hmmm, that’s an interesting way to put it. i see what your getting at, i think.
let me look more closely at this:
okay, not to detract from what was said in the first quote - i don’t think the two quotes are working together like you think - let me suggest that we’re using the concept ‘experience’ in an inappropriate way. if we were to simplify your argument and just say that all that exists is ‘information’, we’d not need to qualify that proof with the fact that information can be experienced. most eliminative materialists call the notion of ‘qualia’ nonsensical; that ‘experience’ does not add an additional substance to existence and does not change the nature of the substance that does exist (in the form of information). so really the relationship we’re talking about between things that ‘have affectance’ (james) is one of physical interaction, not ‘experience’. that is to say, we add nothing to the interaction between things when we call such interaction ‘experience’… as ‘experience’ isn’t in space/time like the information and its various activities. so to say that something doesn’t exist until/unless it is experienced is to say that it has no physical reality until/unless the property of ‘qualia’ is added to the nature of its activity as information. of course, the physical interaction between humans and particles and anything else that exists can be explained in terms of movement (radiation), but we need not call a particular causal interaction between entities an ‘experience’.
another disputation to that argument is that we are anthropomophizing (pathetic fallacy) the concept of ‘experience’ by using it to describe behaviors of things that dont share our language, and therefore can’t confirm they can experience. it’s then only through a rather shaky analogy that we change the usual meaning of the word ‘experience’ and say that an electron is ‘experiencing’ its relationship to a nucleus in the same way joe experiences a conversation with bob. but again, if we reduce the meaning of ‘experience’ down to simply ‘physically interacting’, then all the information in the universe exists regardless of whether or not the qualia of it can be produced in experience.
so by ‘objective’ we can only mean the state of things with the exemption of experience as a qualifier. using the concept of ‘experience’ in the way you use it first divides this information into two ontologically distinct substances - one of the physical and the other is the immaterial ‘qualia’ (the perception) that is produced when a particular kind of interaction we call ‘experience’ exists between entities… and then it substantiates the existence of one with the other.
but the first quote i can get down with. if we hypothesize everything that exists as set x, there is nothing set x can be relative to, nothing it can be affected by, nothing that’s outside of it. it wouldn’t be interacting with anything. but to say it can’t exist unless it is interacting with or affecting something, doesn’t seem to follow. we simply have a kind of parmenidian block of substance that can’t not exist. our definition of ‘objective’ in this case would only mean; the necessity to exist without any qualification. it’s the properties of this existing block that gives rise to inquires about ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ kinds of knowledge about it… but it doesn’t rely on its properties being ‘known’ to continue having to exist.