self as much as one wants but here's why it's a nonsensical argument: You're no more responsible for the workings of your brain as you are for your heart beating or the production of testosterone in your body or the number of red cells you have in your blood.
Your liver is part of your body and yet no one would hold you accountable if it stopped functioning properly and no one would argue that you control your liver.

Sam Harris believes it is ultimately a better strategy to see free will as an illusion, because there are certain consequences (eg. for moral reasoning) that are aided by the realization that who we are is causally determined.

Harris does believe that free will is an illusion. It's not some sort of tactic to make us more moral.

[volchok]

Imagine that the brain is like a switchboard, how is it operated?…

a. signals derived of external sources operate the switches?

b. consciousness is the physical [or other] subjective aspect of the brain, which operates the switches?

c. both a and b.

If b or c then consciousness must have an effect on evolution!

Putting aside how the brain works for a moment, I never denied that consciousness has an effect on the world or that it has evolutionary advantages. I'm not sure why you're insisting on that specific point.

I am claiming that consciousness is the mechanism which controls the experience, but not what informs it! Note that here I am not saying that consciousness is something other than part of the machine.

That's a self-defeating argument. You have just conceded, implicitly, by not addressing what I said, that you do not control the how sound is perceived. ( And no one in their right mind would argue otherwise)
If consciousness was something that controlled experience then you would have full control over how sound is perceived.
Please notice that I'm using sound as an example. It can be easily interchangeable with something else.

The consciousness is the only thing which can understand information,

Is it? I think consciousness is the product of information being processed. A kind of self-referential process.

Lets just throw the self out of the window here. Free will however is different, it isn’t entire, the non selecting aspects of the brain can act alone, but the consciousness can select options too, so there are both parties at work here. The self isn’t fundamental to free will, its just a mechanism of worldly and societal interaction, a tool that consciousness uses.

Actually if you throw the self out of the window, you have automatically thrown free will out of the window as well. After all, if there isn't something independent of the brain but that somehow affects it, how could you possibly have free will?

Twins for example can have very similar personas/selfs.

Now you're just mixing concepts.
Although to be fair, there' s a shitload of different conceptualizations of the self. As a psychology undergraduate, I think I have learned like 10 already.

I’d say consciousness is the aspect of the brain which centralises ~ there must be something doing that for cohesive purposes, our minds would be a mess otherwise.
There are massive advantages, but I am not just talking about being fit, I think just ‘being’ conscious gives a further need to be fit and survive.

I understand what you're saying, I just don't think you can support that claim. As I've said before, we know that different parts of the brain control different things to the point where a person can, for instance, be able to talk fluently but not be able to enunciate the function of a certain object. There really is no center. Certainly not from an objective point of view and I'm arguing that even from a subjective point of view, it doesn't exist.

Hmm well I saw a documentary where sealions and walruses, took logic tests involving food rewards for changing sets of symbols. They out performed some humans! Dogs and dolphins take linguistic instruction from us, birds make music when their chirping is slowed down. One example showed a bird a small segment of Beethoven’s 9th. Dogs with smells millions of times stronger than ours probably have an associated language in their minds.

An associated language? I don't buy that. Associated emotions, feelings and physiological responses ? For sure.

[BUFFALO]

still feel that free will is (in some ways) compatible with determinism.

That point is moot. Free will is a a logical impossibility regardless of the universe being deterministic or ramdom.

I agree - it does not matter if there is a random component; this does not restore or bestow free will in any fashion. What I am saying is that, in my interpretation, it may be valid to redefine free will such that it is compatible with determinism. And a number of people, like Dennett have essentially done just that. I mean, most of my decisions are "up to me" in the sense that they are unrestrained by external factors (I am not under duress) - they are still determined by my personal likes/dislikes/preferences/conditioning etc. etc., but they are mine. And although they are determined, they are not "predetermined" i.e. until I make them nobody (not even me) knows what I will choose. That's about as free as things can get.

And although I think science has made it obvious that this is an illusion, if we expand our definition of "self" to include the brain and body and all it contains and has experienced, we can still see ourselves as conscious agents;

I hate that holistic you can have your cake and eat it too bullshit kind of argument. It's beyond stupid. I think Dennet subscribes to it although I'm not sure.
One can expand the notion of self as much as one wants but here's why it's a nonsensical argument: You're no more responsible for the workings of your brain as you are for your heart beating or the production of testosterone in your body or the number of red cells you have in your blood. Your liver is part of your body and yet no one would hold you accountable if it stopped functioning properly and no one would argue that you control your liver.

