Anon's Compatibilism

Arthur Schopenhauer famously stated: “Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills.” This may sound true, but let’s examine both the veracity and implications of such a statement.

I reach for a glass of wine. What is the cause of this action? Surely there is no one cause, unless we claim that whatever conditions were necessary and sufficient to cause the action, caused the action, and that this complex of conditions can be called “the” cause. But to say such a thing says next to nothing.

Surely, however, to reach for a glass of wine typically involves the will to reach for a glass of wine. All other things being equal, then, “man can do what he wills”. But is the willing itself not subject to the will? Of course it is not subject to the same will, but it is surely subject to a different will. That I will to reach for a glass of wine may or may not conflict with other outcomes that I will. For instance, I don’t want to drink before a certain hour, say 5pm, as I might be developing a drinking habit, and I don’t want that to happen. So there is no one cause, unless we are willing to dabble in truisms, and there is no one will, unless we are willing to construct an imaginary source for all apparently conflicting wills.

Let’s now look more closely, and see whether each of these particular wills can itself be willed or not. If a desire to reach for a glass of wine can become the will to reach for a glass of wine, then something happens between the desire and the will. The will to reach for a glass of wine is not an unchanging, innate, something, but is a temporary state (like potential energy), the presence and strength of which is based on a variety of factors. If something happens, which distinguishes desire from will, then that will is subject to modification. If I am able to will this modification, then I can willingly work with what I will.

But where does the will come from that wills to work with what I will? And where does the will come from that wills to will what I will? For surely my only option isn’t merely to not act on some will of mine. I can decide, even if on a lark, to will something I have never willed before. If it is possible to “brainwash” another, and if there is no singular will within me to be found, then it is possible for one will to convert another will to its cause. I can choose anything at all to will, and I can train myself to actually will it. It may seem inevitable that I have no desire to go to the opera, but I can choose to take the various steps required to learn to appreciate opera. If I go far enough with this project, and put myself into situations where I will come into contact with opera, a genuine love of opera becomes a distinct possibility. One day, hearing Kathleen Battle singing Fauré’s Notre Amour, I may even brazenly decide that there is no other music worth listening to.

But where did this will to will what I would, and not to will what it is in my power to not will come from?

As should be clear by now, that everything is determined by all the circumstances that were necessary and sufficient to determine them, is a truism. If I can’t will that I willed to will the training required to will what I will in the future, then how do I find the will to discover and root out some “original” will? Obviously, it doesn’t matter.

Therefore, determinism and free will are fully compatible, for all practical purposes. And if it’s really for all practical purposes, then there is no need to add a qualifier at all. Determinism and free will are fully compatible. There is no contradiction.

Interesting study. We are so eminently suggestable. But wow, could you have added any more ‘wills’ to the OP…?

How is that different from this:

If a desire to beat, rape and torture a child can become the will to beat rape and torture a child, then something happens between the desire and the will.

Are they compatible?

I wrote the OP pretty quickly. I wanted to add more, but with the limited time I had, I did the best I could.

Do you mean is the latter example as true as the former? Of course.

Then he who acts on the desire and the will to beat, rape and torture a child cannot be held morally responsible for it?

I don’t understand your logic here. Why?

Do you mean is the latter example as true as the former? Of course.
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The OP says nothing about the moral or ethical constructs we may apply to that something between desire and will to act. That is a seperate issue and a different thread.

This is where the concept of ‘Will’ gets confusing because the term is used in so many ways. I usually find it useful, and pertinent, to include the concepts of ‘volition’ and ‘desire’ in these types of descriptions. I think, like Shope and some others, that all is essentially Will or some extension thereof. This means the Will is, among other things, a metaphysical base to all. At the same time, the Will is really no one thing though it may manifest in predictable ways. So, breaking the Will down into “wills” seems kind of redundant. Let’s say the Will is composed of naturally occurring ‘forces’ [energy].

