That’s not true. It is the very same pear, but it is now rotted. Something can have different properties, and still be the same as it was. If I paint a chair red after it was green, does that make it a different chair? No. It is just the same chair; now red when it was green.
No i am not assuming that. I am just trying to accept reality for what it is.
I don’t know how that’s a reply to my argument. You think that unless you are certain about something, you are mistaken about that something. But that is false. What is true is that unless you are certain about something, you may be mistaken about that something. But you also may be correct.
Yes. That is what Kant said. And, for all I know, he may be right. But that is irrelevant. It is Descartes argument that is under discussion. He thinks that I exist follows from I think. That is true. But, then, I exist follows from I walk too. So, I think is no more unique than is I walk.
to reiterate in case you missed out on that part
In what sense could it even remotely be the same except in our conception? The water has revolved, the banks have accumulated sediment or eroded. All of these names and relationships serve to reinforce the concept that we can capture reality, and we can to an extent, but the Mississippi exists independently of our conception of it. Show me the part of the “physical geographical entity” that is the same, hold it out in your hand.
Here is my Yes:
- Yes, Ego sum follows from Ego ambulo, but only if the transcendental apperception Ego cogito appended. Otherwise you will not be aware of who is actually walking. No one can infer one’s existence from the fact of one’s simple walking. The cat is also walking, but is the cat aware of its existence?
BTW, I don’t see any difference between D’s Cogito and K’s Ich denke. The latter is a German translation of the former.
It is one and the same river (not conception of the river) , which persists through change. A thing can, and is the same thing, although it may have different properties. One and the same thing, say a chair, can be green at time t1, then painted red, at time t2 and can be the very same chair of which it is true that it had the property of being green at t1 and red at t2. And, in fact, that is how we talk and we think.
[quote=“Imago”]
Here is my Yes:
- Yes, Ego sum follows from Ego ambulo, but only if the transcendental apperception Ego cogito appended. Otherwise you will not be aware of who is actually walking. No one can infer one’s existence from the fact of one’s simple walking. The cat is also walking, but is the cat aware of its existence?
Why must I, or the cat, or, indeed, a chair, be aware of its existence in order to exist? Surely, when I am asleep, or in a coma, I exist, but am not aware of anything, and therefore, I am not aware of my existence. The Cogito argues that if something is aware of its existence, it exists, (Just as if something walks then it exists) No one can be either aware of something, nor walk, unless it exists, for there would then be nothing to be aware of anything, not to walk. But Descartes did not argue the converse which is that if I exist, then I am aware. Existence is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of awareness. And awareness is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition of existence. That distinction is important and true. (Later, in the First Meditation, Descartes goes on to argue that he, who exists, is necessarily a thinking or a conscious being. But that is not the Cogito argument, but the next one. And that, as I said, comes later.)
My point about Kant is that although what he says about the trancendental apperception of the ego may be true, I do not know, that was not Descartes’ cogito argument, although I agree that “Je pense,” “Cogito,” and “Ich denke” all mean the same thing.So, if we are discussing Descartes’ cogito argument, I think we ought to stick to what he said.
You’re not following the argument. This comes directly from the questions that Descartes asked.
Let us say we have chair X and it is currently red. Tomorrow you walk into the room and there is a chair that is green, but otherwise looks the same. You could say, “Oh, someone painted the chair.” But you could also say, “Oh, someone replaced the other chair.”
Both would be logical statements. Chairs are mass produced, so there’s no reason that someone couldn’t have taken the chair you knew, and then someone upon realizing they were one chair short, replaced it with the green one.
The point here is that you wouldn’t “know” that it’s the same object.
Let us take the pear from 3 weeks later and put it beside the fresh pear of today. Someone who walks into the room and looks at them will in no way believe that those two are the same pear. You’ll never be able to convince them that they are the same pear. And why?
Because they’re not. Everything we use to identify the pears or at least, many of those properties, have changed. We cannot identify something without using its characteristics. That’s how we talk, and that’s how we think as well.
But let us use something more complex, and more notable. You teleport magically ten years into the future. Let us say, right now you’re married with a new child. Ten years from now you’ve been married for ten more years, maybe you’re divorced. You’ve watched your child grow and mature, maybe have a second or even third child (planned or not). Your friendships have changed, maybe you’ve developed some new ones, maybe lost others. Your job has changed in at least some ways, maybe you’ve been promoted or gone somewhere else.