I know where you are coming from here (why not just face the facts, right?) but I'm not sure I would call Dennett (or the other compatibilists) stupid. I can alter or modify the workings of my body including my brain. You yourself have expressed an interest in bodybuilding if I remember correctly. Certainly here is avenue for changing our bodies and how they function, essentially by using our brains. And the brain itself can be modified by meditation. But it is still all subject to determinism, i.e. there is a complicated causal chain (more like a web) of antecedent events.

Sam Harris believes it is ultimately a better strategy to see free will as an illusion, because there are certain consequences (eg. for moral reasoning) that are aided by the realization that who we are is causally determined.

Harris does believe that free will is an illusion. It's not some sort of tactic to make us more moral.

Again I agree that he really does believe it is an illusion and I have heard a talk where he specifically addressed Dennett's take on free will as being simply a redefinition. And then he specifically stated that he thinks it healthier to accept the fact that we do not have free will, because it can make us more compassionate. I'll look for the video or essay or whatever it was.

[Fixed Cross]

As we all know, we do not control the physical configuration of your brains.

But since you said that the self is an illusion, this might read: "that which does not exist does not control the physical configuration of the brain belonging to that which does not exist".

My point is that what we associate with the name volchok/FC does in fact control the physical configuration of the brain it pertains to, as it is nothing but the existence of that brain, including all that caused it.

So the larger point being that testosterone changes decisions, and this is significant, but what caused the presence of testosterone and the system in which it has the capacity to influence decisions? Exactly - "you", "The Self" - the irreducible "complex of drives" as a cause of which chemicals can be identified as fulfilling a function at all.

Man is not passive to his chemicals, man is such a combination of chemicals that cyclically reacts to sustain itself as a reaction pattern with particular properties, requirements and operating context. This quality holds all chemicals in a firm grasp. For without this selected tendency to sustain a behavioral circuitry, instead of a non circular continuum of change, there could be no cells or particles whatsoever - no energy would get caught in spin, no mass would be thinkable.

Testosteron is a part of the balance, power over it as an isolated element gives tremendous, if not devastating power over the whole organism. Power over its regulation without knowledge of the consequences to its function in terms of other elements of the system, is a very dangerous power, like administering neurotransmitters supplements can cause the most intense crises as well as instantly cure depression. The science of chemicals is both of the greatest risk and merit.

[Only_Humean]

One can expand the notion of self as much as one wants but here's why it's a nonsensical argument: You're no more responsible for the workings of your brain as you are for your heart beating or the production of testosterone in your body or the number of red cells you have in your blood.

I can't affect your liver function with all the social pressure I can bring to bear (excluding maybe extreme psychological stress or execution) . I can affect your behaviour more or less, though, so you are held responsible for your behaviour.

This might strike people raised with a Christian free-will moral ethic as unfair or uncompassionate, but I don't see what that has to do with anything.

[volchok]

I agree - it does not matter if there is a random component; this does not restore or bestow free will in any fashion. What I am saying is that, in my interpretation, it may be valid to redefine free will such that it is compatible with determinism. And a number of people, like Dennett have essentially done just that. I mean, most of my decisions are "up to me" in the sense that they are unrestrained by external factors (I am not under duress) - they are still determined by my personal likes/dislikes/preferences/conditioning etc. etc., but they are mine. And although they are determined, they are not "predetermined" i.e. until I make them nobody (not even me) knows what I will choose. That's about as free as things can get.

Well, yes we do have that. But that is not free will. That is usually described as "Freedom to act".
I think it's intellectually dishonest to redefine things like that. It´s an impediment to clear thinking and intellectual discourse really.

Certainly here is avenue for changing our bodies and how they function, essentially by using our brains. And the brain itself can be modified by meditation. But it is still all subject to determinism, i.e. there is a complicated causal chain (more like a web) of antecedent events.

I wouldn't call Dennet stupid. His argument is stupid.
Yes, it is possible to change your body, or your brain. But again, wanting to do so is a mental state in itself that doesn't just happen in vacuum.
It reminds me of when I'm thinking about free will. Suddenly a thought occurs, and I recognize that I didn't control that thought, it just emerged. And then I notice that me recognizing that I did not control that thought is just another thought which I also didn't control. See where I'm getting at?

