"Inside" Experience

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
21

=D>

I do concur that Sil has chosen a heavy term to build an ontology out of. Im not convinced by his argument, as clever as it is. Its not that he is being clumsy about it.

Sil has skills. But … the term experience simply isn’t enough to account for the existence of experience. In the end its as simple as that. Language isn’t enough, as I have also told Faust, who also wouldn’t respond to the challenge, to account for the existence of language.

I see all that taking words at face value as French philosophy. Im a Nietzschean.

22

I guess a better question would be: why do they come into experience (atoms)?

Also, it is certainly not sollipsist to say that “atoms” are an imaginary fiction for a set of experiences. They aren’t “real” in the same sense as the Sun’s heat or the hardness of concrete. They are interpretations.

But that aside. That thing atoms are names of.

23

It’s an interesting question to consider exactly how discrete experience is initially arrived at from the starting point of Continuous Experience.

At the point of Continuous Experience, our singular basis of unity does not allow for a mechanism, as mechanisms require a plurality of components to interact with one another.

The only conclusion therefore, given Continuous Experience as a starting point, is that there is no valid mechanism to explain the transition from Continuous Experience to discrete experiences. Either that, or reject outright the notion of a singular basis of unity from which to found an ontology - to leave only the possibility for baseless and/or circular “chicken or the egg” epistemologies to follow from using either no foundation or plural foundations respectively. Perhaps a plural set of bases that you unite into one to avoid circularity? - yet this is just singularity in disguise as plurality.

So we are left with the irking consequence that Ontology precedes Epistemology, in order for either to “exist” in the first place, meaning that Ontology is pre-knowledge - and directly immediate and unavoidable rather than allowing anything “about” it to be meaningfully known via any mechanism or relation to a separate subject. Asserting instead the “subject” as this primary unity or ultimate foundation would be Solipsism. Experience is pre-subject, just like self-consciousness is learned later in life. As such, all existence/experience goes beyond the individuality commonly associated with Solipsism. Technically the derivation of Solipsism as “alone by itself” doesn’t necessitate the emotional pathology of loneliness as “alone” is simply a contraction of “all one”, which is of course what Continuous Experience is. So it’s far broader than what most people think of when they think of Solipsism as it doesn’t rule out “other people” - experience covers all existence with everyone in it (as they can subsequently be thought of post-Continuous Experience in terms of discrete experiences).

Hopefully this gets to the bottom of the proposed objections.

As for language, maybe I’m missing the point behind the mention of it, but given that knowledge is the means to connect plural concepts, language is just arbitrarily associated discrete experiences - symbols and sounds being more portable stand-ins for otherwise less portable discrete experiences. I complimented your mention of “The I is thus always an activity” on the other thread - this actually sums up that unity of subject with predicate that I’m arguing in favour of: as a fundamental starting point. It’s perhaps interesting to consider that older languages like Latin don’t separate the subject from the predicate into different words. You had a lot to say about Descartes’ cogito, which of course he wrote in Latin in full as “Cogito ergo sum” as you will already know. As you are not English you will probably appreciate how it’s easier to think certain things in one language more than another because one language is better designed around different values than the other, having evolved more around them in its whole formulation than the other. No doubt it was simply tradition to write in Latin or ancient Greek because all the original philosophy was read in those languages, but I think it’s worth considering the possibility that thinking in Latin is more compatible with “the I as always an activity”. “Cogito” and “sum” similarly tend back to this unity of subject and predicate where I’m suggesting everything starts off.

24

I just don’t see where the unity (as in " “all one”, which is of course what Continuous Experience is") comes in. why? why is it even posited?

25

I think that is correct, simply the pre cognitive and post cognative(simulated), do evolve, where any formal modality between them breaks down into relative sets of various commesured, synchronous ones producing epochs which may or may not resemble each other , to form a cohesive link that can be optically or otherwise understood.

That is a mechanical way to structure different matrix arrangements into sets of variability, stretched from the set absence of minimal bits to the absolute maximum, up to the self inclusive set.

The matrix never contain contagious bits, as You point to that problem lhaving been relatively disposed from since cogito ergo sum, ( I think therefore I am)and reduced to esse eat percipii. (To exist is to perceive)
Note, the change of perception in the plural, from the singular of thinking)

That predicated a conformation of the ontological subjective predicate, as by an implication, and rightly of French, and not Viennese/German sourced.

The French are 1/German dialectically reverse morphology, who h is a qualitative inversion, reversal.