Notice, in many of the ways you identify “self” you have changed. Maybe even some of your values and thoughts on life and or the world at large have changed. Someone may see you after years of absence and say, “Wow, John, you’ve really changed.” Or even, “You’re not the same guy anymore.”
And you know what? They’re right again.
You’re arguing for some sort of “essence” I assume. But that isn’t something we can prove in any verifiable way. The things we note which make an object “that” object, are all things derived from observation. Sure, John is still John in the sense of possesing the same DNA, many of the same physical properties and having had all the experiences etc., that were present up until point X. But now we’re at point Y, and there have been changes, some of which may be remarkable.
He is not the same person. Or at least, he is not “wholly” the same person. And therefore John Y is not equal to John X. Just as the Fresh Pear is not equal to the Rotten Pear. One is simply more complex than the other (John is more complex than the pear).
And notice, just as the chair statement, we can very easily be wrong about these assumptions. Which is why it ties back to Descartes. He walks out of the room. And then walks back in just moments later and sees that nothing has changed. But he’s secrecly been teleported onto a spacship where the aliens have duplicated his room down to the most minute detail. Is it the same room? No. But he may never realize that.
This is the problem we’re dealing with. We have to assume the continuity of the pear and John has remained constant. But even assuming that, they’re not interchangeable with their selves after X period of time. Too much has changed to say that.
It’s simply quite empirically evident that the “I” of now is not the “I” of the eight year old I was previously. Even though we may say, “Oh, look at how cute Chris was” or some such thing. That’s not the Chris of now. Nor shall it ever be again.
Make more sense?
We have no way of denoting some “unchanging essence” of a thing. And thus, it’s pointless to discuss it. But we do notice variations, changes, developmets, decay, etc. And it’s only practical and logical to take these things into consideration. Especially when they’re the very characteristics we use to identify something in the first place.
Your statement just doesn’t hold up empirically.
Because what we discuss here is the INFERENCE Cogito ergo sum. A cat, or a chair does not infer. For us, the philosophical problem in this case is: have we the right to infer the existence of the cat from the fact of its miauing? Is that a kind of apodictic inference?
Cogito ergo sum is not about existence of the Self, it is much more about the way we come to the axiomatic foundations of our knowledge. That’s why Descartes, Kant, and Husserl are all in one and the same line of cogitating, they all are Cartesian Cogitans, while Gassendi with his walking definition is in the best case empirical positivist.
Now let’s see. I don’t like the color green, so when someone gives me the gift of a green chair, I take it to a man I know who does good work, and ask him to paint the chair red. I return in a few days, and there it is, my chair, but now it is red. The man asks for his money, and I tell him that the chair is no longer my chair, since it is not one and the same chair I gave to him to paint.
And that’s how we talk and think? And my view does not hold up empirically? And if the man took me to small claims court, the judge would agree with ME? You can’t be serious.
The issue, is not whether I know that the chair is the same chair. The issue is whether it is the same chair, whether I know it is or not. How I know, and whether I know that X and Y are one and the same thing, is one issue; but whether X and Y are one and the same thing is a different issue.
By the way, there is no difference in the properties of that chair. One and the same chair has the property of [being green at time T1, and being red at time T2] So there is the property of being one color at one time, and another color at a later time, and the chair has that property. Otherwise, you would have to say that the chair is not the same chair because I saw it at one time, and then, I saw it at a later time. If changing the color makes the chair a different chair, then why doesn’t my seeing it at one time and then seeing it at a later time, make it a different chair even if it remained the same color. So that each time you walk into a room your funiture changes. Does that seem right too?
This discussion seems close to the idea of universals in that the question becomes how does the idea of ‘chairness’ carry over from one moment in time to the next for the same chair (Usually the universal discussion takes the form of how does the idea of ‘chairness’ carry over from one chair to another chair). So it seems like the same discussion only as related to time, not space.
Not close. In fact, not even far. The question is why on earth should existence imply awareness? No reason that I can see. Only the confusion between: awareness implies existence, and existence implies awareness. The first is true, the second is false. No discussion. Only confusion.
I may be digressing away from the gist of the conversation. My ‘universal’ thoughts were more relevant about 9 threads ago and not even germane to the the thread at hand. I’m sorry.
I personally can not see how existence can imply awareness, but the converse is certainly true.