Again I agree that he really does believe it is an illusion and I have heard a talk where he specifically addressed Dennett's take on free will as being simply a redefinition. And then he specifically stated that he thinks it healthier to accept the fact that we do not have free will, because it can make us more compassionate. I'll look for the video or essay or whatever it was.

It does make us more compassionate.
This is it: http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/free ... -free-will

[volchok]

But since you said that the self is an illusion, this might read: "that which does not exist does not control the physical configuration of the brain belonging to that which does not exist".

Language does have its limitations. I cannot discuss these matters without using personal pronouns.

So the larger point being that testosterone changes decisions, and this is significant, but what caused the presence of testosterone and the system in which it has the capacity to influence decisions? Exactly - "you", "The Self" - the irreducible "complex of drives" as a cause of which chemicals can be identified as fulfilling a function at all.

There is no unit in control. What produces and regulates testosterone is not the same thing that produces and regulates something else. And there isn't a "you" that is somehow responsible for that. No more then you are responsible for the appearance of say, a tumor.

[volchok]

I can't affect your liver function with all the social pressure I can bring to bear (excluding maybe extreme psychological stress or execution) . I can affect your behaviour more or less, though, so you are held responsible for your behaviour.

This might strike people raised with a Christian free-will moral ethic as unfair or uncompassionate, but I don't see what that has to do with anything.

I don't understand your point.

[Only_Humean]

I can't affect your liver function with all the social pressure I can bring to bear (excluding maybe extreme psychological stress or execution) . I can affect your behaviour more or less, though, so you are held responsible for your behaviour.

This might strike people raised with a Christian free-will moral ethic as unfair or uncompassionate, but I don't see what that has to do with anything.

I don't understand your point.

Hmmm.

I'll try it this way:
1) Why should we become more compassionate as a result of seeing free will as an illusion?
2) Given that we either will or not do so, depending on our mental states, dispositions, history and genetics (etc), why would it be important for you to make any such claim?

It may seem a bit nonsensical or tangential put this way, but I'm trying to work out the responsibility thing.

[Only_Humean]

How is that last sentence not fatalistic?

From naturalism.org:

Fatalism holds that the natural world causes events in human life but is not itself influenced by human will or behavior. No matter what you do, the same things will happen to you. The fatalist position is that "if I do not have free will, then my life is totally determined by the outside world, therefore my beliefs and desires have no effect on the outside world, and therefore no matter what I do the same things will happen to me". Of course, it is empirically demonstrable that our behavior affects the environment and thus what happens to us.

If you want to read further: http://www.naturalism.org/fatalism.htm# ... lism%C2%A0

Interesting distinction; everything is foreordained in either case, but fatalism assumes free will.

[BUFFALO]

I can't affect your liver function with all the social pressure I can bring to bear (excluding maybe extreme psychological stress or execution) . I can affect your behaviour more or less, though, so you are held responsible for your behaviour.
This might strike people raised with a Christian free-will moral ethic as unfair or uncompassionate, but I don't see what that has to do with anything.

I don't understand your point.

Hmmm.
I'll try it this way:
1) Why should we become more compassionate as a result of seeing free will as an illusion?
2) Given that we either will or not do so, depending on our mental states, dispositions, history and genetics (etc), why would it be important for you to make any such claim?
It may seem a bit nonsensical or tangential put this way, but I'm trying to work out the responsibility thing.

One of Harris' main contentions is that we will be more compassionate because we will be able to see that people are not responsible for many of the bad things they do in the way that an assumption of free will appears to demand. In other words, criminals don't often have any real "choice" about their behavior. I think we have witnessed a few threads here on ILP where posters were positively revelling in the manner in which certain deviant criminals should be tortured and killed. A realization that these individuals might not be responsible for their acts in the way that is assumed by much of our legal system could increase compassion and hopefully prevent us from treating the offenders in a similar fashion to the way they treated their victims.

And just because things operate deterministically doesn't mean that we are not agents or that our ideas carry no weight or influence - realizing that others are not necessarily free to "not commit" atrocities can influence the way we respond. It could make us more compassionate.