The languages are morphed from the French but the qualitative reversal, does not equivocate into an inverse pure dialectical relationship.

No wonder the early existentialist sided with Marx/Engels material dialectics, and their failure reinvented and reversed again that failure.

The Satlinist revision was another attempt, separating Mao, whose Chinese mind could not fathom revision, as underlying method, since they were not yet into empire building as the Soviets were at that time.

26

This will have only been partly covered in this thread so far - Jakob has already been familiar with my philosophy for a while now, so some of it has probably been skipped.

The logic is that there are no gaps of nothingness to separate “different things”, and any gaps of somethingness to separate “different things” will themselves have no gaps of nothingness between them and the things they separate either etc. So with the impossibility of gaps in experience, it must therefore be fundamentally continuous.

Seeing experiences as discrete is therefore fundamentally an error, which makes it even more interesting that it’s so useful to do so. You can’t formulate knowledge without dissecting the fundamental continuity of experience because knowledge is meaning, and a means requires a start separate from an end. One thing “meaning itself”, tautologically, doesn’t mean anything - meaning and definitions have to be in terms of something else. Hence the necessity of plural discrete experiences to Epistemology, even though Ontology necessitates singular Continuous Experience as I explained just before.

This is only further corroborated by other things I’ve been saying so far on this thread. For example, plural fundamental bases either create a “chicken or the egg” circularity or no fundamental basis to know anything at all like with Postmodernism. The utility of models of discrete experiences is in how well they are conceptually reconnected back together to match Continuous Experience - that’s how you know and test anything epistemically. The sum of the parts is never quite the same as the “gestalt”, so there’s an inevitable gap between useful knowledge and truth, making utility relatively “true to” absolute Truth. The world is never more than one way at any one time, and it’s this singular ontological standard that’s required to evaluate any plural number of epistemologies. And no matter what you try to do away with, to arrive at what this sole unity is, you’ll be confronted by experience as the concrete form of existence in the abstract. And without experience as existence, you have nothing at all. That’s how you know it’s experience that’s continuous at the foundation of all ontology. It’s all the many things you can do with this foundation, dissecting it and reconstructing it to better approximate this single foundation, that is the challenge of epistemology.

The fundamental “error” of discrete experiencing makes sense though, because knowledge is useful insofar as it differs from “what is”, or is becoming. Continuous Experience is naturally continuously emerging unto itself, and so to predict and control this, you need grounds to determine how it’s going to be before it gets there. Knowledge is prediction and control, and that’s power.

27

Ok, you say why not a bunch of things, but you still have not said why one thing. Where does that come in?

28

“Why Anchorage?”

“Because not Wisconsin.”

“Wait what?”

29

Silhouette said,

“The logic is that there are no gaps of nothingness to separate “different things”, and any gaps of somethingness to separate “different things” will themselves have no gaps of nothingness between them and the things they separate either etc. So with the impossibility of gaps in experience, it must therefore be fundamentally continuous.”

The foundation of any proposition establishes the same objective model , as any possible revision may appear to indicate. As memory or recall is the only problem, it is a simulation that a similarity can be understood to sustain a probable equanimity.

It does not matter if the spaces between exist or not, by the same token as lack of memory blocks the reductibility beyond transgressing against a naturally fallacious predicament.

The mind is not the thing, it is it’s functional containment , and recall or the lack of it, sets a revision into motion.
Revision always conduits an encapsulation of an appearance, as in the creation of the illusion of motion from being still.
The difference in a grand allusion lays in momentus, primary startup, of elements that appeared in indifferent state, as a whole general, and suddenly that wholeness is compromised and broken up.
The reductive process of the whole, or many wholes is anti productive, weather or not it befits a normative objective value.
The breakup necessitates a simulated object, as a synthetic a priori object established unresolved a posteriori missing elements even in projections that clearly identified generally excluded elements that would not appear to fit into the post modern big picture.

The argument you put forward does not recognize the basic faults with Russell and Ayer, of the problem with the data consisting of sense, the very anti thesis of what the relation between sense as an object is.
The fallacy of this sustains the illusion since Descartes that thinking is not included with the act of thought, since ‘thought’ is connected to a thing thought about.
ONE can not break this sequence, without disassociating many elemental associations, therefore blocking by emotions that bar for some minds the very illusion they want to , need to sustain.
This becomes a habit, and the problem with synthesizing is that even of material overcomes.the ideal sense of union as definitive of that game,
the habitual functions which sustain such an idea remain unresolved.