You are certainly right. Existence does not imply awareness. Why did you think that anyone said it did?
That is precisely the point. The point is can we “know”, geuinely, honestly, “know”.
And if you start with a different direction in your argument, then we’re no longer even on the same topic.
Descartes was telling us that we can’t know. Bertrand turns around and says we have good reason to believe. So we can believe it’s the same chair that you had painted, but we can’t “know” it’s the same chair. Nor can we even know the chair exist in the first place.
But you don’t know if it is or isn’t, you have only reason to believe it is. That’s the point.
You made that a little hard to read through. But I’ll reply in what I think is the spirit of your new topic.
There is a difference in the properties of the chair. If I look at the chair and describe it to you, you understand what I’m talking about. However, the light you’re seeing is different from the light I’m seeing, and our senses of touch are different, so the sight and texture (etc., all) will be different for both. But enough that we can communicate effectively about the chair.
This is how we define things. We attribute certain properties to a chair of any kind. But when I think of a chair, I may not be thinking of the same chair as you. But we still have some “general” consensus of what it is “to be a chair.”
But that isn’t what we’re specifically talking about here. We’re talking about a particular chair. As such, we must define this object as itself, in whatever ways we can possibly do so. Color would be one factor. As such, it is a property, and a property used in defining the chair.
Just as we use “peach” as both a color and fruit. We would say a peach is the color of a peach. That is a characteristic of its “peachness.”
However, that could change, especially if it’s rotting.
So essentially, we have a hierarchy of how we define objects. If the peach is still “peach enough” we will refer to it as “a peach.” If it is now made into jam, we call it peach jam but it’s not a peach.
Notice, it would still have the same matter, but be in a different form. So the question to you is: if i turn your chair into sawdust, is it still the same chair?
It’s obviously not a chair. So it can’t be any type of chair. But it’s the same material, just in a different form.
Since color applies to form (at least moderately) it must be a characteristic of form and we find form important.
But let us take this to something more complex, which may make it actually easier to understand.
Take the previously mentioned person John. Ten years from now he’s somewhat the same person, and somewhat not.
We could the define two Johns. John N (now) and John +10. They’re both John (obviously) but a different “type” of John. They have different characteristics and properties. The two Johns are not interchangeable. Thus John N and John +10 are not equal to each other, but instead relative to each other.
If you brought in the red chair to the old lady who owns it, and said here’s your chair, she might say, “No, honey. My chair was green, this one is red.” And then when you inform her that you had it painted, she may well throw a tantrum. Thus proving my point. Though it’s the same object (mostly) it has changed. And in this instance, to the point of being hugely unequal (thus the tantrum).
If someone vandalizes your car, you’ll complain to the judge, on the grounds that someone wrecked your car. The judge will concur with you. But you’re putting this is the wrong context. I was dealing with knowledge (as we were previously) and you’re dealing with “facts” in a setting of law. Facts are merely reasonable assumptions based on observation.
Note, this means that they’re empirical. And nothing empirical gives knowledge.
I never said we don’t have “reasonable belief” to state that the chair is the same and can go with that. But we certainly don’t know.
And more to your point, I believe.
A=A but A1 is not equal to A and A2 is equal to neither. Thus, if we say A = Chair G and A1 = Chair R and A2 = Chair B (broken) we cannot say that they’re all “exactly” the same chair. They’re simply not.
Think of how we define things. Think of how we categorize them. We have debate as to whether a fetus can be considered a human being. Why? Because a fetus doesn’t necessarily have all the characteristics we use to define a human being. If we say it’s DNA, then I could say that a corpse is also human, and thus should have all the rights pertaining to it. Or that since chimps have 99% of our DNA, that they should have all the rights we have, minus 1%.
Do you see how tricky this becomes?
Thus, you’re looking for an absolute way of defining “Chair X is Chair X and shall always be Chair X.” This just doesn’t happen.
We are limited in our ability to define any “thing”, since a “thing” will invariably change, and thus the characteristics we use to define it can change to a point at which we will no longer classify it as that which we previously considered it to be.
That’s the point. Empirically we can say that it’s still your chair, but it is not the same chair, in that it is not “exactly” the same chair. It still has many properties of your previous chair. But what of when we change it to such a degree as we can no longer define it as a chair? Of course, you could say it’s based on the matter, but if I turn it to ash, and replace that ash with different ash, would you even have “reasonable belief” to state that X ash it not Y ash? Not really.