[Only_Humean]

And just because things operate deterministically doesn't mean that we are not agents or that our ideas carry no weight or influence - realizing that others are not necessarily free to "not commit" atrocities can influence the way we respond. It could make us more compassionate.

So we should stop asking - no, insisting - that people not do certain things. Because either they will or they won't.

- Of course we should insist, as that is part of what influences whether they will or they won't.

So what if it's something really nasty, and they do it even though we insist they don't?

- Then we should up the punishment stakes to make the deterrent influence greater.

But they can't be held responsible for the acts they commit!

- And I can't be held responsible for being an uncompassionate bastard.



Taking responsibility out of the equation doesn't increase compassion unless you secretly still hold the link between responsibility and deserved compassion. If responsibility doesn't come into it, you should scrap your obsolete moral hangover.

Edit: "should" purely for logical consistency, of course. Either you will or you won't.

[BUFFALO]

And just because things operate deterministically doesn't mean that we are not agents or that our ideas carry no weight or influence - realizing that others are not necessarily free to "not commit" atrocities can influence the way we respond. It could make us more compassionate.

So we should stop asking - no, insisting - that people not do certain things. Because either they will or they won't.
- Of course we should insist, as that is part of what influences whether they will or they won't.
So what if it's something really nasty, and they do it even though we insist they don't?
- Then we should up the punishment stakes to make the deterrent influence greater.
But they can't be held responsible for the acts they commit!
- And I can't be held responsible for being an uncompassionate bastard.

The point would be that now we are not just punishing people for doing wrong: what is the point if they are not really acting freely? However, they are still responsible in the sense that they are the agent that commits the crime. Therefore, if we see that there is any risk whatever that they may do this again, it is our duty to prevent them from doing so. Furthermore, we can not rule out deterrence as possible avenue for preventing crime. It may be practical to impose a punishment severe enough to deter potential offenders.

[BUFFALO]

I agree - it does not matter if there is a random component; this does not restore or bestow free will in any fashion. What I am saying is that, in my interpretation, it may be valid to redefine free will such that it is compatible with determinism. And a number of people, like Dennett have essentially done just that. I mean, most of my decisions are "up to me" in the sense that they are unrestrained by external factors (I am not under duress) - they are still determined by my personal likes/dislikes/preferences/conditioning etc. etc., but they are mine. And although they are determined, they are not "predetermined" i.e. until I make them nobody (not even me) knows what I will choose. That's about as free as things can get.

Well, yes we do have that. But that is not free will. That is usually described as "Freedom to act". I think it's intellectually dishonest to redefine things like that. It´s an impediment to clear thinking and intellectual discourse really.

I agree that there is a certain dishonesty here that needs to be excised. But any attempt to refute free will, in my opinion, will have to address the powerful underlying subjective experience that we have of being in control. I think we confuse our genuine "Freedom to Act" with a popular romanticized (if you will) interpretation that converts it into this "ghost in the machine" type of free will where we see the self as something that stands quite apart from our bodies; this "immortal soul" that has a supernatural capacity to devine good and bad is ultimately responsible for the choices we make. But the fundamental "sense" of freedom is difficult to avoid and I think it is genuine, in a limited way.

And I don't think our positions on this are very far apart. One of the things that struck me in reading Susan Blackmore's book of interviews with consciousness researchers was how much all of them fundamentally agreed on the subject, even though each one had his/her own nuanced interpretation. And none of them claimed to be anything close to certain on the subject; there was no dogmatism.

Certainly here is avenue for changing our bodies and how they function, essentially by using our brains. And the brain itself can be modified by meditation. But it is still all subject to determinism, i.e. there is a complicated causal chain (more like a web) of antecedent events.

I wouldn't call Dennet stupid. His argument is stupid.
Yes, it is possible to change your body, or your brain. But again, wanting to do so is a mental state in itself that doesn't just happen in vacuum.
It reminds me of when I'm thinking about free will. Suddenly a thought occurs, and I recognize that I didn't control that thought, it just emerged. And then I notice that me recognizing that I did not control that thought is just another thought which I also didn't control. See where I'm getting at?

I indeed do see what you are getting at and you are doing a pretty good job of describing one of the fundamental problems: most of the time we have no choice whatever what pops into our heads. Now the argument can be made that we can, and often do, tell our minds what to think about, and this is true enough. But I don't think people really appreciate how hard it is to do this for an extended duration: attempting to meditate is a very good way to demonstrate to yourself how difficult it is to maintain fixed concentration (even for just a few minutes).