Therefore some say why argue about languages?
The only solution is the way AI can resolve the issue without becoming belligerent by way of desperation
and resort to violent control.

The flow consisting of still parts, is reductive, for parts have parts, etc.

Such reductions terminate at epochs, or at times when a review becomes objectively non sensible, and it is getting to the point where the revision validates a revocation, by merely heresy.

©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©

Communism failes.eidectically by the 60’ s and phenomenally it was revised by the 50’ s. The non sense of the nothingness of material synthesis failed, because this long adherence.to the cogito as a.zero sum, as people here tend to talk about it, and thus the derivitive of languages (Nietzche) and of games surrounding them (Wittgenstein) squaring with a reduced sense of meaning, syntax, structure- appearing an inadequate equivocation with the prior understand ing.

Some fractures remain internal, some external, but they are always relational on some level of gestalt, and the languages burden simulation, as You may admit, alongside of Peace girl, and others.

30

Because, like I said, no fundamental gaps/separation = fundamental unity.

How is that not answering your question?

Let me know what part of this answer is confusing you, and I can attempt to make it clearer.

31

Why do you say that “consciousness is self-observing”. That doesn’t seem right to me, else “self-consciousness” would be a redundant term yet it has an unique and explicit meaning. A person can be “conscious of the weather”, no? Or “class conscious”, “politically conscious”, “gender conscious” and so on.

32

no fundamental gaps/separation…

ok… with you so far…

= fundamental unity.

I don’t get it.

33

You’ve piqued my interest.

What is it about things not being separated that makes you doubt that they’re unseparated/together?

34

I just don’t see the link between “no gaps” and “unity.”

35

Uninvitingly there lays the fallacy behind an illusive sustenance of an inviting naturalism.

{Topicality may be analogous, as in the relatively early study into Moebius effects,}

wARNING: TOPICALITY may deranged intuition into narcissistic disorder.Use limited to 18 years or older by statute.

36

Experience is any form of existence and also the totality of existence - indeed experience and existence in either context mean exactly the same
You can separate or isolate an individual experience from everything else but everything that it is separated from is also an experience as well
The spaces in between these words are just as much experience as the words themselves even if those spaces are truly empty [ they are not ]

All perception or consciousness is experience but not all experience however is perception or consciousness
An object with no self awareness is experience but that is not the same as the self awareness of an organism

So there are two fundamentals to experience : existence and awareness of existence

These divisions are in reality however entirely arbitrary because reality itself is one and has no such divisions
They only exist within minds that seek to compartmentalise and divide reality up into manageable quantities
Although these minds are themselves a part of reality that are merely peripheral while reality itself is eternal
Minds are experience and their awareness of experience is experience as also is their awareness of their own mortality

There is no inside or outside of experience because experience is eternal and infinite and absolute and exists everywhere for all of time

37

Same answer as previous to time travel

Why? -some measure of a unified field.

38

Silhouette, from this very interesting probe, for me your most interesting post since the one where you announced your theory on H, I conclude that what Experientialism really expresses is that experience is the only thing we can directly approach. It is not so much about what is, as it is about being. “What is” is always discrete, “being” isn’t necessarily.

I like that you straight out admit that you have no answer to my question but don’t worry about this, it speaks to consistency. I also agree with where you take the uncertainty, into an analysis of grammar. Yes, Latin grammar is often indeed rather contingently amounting in a subject than that it builds on the premise of one.

I still have iron arguments for the technical requirement of the subject but I can agree to suspend their implementation, and investigate what is possible to conceive without one.

39

“No fundamental gaps” doesn’t preclude some kind of contingent gaps, just as “no fundamental unity” doesn’t preclude contingent unities.

40

I do believe I am slightly too apprehensive to draw conclusions where you do.

all I know about existence is that it has to be existent, that it cant not exist when it does exist.

Precisely because all I can know comes from experience and the act of defining is experience, I can have no certainty that it is also the case that existence is sufficiently defined as experience.

The existence of which I am certain is my experience - which is the distinct experience of an I, which is sometimes coupled with the I sharing an experience with what appears to be another I. This is all I am truly certain of. I am certain of it because it is my perfectly consistent experience, Ive never experienced anything else.

So annoyingly perhaps, I would only agree with Experientialism as criterion for epistemological method, but consider it too “bold”; too determinate to speak to the whole of ontology.

Regardless, Im interested in the approach.