Empirically we lack knowledge, and only have reasonable belief. Thus, we must utilize our limited observational skills as best we can. We can only identify things via characteristics. And characteristics change, thus the object defined changes into a new definition, identified by the new characteristics.
Even if it’s only so far as saying, “My green chair is now my red chair.” Enough properties are there for you to still claim ownership. We can say it is “essentially” the same chair. But if you’re defining it by matter, we have much the same problem we have with the DNA issue. Is it still a chair when it’s ash? If I make it into a bird feeder? If it decays and becomes part of the grass, is it still your chair now? Is it a chair at all?
I don’t think you were taking the discussion to the full conclusion.
And I apologize to everyone for this tangent. I know this isn’t what we started with, but since it’s here, I guess we can deal with it here.
PS- And your furniture does change, only not enough that you recognize it. The furniture you’ve owned for 20 years is not the same exact furniture you had when you first bought it. If were, you’d never buy new furniture.
Descartes never intended to say “I exist BECAUSE I think” that’s why there is no need to substantiate the existence of anything with the fact of that “anything’s” thinking. Quite on the contrary, I think because I exist, and this ontological dependence makes good for the Cogito ergo sum, I think, HENCE I exist.
The invariable concomitance of the probandum and the probans in a syllogism has not to be interpreted as a generative causal relation.
It is riduculous to maintain that I exist because I walk. This can be true only of some peripatetic close to full physical and mental exhaustion. It is all the more ridiculous ta say, I walk because I exist. Or I smile because I exist. Take for example the smile of the Cheshire cat…
Quote:
“If one reduces the proposition to “There is thinking, therefore there are thoughts”, one has produced a mere tautology: and precisely that which is in question, the “reality of thought”, is not touched upon – that that is, in this form, the “apparent reality” of thought cannot be denied. But what Descartes desired was that thought should have, not an apparent reality, but a reality in itself”
Nietzsche, quoted by Marshal McDaniel.
The point is that for Descartes the “apparent reality” becomes the most substantial reality, the reality in itself. I do not know, who am I outside my perceptions, my dreams. But if I perceive myself as something, I become that something in my thought. And this is the reality I cannot deny.
[/b][/i]
[quote=“Somov”]
Quote:
“If one reduces the proposition to “There is thinking, therefore there are thoughts”, one has produced a mere tautology: and precisely that which is in question, the “reality of thought”, is not touched upon – that that is, in this form, the “apparent reality” of thought cannot be denied. But what Descartes desired was that thought should have, not an apparent reality, but a reality in itself”
Nietzsche, quoted by Marshal McDaniel.
The point is that for Descartes the “apparent reality” becomes the most substantial reality, the reality in itself. I do not know, who am I outside my perceptions, my dreams. But if I perceive myself as something, I become that something in my thought. And this is the reality I cannot deny.
_____________________________________________-
The term “apparent reality” is no more the name of a kind of reality, as N. seems to think, than is “an apparent heart attack” the name of a kind of heart attack.
A typlcal N. confusion of which there are so many.
Kennethamy wrote:
“The term “apparent reality” is no more the name of a kind of reality, as N. seems to think, than is “an apparent heart attack” the name of a kind of heart attack. A typical N. confusion of which there are so many.”
I think the analogy between the expressions “apparent reality” and “apparent heart attack” is groundless and has no relevance to the subject of current discussion. I am not sure what you mean by “apparent heart attack”, but the meaning of words “apparent reality” can be easily explained.
For example, one thinks that he (or she) is a good-natured person. This may or may not correspond to what other people think about him. And the opinions of other people may also not be the same – in fact, opinions on such matters differ a lot.
Now, if we try to find out, whether he REALLY is good–natured, this will inevitably turn out to be a waste of time. He may seem good to some people, bad to others, but it is all a matter of subjective criteria and differing personal experiences, a matter of opinions and appearances, and there is no reason to search for the “truth” or “reality in itself” in this case.
Now – if someone says: “I am a good–natured person” – does this statement correspond to some kind of reality? Yes, it does. It corresponds to the reality of his own perceptions, and there is no question here about the “reality in itself”.
So, what Descartes is essentially trying to say can be expressed in the following way: we can always doubt our opinions about the “reality as such”. What we cannot doubt, however – is the reality of our perceptions.