Again I agree that he really does believe it is an illusion and I have heard a talk where he specifically addressed Dennett's take on free will as being simply a redefinition. And then he specifically stated that he thinks it healthier to accept the fact that we do not have free will, because it can make us more compassionate. I'll look for the video or essay or whatever it was.

It does make us more compassionate.
This is it: http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/free ... -free-will

I wasn't sure where I had seen it, but I should have know it would be in an obvious place.

[volchok]

Hmmm.

I'll try it this way:
1) Why should we become more compassionate as a result of seeing free will as an illusion?
2) Given that we either will or not do so, depending on our mental states, dispositions, history and genetics (etc), why would it be important for you to make any such claim?

The reason why we become more compassionate once we realize that free will is an illusion is because we then understand that no one could act different then they did and if we were in their shoes( identical body, brain chemistry, mental states, dispositions, genetics and so forth) we would have acted exactly the same way. Notice that they have no control over any of the aforementioned things. Once you understand this hate becomes irrational. Even hating Hitler is irrational. Natural, yes. But irrational. Vengeance looses all it's meaning and so does retributive justice. In some cases, some small form of retributive justice might still be moral but this are rare cases.

As far as why it's important to make this claim, the problem here is that you're making the same mistake you did when you asked how could determinism not be fatalistic ? While it is true that things are determined, our bodies are also composed of atoms like everything else. You are part of nature therefor your actions have consequences.

Interesting distinction; everything is foreordained in either case, but fatalism assumes free will.

No. Fatalism assumes that we are not causal agents.

[volchok]

So we should stop asking - no, insisting - that people not do certain things. Because either they will or they won't.

- Of course we should insist, as that is part of what influences whether they will or they won't.

So what if it's something really nasty, and they do it even though we insist they don't?

- Then we should up the punishment stakes to make the deterrent influence greater.

But they can't be held responsible for the acts they commit!

- And I can't be held responsible for being an uncompassionate bastard.

Yes they can´t be held responsible but we still have to deter certain behaviors. Why ? Because everyone else will be better off. We need not entertain any notions of free will to understand this. We can, and should, be honest about it.

[volchok]

I agree that there is a certain dishonesty here that needs to be excised. But any attempt to refute free will, in my opinion, will have to address the powerful underlying subjective experience that we have of being in control. I think we confuse our genuine "Freedom to Act" with a popular romanticized (if you will) interpretation that converts it into this "ghost in the machine" type of free will where we see the self as something that stands quite apart from our bodies; this "immortal soul" that has a supernatural capacity to devine good and bad is ultimately responsible for the choices we make. But the fundamental "sense" of freedom is difficult to avoid and I think it is genuine, in a limited way.

Agreed but, I truly think that the powerful underlying subjective experience that we have of being in control is not powerful at all upon close inspection.
Trough introspection it becomes painstakingly obvious that we are not the authors of our thoughts and actions. In fact, if I focus my attention on this subject, I can loose that underlying sense of authorship very easily. You should try it. Or not...it can be a bit scary at times.

And I don't think our positions on this are very far apart.

I don't think so either. I'm discussing this with you, not arguing against you.

I indeed do see what you are getting at and you are doing a pretty good job of describing one of the fundamental problems: most of the time we have no choice whatever what pops into our heads. Now the argument can be made that we can, and often do, tell our minds what to think about, and this is true enough.

Of course. That happens all the time. However, you telling your mind what to think about is just another thought that emerged into consciousness. And that is what most people seem to ignore.

I wasn't sure where I had seen it, but I should have know it would be in an obvious place

.

Yep. I love his blog. He can even make the hazard of burning wood an interesting topic.

[iambiguous]

So, when a tiger chooses to kill a wild boar that's the same thing as a hunter choosing to kill a tiger? Which is the same thing as someone from PETA choosing to express outrage at this?

The same thing in regards to what?
If you mean complexity, clearly it isn't.

I mean the capacity to weigh alternate behaviors and to choose one over the other. I see this as rooted in dasein, while you see it as rooted in...matter?

The tiger is not dasein because there is no "I" other than as a manifestion of the brute facticity rooted in instinct.

