Arthur Schopenhauer famously stated: “Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills.” This may sound true, but let’s examine both the veracity and implications of such a statement.
I reach for a glass of wine. What is the cause of this action? Surely there is no one cause, unless we claim that whatever conditions were necessary and sufficient to cause the action, caused the action, and that this complex of conditions can be called “the” cause. But to say such a thing says next to nothing.
Surely, however, to reach for a glass of wine typically involves the will to reach for a glass of wine. All other things being equal, then, “man can do what he wills”. But is the willing itself not subject to the will? Of course it is not subject to the same will, but it is surely subject to a different will. That I will to reach for a glass of wine may or may not conflict with other outcomes that I will. For instance, I don’t want to drink before a certain hour, say 5pm, as I might be developing a drinking habit, and I don’t want that to happen. So there is no one cause, unless we are willing to dabble in truisms, and there is no one will, unless we are willing to construct an imaginary source for all apparently conflicting wills.
Let’s now look more closely, and see whether each of these particular wills can itself be willed or not. If a desire to reach for a glass of wine can become the will to reach for a glass of wine, then something happens between the desire and the will. The will to reach for a glass of wine is not an unchanging, innate, something, but is a temporary state (like potential energy), the presence and strength of which is based on a variety of factors. If something happens, which distinguishes desire from will, then that will is subject to modification. If I am able to will this modification, then I can willingly work with what I will.
But where does the will come from that wills to work with what I will? And where does the will come from that wills to will what I will? For surely my only option isn’t merely to not act on some will of mine. I can decide, even if on a lark, to will something I have never willed before. If it is possible to “brainwash” another, and if there is no singular will within me to be found, then it is possible for one will to convert another will to its cause. I can choose anything at all to will, and I can train myself to actually will it. It may seem inevitable that I have no desire to go to the opera, but I can choose to take the various steps required to learn to appreciate opera. If I go far enough with this project, and put myself into situations where I will come into contact with opera, a genuine love of opera becomes a distinct possibility. One day, hearing Kathleen Battle singing Fauré’s Notre Amour, I may even brazenly decide that there is no other music worth listening to.
But where did this will to will what I would, and not to will what it is in my power to not will come from?
As should be clear by now, that everything is determined by all the circumstances that were necessary and sufficient to determine them, is a truism. If I can’t will that I willed to will the training required to will what I will in the future, then how do I find the will to discover and root out some “original” will? Obviously, it doesn’t matter.
Therefore, determinism and free will are fully compatible, for all practical purposes. And if it’s really for all practical purposes, then there is no need to add a qualifier at all. Determinism and free will are fully compatible. There is no contradiction.