As such, the Will need not be “willed”. I see sentience as a way to focus, or direct, the Will. We don’t create or choose what we Will. This is where desire seems like a pertinent distinction. A desire to reach for a glass, for instance, is an extension of the Will. Will to survive, assimilate, persist, what have you, manifests a biological necessity and conscious desire to satisfy thirst. Then comes volition, which is where we are free to do what we will, as Shope put it. An act of volition is an expression of desire as a manifestation of Will. For me, these distinctions serve to clear up confusion about “willing wills”. The only way we actively ‘will’ something is when we consciously act in service of the Will, as an extension of the Will. Otherwise, we are Will, and “willing”. What we do, or actively choose, is only “willing” insofar as the entirety of your physiology is “willing” – manifestations or expressions of the Will.

The Will to act [on some interest] is a precursor and grounds for any desire. Volition is where moral and ethical concerns come into play. Desire doesn’t create or modify the Will, just your sentiments toward its manner of expression. Habituation is more akin to refining, or otherwise indulging, a means of expression.

The ethical constructs we apply to intent, which is what I assume you’re getting at, are arguably those which are most misunderstood. In fact, part of Nietzsche’s beef with modern moralities was the focus on intention. We treat intention as an origin – as all that precedes an action. The concept is too narrow a means of description.

Why would we say that?

Is it possible to discuss ‘will’ without using the word ‘will’ over and over in the same sentence?

So as not to refer to the Will as being composed of wills. The language seems redundant to me.

That’s what I’m attempting to do.

Why not just use the dictionary definition?
will - the power of making a reasoned choice or decision or of controlling one’s own action

So ‘will’ is just about being able to make decisions.

I already explained my usage of ‘Will’. I’m saying volition is about making decisions. The Will is something more fundamental: the “power” [as you put it] which manifests as a ‘capacity’ or ‘drive’.

Statik, do you think it’s redundant to talk about causes of causes also?

Other than this simple question, I have to put off a response to your post for now. It’s meaty - I’ll get back to it when I can.

I do. However, to clarify, I don’t think the effort is redundant, only the language. I’m just trying to avoid confusion in the language we are using because the concept of ‘Will’ is taken to mean far too many things. The standard definitions, as phyllo suggested we use, are too ambiguous to be practical in discussions like these. So, for the sake of simplification, I attempted to form distinctions where the dictionary does not.

I also don’t want you to take my comments as criticism. I, of all people, know how confusing the subject can be. Shit, I’ve confused myself in discussion about the Will before. Especially with a metaphysical view of the Will, like Shope or Nietzsche, anything can be taken as “will”.

In brief, the notion of “Free Will” to me is more like “Free Volition”. We aren’t ‘willing’ the Will only when we choose – we are always ‘willing’. Volition, then, is a choice of Will. That is, an ability to consciously and actively direct your ‘willing’.

Right on. Just keep in mind that I am not necessarily disagreeing with you. I just want to clear up exactly how “will” is being used. Would you agree with a statement like this–

We are actively ‘willing’ only insofar as we are Will. In other words, being is ‘willing’. Everything else is a matter of how the Will manifests in us and how we choose to express it.[?]

There is no ‘free volition’. All our volitions are determined by our experience.

Why do people keep saying that? Experience doesn’t determine anything. Your experiences are not making choices for you. Experience is a major factor, or a means of reference, in our capacity to reason, but doesn’t altogether dictate how you act. Volition is an act of Will wherein we decide the means of expression.

We don’t control our motives, but we do direct, or choose, the nature of our acts of Will [desires]. Nearly all actions are acts of Will, so, even subconsciously, you [not your experiences] determine your actions.

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You can’t choose something you can’t do.
You can’t choose something you don’t know.
You can’t choose something you don’t believe.
You can only choose something that you have been taught, something which comes from the sum of your experiences. The choice you make is entirely dictated by the experiences. How could it be otherwise?

You’re describing experience as a grounds for a decision, not some deterministic mechanism that decides for you. The choice you make is entirely predicated by experiences, but dictated by thou. In other words, ‘reason’ is how it could be otherwise.