Determinism-Free Will as Duck-Rabbit

I don’t know if you’ve picked this up yet, anon, but he’s not using the same definition of free will as you.

Haha, yeah. My point is that his definition of free will is no different than his definition of determinism. Tricky, but completely uninteresting.

no, it’s not “no different” – lol sorry for the weird double negative – in fact it is different, and they have nothing to do with each other. his definition of free will has 0 to do with determinism. they’re about as related concepts as pornography and euclidian space. that’s why they’re not incompatible – because they’re unrelated.

Maybe I missed that. Can you point it out for me? I’m probably skimming a bit…

This definition is unrelated to determinism.

Hmm, ok. I see your point. Yes, this is unrelated to the philosophical problem.

Anyway, I think the determinism-free will problem is a conceptual one. Compatibilists (me among them) rely on their intuition to guide their philosophy. The incompatibility problem exposes a deeper issue with the underlying concepts. So we go about our life as if both are somehow true at the same time, while keeping our eyes and ears open as to what the problem could be with how we conceive of such things. That’s my basic view of this.

Not really… plenty of compatibilists argue what I have.

I realize that. I think plenty of “compatibilists” are, in fact, determinists.

hit the nail on the head.

They have to be, as well as, uh… “free willists” :slight_smile:

plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/
"Compatibilism offers a solution to the free will problem. This philosophical problem concerns a disputed incompatibility between free will and determinism. Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed in terms of a compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.

  1. Terminology and One Formulation of the Free Will Problem
    1.1 Free Will

It would be misleading to specify a strict definition of free will since in the philosophical work devoted to this notion there is probably no single concept of it. For the most part, what philosophers working on this issue have been hunting for, maybe not exclusively, but centrally, is a feature of agency that is necessary for persons to be morally responsible for their conduct.[1] Different attempts to articulate the conditions for moral responsibility will yield different accounts of the sort of agency required to satisfy those conditions. What is needed, then, as a starting point, is a gentle, malleable notion that focuses upon special features of persons as agents. Hence, as a theory-neutral point of departure, free will can be defined as the unique ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in the fullest manner necessary for moral responsibility.[2] Clearly, this definition is too lean when taken as an endpoint; the hard philosophical work is about how best to develop this special kind of control. But however this notion of control is developed, its uniqueness consists, at least in part, in being possessed only by persons."

However I prefer Merriam webster’s definition… its a little broad than most definitions but it does recognize the debate that determinists think free will is negated by determinism yet doesn’t concede that it is.

You can’t solve a problem* by changing the definitions. The free will problem ISN’T a problem with your definition. There is no problem.

Exactly. And it doesn’t matter how many philosophers use this tactic.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predeterminism

I say you can’t create a problem by changing definitions. There was no problem to begin with.

The problem wasn’t created by changing definitions lol. The problem was created by the definitions themselves. Words are empty vessels, you see; the problem wasn’t with the WORD free will, you must understand this, it was with a particular definition of the word, and not the one that you’re using.

Of course a problem was created. There would be no reason to utilize a definition that negated the concept when it originally was valid, regardless of it being vague.

You seem to not be okay with the idea that some words have multiple definitions. Here is a link that should make you more okay with it: rinkworks.com/words/contronyms.shtml

I am fine with multiple definitions, however I am not fine with a definition that negates itself (not as with multiple senses, but in the very same sense) and is used exclusively by many as if another definition that makes sense actually exists.

Your link on contranyms is interesting. Thanks. However, the incompatibilist definition of free will is not a contronym.

the definitions aren’t contranyms bud, the word itself is. also, you’re right, free will isn’t a contranym. just giving you examples of words with multiple definitions. also, your post doesn’t make sense. “I am fine with multiple definitions, however I am not fine with a definition that negates itself (not as with multiple senses, but in the very same sense) and is used exclusively by many as if another definition that makes sense actually exists.” #-o

Are you saying “Free” and “will” is negating? I don’t know what you mean. Anyways I don’t like Ayn Rand but I do give her credit with this idea:

“Anti-Concepts”

An anti-concept is an unnecessary and rationally unusable term designed to replace and obliterate some legitimate concept.

Although where she goes with Anti-Concepts is paranoid conspiracy theorist territory, I do like the above;