With the hunter and the animal rights advocate "I" is more or less sophisticated. For some of us, we grow up believing what we were indoctrinated to believe and hardly ever consider any alternatives. For others, alternatives are always considered.

But is the consideration of the hunter and the animal rights activist really nothing other than a more complex interaction of the matter that interacts in the brain of the tiger responding [more or less mechanically] to feelings of hunger?

[volchok]

But is the consideration of the hunter and the animal rights activist really nothing other than a more complex interaction of the matter that interacts in the brain of the tiger responding [more or less mechanically] to feelings of hunger?

Yes. Although a human brain is much more complex then the brain of a tiger.
You argument seems to go a little something like this : We have rational thought and we make decisions therefor free will exists.
I don't think I need to point out how ridiculous that is.

As a side note, our dna is 99% identical to the dna of a chimp. And 50 or 60% identical to a banana's dna.

[iambiguous]

But is the consideration of the hunter and the animal rights activist really nothing other than a more complex interaction of the matter that interacts in the brain of the tiger responding [more or less mechanically] to feelings of hunger?

Yes. Although a human brain is much more complex then the brain of a tiger.
You argument seems to go a little something like this : We have rational thought and we make decisions therefor free will exists.
I don't think I need to point out how ridiculous that is.

I would not say that your own point of view is ridiculous. I would only point out the obvious implications of it for human interaction.

Basically you are saying that those who embraced the Holocaust and fought for it are essentially interchangable with those who detested it and fought against it.

Just different sets of dominos.

I would only suggest it is not necessarily ridiculous to speculate there might be more to it than that.

What is ridiculous, in other words, are those who speak of these things as though they can be understood in their entirety.

And maybe someday they will be. But if they are and you are right then that too is just another domino falling. Nature is the designer but it knows not of what it designs. Why? Because that would be like a heart knowing it is beating to keep me alive.

[Only_Humean]

The reason why we become more compassionate once we realize that free will is an illusion is because we then understand that no one could act different then they did and if we were in their shoes( identical body, brain chemistry, mental states, dispositions, genetics and so forth) we would have acted exactly the same way.

If I'd been identical to them, I'd have been them and not me. And I'd of course deserve whatever punishment I got, just as they do. Unless you believe in some soul or essence, of course. This is part of the sneaky theistic hangover.

I can see why you'd be more compassionate if you still thought that desert is related to making a choice. "He had no real choice, so he can't be blamed" assumes that blame should be related to some real choice, that you've already said doesn't exist. I don't see why I should treat a malfunctioning machine compassionately, any more than I should treat it maliciously.

Notice that they have no control over any of the aforementioned things. Once you understand this hate becomes irrational. Even hating Hitler is irrational. Natural, yes. But irrational. Vengeance looses all it's meaning and so does retributive justice. In some cases, some small form of retributive justice might still be moral but this are rare cases.

So presumably we can choose not to feel hate or vengeance, based on reason? And if we can, do we have any responsibility to do so?

As far as why it's important to make this claim, the problem here is that you're making the same mistake you did when you asked how could determinism not be fatalistic ? While it is true that things are determined, our bodies are also composed of atoms like everything else. You are part of nature therefor your actions have consequences.

I'm not saying it doesn't have consequences. Why is it important? Because your actions can affect others' behaviour, right?

Interesting distinction; everything is foreordained in either case, but fatalism assumes free will.

No. Fatalism assumes that we are not causal agents.

I don't think so - fatalists don't assume that whether or not you let go of the specific ball you're holding it will hit the ground in two seconds. It's more that our actions and choices will be swamped out by the millions of others, in the big picture. But it's not important, I see your point as a related "and"
Fatalism: you can choose what you like -> the result is already set up
Determinism: you can't choose -> the result is already set up

Yes they can´t be held responsible but we still have to deter certain behaviors. Why ? Because everyone else will be better off. We need not entertain any notions of free will to understand this. We can, and should, be honest about it.

I don't see where that deterrence has to be compassionate. If a hideous public torture and execution would act as a much more effective deterrent to serious crime, increasing overall well-being, would it be more compassionate to do that? In that case, I think "compassionate" is a misleadingly warm and fuzzy word, and "dispassionate" is probably the one you are looking for. Which could also be argued to be a positive thing, but it's very different.